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CHAPTER I 
A NEW DIPLOMACY 
Diplomatio questions intrigued the soholars of oivilizations long 
sinoe passed awaY'; and though the quality of soholarship maY' hav~ suffered 
with the passing years the intrigue of diplomaoy remains untarnished. The 
diplomaoy of Woodrow Wilson as it touohed the foreign polioy of Great 
Bri tain was doomed to reach the lives of every man and WODaD in the Uni ted 
states and ohange them. for weal or woe. A study of a subjeot so far reaoh-
ing, so pregnant in its possibilities, so olearly related to the happiness 
of a great nation must neoessarilY' be approaohed with doubt and apprehamsion. 
The dawn of the "New Freedom" as announoed by demooraoy ill 1912 faoed 
a problem in diplomaoy. The imperialism of the olosing Nineteenth Century 
was to be superseded by a new polioy. The fashioning and stating of that 
polioy was left to Woodraw Wilson. :i>l1ring the politioal campaign of 1912, 
Wilson had made no direct statement on a foreign polioy. His interest was 
given entirely to domestio questions with a few remarks on the purpose of 
America in conneotion with the Philippines and exemption of tolls on United 
1 States coastwise shipping. 
A study of the publio utteranoes and written statements of Woodrow 
Wilson soon sho~a definite toreign polioy emerging. This foreign polioy 
appeared as a result of his oonoept ot demooratio prinoiples applied to 
politioal and tinanoial operations of governments or oitizens, as outlined 
1 Edgar E. Robinson and Viotor J. West, The Foreir Policy ot Woodrow Wilson, 
1913-1917. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1917,. ' 
2 
.' and defined in the oonstitution. The formulation of this polioy 11'8.8 one 
task; the interpretation of the polioy to the Amerioan people was another. 
Mr. Wilson aooepted the task and it is probably not unjust to state that in 
expounding the prinoiples of an American foreign polioy to the Ameriou. 
people he made his greatest historioal oontribution. 2 
Two diplomatio problems, eaoh calling for the formulation of new 
diplomatic rules along Wilsonian lines, awa! ted Wilson on Maroh 4, 1913. 
One 1I'8.S the Mexioan question and the other the sanotity of treaties. On 
Maroh 11, 1913, Wilson deolared that the ohief objeot of his administration 
would be to CUltivate a friendship with the republios of Latin Amerioa. He 
hoped to deserve their oontidenoe and was anxious to oooperate with them. 
However it seemed that oooperation was possible only when supported at 
every turn by the orderly prooesses of just government whioh was based upon 
law, not upon arbitrary or irregular foroe. 3 In another statement in the 
same speeoh he told his hearers that he was ooncerned with the trade 
relations of the Latin countries but only as they redounded to the benefit 
of all, not to oertain special groups or interests. The first pronouncement 
outlined his Mexican polioy, while the second stated his demooratio ideas 
in oonneotion with speoial privileges. 
At a Joint Session of Congress on August 26, 1913, he again brought 
out the Mexioan question in all its meanings to the world at large and 
espeoially to the United states. Wilson stated that the establishment of a 
real demooratic government in Mexico would mean the realization of the hopes 
2 Ibidl., 16-17 
3 1'6fa., 8 
.' and rights of a nation whose best aspirations had been long suppressed and 
disappointed; also that we oould serve 1i:hem without first thinking how we 
4 
were to be served. In the light of the future clevelopment of Wilson's 
3 
poli~, we must inolude one other sentenoe in this same address; he said, 
" ••• We ean afford to exereise the selt restraint ot a really great nation 
5 
whioh realizes its own strength and sooms 'be misuse it. It These pronounoe-
ments cover Wilson's toreign polioy in Mexioo up to October, 1913. At that 
time, Wilson notitied Presiclent Huerta that the Govermnent at Washington 
would not reoognize him. as presi'ant even though the eleotions then in 
progress should result in his eleotion. The reason given was, that the 
eleotions as oonduoted were not the orderly prooesses ot oonstitutional 
6 government. 
A new thought appeared in Wilson'S speeoh made at Swarthmore College 
later in October, 1913. This thought appeared again and again in his war 
time pronounoements. Wilson atateds "' ••• the mere extent ot the Amerioan 
eonquest is not what gives Amerioa distinotion in the annals ot the wor14, 
but the protessed purpose ot the oonquest whioh was to see to it that every 
foot ot this land should be the home ot tree, self governed, who should have 
1 
no government whatever whioh did not rest upon the oonsent of the governed.' It 
4 James Brown Soott, President Wilson's Foreign Polioy, Messages, Addresses, 
Papers. OXford UniversitY Press, Amerioan Branoh, 
New York, 1818, 2. 
5 Ibid., 7 
6 ROlirl'18on and West, 18. 
7 Ibid., 19-20 
4 
.' A few days later in October, 1913, he questioned an audience in Philadelphia 
as follows: "How are you going to assist in loae small part to give the 
,American people and by example, the people of the world, more liberty, lI10re 
happiness, more substantial prosperity; and how are you going to make that 
8 prosperity a common heritage instead of a selfish possession?a 
Wilson feared the British interests in Mexioo, or rather the foreign 
interests who were fo~lowing the British interests, would wreck hil 
9 d8!l1Ocratic ideals in Mexioo. Taking advantage of a meeting of the Southern 
Commeroial Congress in MObile, Alabama on October 27, 1913, he delivered a 
speeoh which olearly enunoiated his beliefs in political democracy, financial 
honesty, and the rights of human! ty. He stated that, aIt il a very perilous 
thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in terms of material 
interest." He laid it was not only unfair to those with whom you were 
dealing but degrading to .. one' s self. Wilson also stated that the hand of 
material interest was at the heart of all our national problems aad so 1I'e 
knew how to s:ympathize with the rest of America when. they had to contend 
10 
with similar cond! tions. The speeoh in Mobile, after his inaugural 
address, deserves to rank first ef all Wilson' 8 utterances, during the tint 
11 
year of his presidency. 
Wilson's first annual address delivered on December 2, 19l3,to a joint 
session of Congress was interesting because it touched upon his second 
probl_, the sanctity of treaties. Very definitely he met the issue anel 
expressed himself as follows: "There is only one possible standard by whiCh 
to determine controversies between the United states and other nations, anel 
8 Ibid., 19-20 
9 Edith Of Shaughnessy, !. Diplomat·s Wife in Menco,4l. Harper & Brothers,New 
5 
.' that is compounded of these two elements: our own honor and our obligations 
12 
to the peace of the world. If The statement m.erely foreshadowed later 
pronouncements whioh opened up his ever expanding foreign polioy, and elosed. 
his work at points touching Great Britain for the year 1913. 
In recapitulating the pronouncements of Wilson's first year in office, 
we find: (1) The President stood for eonstitutional gover.ament arrived at 
democratically. (2) No group with speoial intercsts should be given prefer-
ence over any other. This polioy was to be followed at home and abroad, and 
many results were to flow from it. (3) The terms of treaties DDlst be 
honored. 
The old Hay-Pauncefate treaty signed on November 18, 1901,and proolaimed 
February 18, 1902, did not exempt Amerioan vessels engaged in a ooast-wise 
trade from paying tolls. On August 24, 1912, a bill was approved by Presiden 
Taft which exaapted ooast-wise vessels from. such payments. On Maroh 5,1914, 
Wilson appeared before the Cohgress and delivered an address in which he 
stated that ill his beliet the bill signed by President Taft was a mistaken 
eoonomic polioy and a plain oontravention 01' the treaty with Great Britain. 
He said the measure was not debated outside the United States beoause the 
non-exemption clause was so clear. He also stated that we had agreed to the 
language 01' the treaty it we had not originated it; and that we were too big 
and powerful a nation to read suoh an interpretation into our own words 
13 just because we had the power to read them as we pleased. 
10 Soott, 19-24 
11 Robertson and west, 20-21 
12 Soott, 28 
13 Ibid., 31-32 
6 
., 
The measure was hotly debated in Congress, but passed by both Houses 
and approved by Wilson on June 15, 1914. A division of opinion appeared in 
rega.rd to this measure which will be dealt with fully in Chapter II. The 
honor of the nation was presumed to have been tarnished by the measure 
pa.ssed in 1912. Our word had been given and the pledge must be kept. That 
was fully implied in the President's statement. From now on, the world 
1f'C)uld expeot the same sorupulous exaotness in all the dealings of the Un! ted 
states Government. 
In the development of Wilson' 8 foreign poliey in Mexico, one more step 
had been taken which brought the new foreign polioy in direot opposition 
to that of Washington. In order to oreate confidenoe in Mexico the good 
offices of Argentina, Brazil and Chile had been enlisted in a oonferenoe to 
smooth out diffioulties. There was 80me opposition shOWD. to the plan OB 
the ground of entangling allianoes. Wilson met this opposition by saying 
that Washington's opposition resulted from the faot that no nation had yet 
set its faoe in the same direotion America had. Now we were strong enough 
14 
to set the paoe ourselves. Brazil, Argentina and Chile were republics 
like the United States. Wilson may have felt that their ambi tions and 
purposes were the same as ours; or he may have felt that bringing the Latin 
nations into the question would relieve the fear Mexioo had of the UBi ted 
States. 
Any consideration of a foreign policy touohing the Wilson Administration 
and Great Britain must oontain a mention of his address to the Graduating 
Class of the United States Naval Aoademy June 5, 1914; for in it we may find 
14 Robinson and West, 36-37. 
~-'------------------------------------~ 7 
a olew to later developments. ~ He told the members ot the class that the 
idea ot America was to serve humanity; that nations had been strong and had 
piled high their hoards of wealth but that they had come unto disgrace 
beoause they had used this power and wealth tor their 01lIl. aggrandizement 
and that America, to save herself, must strike out on new paths. In speaking 
of the flag, Wilson stated that the white stripes were stripes of parobment 
upon whioh were written the rights of men; that the red stripes were the 
streams of blood by whioh those rights had been made good; and that the 
11 ttle blue firmament in the oorner had swung out the stars ot the states 
of the American Union. It was a sort of floating charter that had oome down 
to us from Runnymede, when men said, "We will not have masters; we will be 
15 
a people, and we will seek our own liberty." The question here is - did 
Wilson consider the England of 1914 representative of oonstitutional govern-
ment arrived at demooratioally and had she set her faoe in the direotion 
that George Washington oould tollow? 
Just two short months were to pass before Europe burst into the tlames 
of the greatest war the world had ever kno1lll. The rights of men vanisheti; 
submerged completely by the might of governments. The great purposes of 
humani ty were consUll1ed by the greed and hate of wilful groups. 
President Wilson who had formulated the foreign policy of the New 
Freedom had now to lead his country along the paths he had prepared for her. 
On August 4, 1914, he proclaimed neutrality and two weeks later, he requested 
16 
the country to cul ti vate a neutrali ty of thought as well as of action. 
15 Scott, 48-54 
16 Louis M. Hacker and BenjaminB. Kendrick, The United States Since 1865. 
Revised Edition, S.F. Crofts and Co::"'""New York, 1934, 486. 
~'------------------------------------------. 
4.J 
"f.he Neutrality statutes thus summarized in the proclamation are historic 
and the result of our long experience as a neutral power." "These are, 
in concise form," says Mr. James Brown Scott, "the neutrality statutes of 
the United States which had been found neoessary in Washington's Adminis-
8 
tration and in that of his immediate successor to preserve the neutral rights 
of the United States against Tiolation by belligerents, and to secure the 
observance of the neutral duties the United States in behalf of belligerents. 
Reissued wi th slight modifications in 1818 and inoorporated in the Statutes 
at large in 1874, they reappear in the so called Penal Code of the United 
States in 1909 with b'U:t trifling changes of phraseology." Our country "was 
the first country to feel the need of a code of municipal law clealing wi th 
the question of neutrality, and it was the first to draft such a oode. By 
its conduct as a neutral when Washington was President "it laid the basis 
of the modern laws of neutrality -- The neutrality, therefore, whioh the 
17 
United States proclaimed in 1914 was not a neutrality born of the moment." 
The United States soon learned that she faced not clearly defined 
statutes, but a great body of preoedents of different nations, some of thea 
conflicting. These precedents represented certain immunities granted by 
belligerents to the commerce of neutrals in time of war. These concessions 
were an advance over the days when a belligerent proceeded like a pirate 
against a neutral. But the advance in international law had not kept paoe 
with the development of the vast interests with which it dealt. Internatio 
law at its best was only a recognition of the rights of those who kept the 
17 John B. McMaster, The United States in the World War, Vol.I. D. Appleton 
and Co., NeW'York, 1918, 19. - - -
9 
peaoe at the bands of those who broke it. 18 .' 
Wilson followed his declaration of neutrality by a statement to the 
belligerent govermnents that he would welcome an opportunity to act in the 
interests of European peace, at that or any other time in the future. ot 
more vi tal interest to the United States. in view of what was soon to 
appear, was his identical note to the several powers. on August 6, 1914. in 
which he oalled attention to the differenoes of opinion as to the rights of 
neutrals on the sea; he then suggested that the rules and regulations set 
up in the Deolaration of London be used as the basis of operation for all 
19 
the nations during the duration ot the war. The Declaration of London 
constituted the finest statements in regard to international questions liable 
to arise in ooean trade and travel; and it had about it the required air ot 
20 
consti tutionali ty. Consti tutionali ty in international law appears plainly 
in Wilson's address before the American Bar Association in Continental Hall. 
washington, October 20, 1914. He stated that as a lawyer he had at times 
fel t that there was no real comparison between the law of a nation and the 
law of nations, beoause the latter lacked the sanotion that gave the tormer 
strength and validity. And then he told them that upon oloser inspeotion the 
two had the same foundations and that the foundations were more evident anti 
oonspicuous now than then. He then covered this statement by saying "The 
opinion of the world i8 the mistress ot the world; and the prooesses of 
21 
international law are the slow prooesses by which opinion works its will." 
18 Edwin J.Clapp, Eoonomic Aspeots of the War. N6~tral Rights, Belligerent 
Claims, and AmerIcflll. Commeroe-;-1"§I~m5. Y81e University Press, New 
Haven, 1"§l5, 1. - -
19 Robinson and West, 44. 
20 Ibid., 45. 
21 Scott, 70. 
,.-'--------~--------------------------~ 10 
.' The reply to Wilson's request contained the basis of all the future 
troubles with Great Britain. In substance the reply was as follows: the 
central powers wrote they were willing to rule th~8elves by the Declaration; 
France and Russia also gave their assent, on condition, however, of England's 
acceptance. England replied that she would accept the Declaration but with 
aodifioations. Wilson wanted no modifications, so he fell back on our exist-
ing treaties and international law as a basis for America's neutrality during 
22 
the war. From noll' on the international features of the United States Penal 
Code wse to cause endless friotion with Great Britain, for she constantly 
set up new rules which opposed the idea of democratic pronouncements arrived 
23 ' 
at Constitutionally. 
Any ohange in Wilson's foreign policy in regard to the European si tuati 
must forecast itself in his written or spoken words. In his a.zmual message 
to Congress in December, 1914, there is a new note, but it hints only at the 
need of preparedness so that we could help Europe in her need when the war 
24 
was over. 
As the economio pressure became greater in 1915, the State Department, 
on February 20, 1916, proposed a modus nTalldi: which was an agreement for 
the use of submarines against merchant ships. On March 1, 1915, the German 
govermnent agreed, contingent upon Great Britain's agreemeD.t, not to arm 
merchantmeD.. Great Britain refused and Wilson again fell baok on the treatie 
25 
and international law for basis of prooedure against England. 
22 Hacker and Kendrick, 487. 
23 Robertson and West, 49-50. 
24 Ibid., 50-51. 
25 Ibid., 56-58. 
11 
.' On November 4. 1915, Wilson apoke at a dinner of the Manhattan Club 
in New York City. The subject of his discourse was ·Our Political Relations. 
Here he showed a ohange i!'1 his foreign poliey and the reason for it. His 
thoughts were reflected in the followiDg words. "I speak as the trustee and 
guardian of a nation's rights, charged with the duty of speak1l1g for that 
nation in matters ilIVolvillg her sovereignty - a nation too big and generous 
to be exactillg and yet courageous enough to defend its rights and the liber-
ties of its people wherever assailed or invaded. I would not feel that I 
was disoharging the solemn obligations I owe the country were I not to speak 
in terms of the deepest solemnity of the urgency and necessity of preparing 
26 
ourselves to guard and protect the rights and privileges of our people •••• " 
In this speeoh the President implied no direot interference with any oountry, 
but he did imply that the merits cf the controversy had been assessed and 
that the United states now stood apart from the oonfliot and would not enter 
except upon her own terms and for her own purpose. Such terms and such 
27 purpose must reflect a change in foreign policy. 
President Wilson made a tour of the United States in the early days of 
1916 and spoke definitely in favor of preparedness for the Amerioan nation. 
He stressed the great changes that were takillg place and the need for America 
to be ready for those changes. That in the great conflict we had interest. 
that were beillg slowly drawn into the conflict. That all the time the 
nations themselves that were engaged seemed to be looking to us for some sort 
of action, not hOatile in charaoter, but sympathetic in oharaoter. He also 
stated in this speech that though this nation was a nation of peace, it was 
26 Scott. l16-l2Z. 
27 Robinson and West, 77. 
.' JJDt always within the ohoioe of a great nation as to whether peaoe was 
possible. He stated that certain groups oalled for peaoe. and that others 
demanded that the honor of the nation be unstained. Another thought whioh 
he voi oed during thi s talk was the. t the real danger to the peace of the 
12 
oountry lay in the action of forces over which he had no oontrol. and that if 
a struggle lay ahead, then America should ohampion the purposes of humanity 
28 
and the rights of men. 
The development of Wilson's policy is next found in the move to prevent 
Americans from traveling on armed merohantmen. In his letter to Senator 
stone. who was chairman. of the Foreign Relations Committee. on February 24, 
1916, Wilson stated that no nation, no group of nations, had the right,while 
war was in progress, to alter or disregard the prinoiples whioh all natioJls 
had agreed upon; he further stated that the abriigment of the rights of a 
single Amerioan oitizen. would be followed by other humiliations, and "'the 
29 
whole fine fabrio of international law would crumble under our hands.'· 
He also wrote to Mr. Pou. who, in the absence of Mr. Henry, the ohail"JDSll of 
the House Committee on Rules, was the ranking member, and asked him. to at 
once handle the questions in dispute, for the report of di Tided counsels in 
Congress was being used in foreign capitals. He also stated that the matter 
30 
lay clearly with the field of Executive initiative. All the messages 
President Wilson had enunciated in regard to neutrality were gathered in 
these pronouncements. The rights of the p~ople under the existing treaties 
and the international law must ate.D.d - not one must be abridged; he promised 
it; he demanded it. The years ahead would SUll up the result. 
28 Scott, 167-174. 
29 ~., 177-178. 30. ~., 179-180. 
13 
.' In the speech delivered to the Manhattan Club on November 4,1915, 
Wilson had iaplied that America was ready to enter the struggle, but on her 
o'Wll tems and for her own purposes. On May 17, 1916, he gave an address 
before the League to Enforce Peace and voiced three necessary principles as 
follows: (1) "That every people has the right to choose the sovereignty 
under whioh they shall live)" (2) "That the SJD8.l1 states of the world have 
a right to enjoy the same respeot for their sovereignty and territorial 
integri ty that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon."· and (3) 
"That the· world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace 
that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of people and 
nations." Then oontinuing, he said, "So sincerely do we believe in these 
things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America 
when I say that the people of the UDited States are willing to become a 
partner in any feasible association of nations fo~ed in order to realize 
these objects and make them secure against violation." He then elaborated 
further aDd explained that "The belligerents should set up their peaoe terms 
as we were in DO sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Then a 
universal association of the nations should be set up to maintain the invio-
late seourity of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use 
of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary 
to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to 
the opinion of the world, a virtual guarantee to territorial integrity and 
31 
politioal independenoe." Only one mor~ step remained to be taken in the 
completion of his polioy. That step he took alone. 
31 Soott, 189-194. 
14 
On the 18th of December in 1916, he boldly oalled. upon both the Allied 
and Central Powers to state what they were fighting for and the ter.ms 
necessary for a settlement. Wilson asked the belligerents, in the name ot 
the neutral nations, to state their purposes, not in the general ter.ms in 
.nich each group had indulged in again and again, but definitely, so that 
32 
the world might know them. and that a comparison might be made. 
From neutral in thought as 'Well as in aotion in August of 1914, Wilson 
had traveled the long way to an association of the nations of the earth by 
:May of 1916. The horizons had broadened, but the objeotive remained the 
same; the saoredness ot human rights applied to indiTiduals, and now to 
nations. 
On January 22, Wilson oame before the United States Senate in one last 
effort to elld the war tor the benefit of hum.ani ty. To acoomplish this, he 
set up the following requirements: (1) It must be a peaoe without notory; 
(2) The nationalism of small nations must be recognized; (S) The great 
oammeroial nations must have an outlet to the sea; (4) The sea must be tree; 
33 (5) Armaments must be l1mi ted; a.nd. (6) Entangling allianoes must be abandoned. 
In this same address, he stated: ~e are provinoials no longer. The tragio 
events of the last thirty months of vi tal turmoil through which we have 
passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning back. 
Our own fortunes as a nation are involved, 'Whether 'We would have it 80 or 
34 
not. n The appeal made by the President was made direotly to all the 
peoples of the earth. In it, statesmen and nations as individuals 'Were 
forgotten. 
32 Robertson and West, 131. 
~3 Haoker and Kendriok, 504. 
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.' There was no more hesitancy in Wilson's mind in regard to the mission 
of the United states; there was a hesitancy as to how this mission could 
fUnotion the mo st effectively, whether as a great neutral leading other 
neutrals in an Association of Nations, or as a belligerent dictating a just 
peaoe. All the world knows the answer to this problem, but behind the 
answer some little prooess may 11e yet unrevealed, and it is in the hope of 
this revelation that the writer presents the following record. 
~---------------------------------------, 
CHAP'l'ER II 
THE DIPLOMATS AND HUERTA 
It was twenty years since a Democratic President had formulated a 
foreign policy for the United States. During those eventful years we had 
fought a war of conquest and had taken our plaoe among the great nations 
of the eart~. The inooming President in 1913 oould follow the beaten paths 
or he oould formulate new policies, for two questions demanded an immediate 
answer; they were as follows I Should Huerta be recognized as President of 
Mexico, and should the measure ram.ain which exempted ooastwise American 
shipping from payment of tolls in using the Panama Canal. 
President Wilson assumed the responsibility at once. He refused to 
1 
reoognize Huerta; thus departing from the usual foreign polioy. Baok of 
this refusal was Wilson's idea that Huerta was a selfish dictator whose 
reign was founded on violenoe, if not the actual murder of a constitutionally 
eleoted President. A few days after Mr. Wilson's inauguration, Mr. Irwin 
Laughlin, then oharge' d' affaires in London - Mr. Page not having arrived -
was instruoted to ask the British Foreign Office what its attitude would be 
in regard to the reoognition of President Huerta •. Mr. Laughlin informed the 
Foreign Offioe that he was not told that the United States had decided on any 
policy, but that he felt sure it would be to the best interests of both 
oountries to follow the same line. This query was not an informal one: it 
was made in definite obedienoe to instruotions and was intended to elioit a 
formal commi'bnent. The answer that Mr. Laughlin received was that the Britis 
1 Robinson And West, 6-7. 16 
1'1 
.' Government would not recOgnize Huerta either formally or informally. 2 
Upon reoeipt ot Mr. Laughlin's letter. the Administration in Washington 
announced that the United states would not accept the Huerta presidenoy. 
At this time. the two countries were working olosely together and whether 
Wilson's action depended entirely on the answer from the British Foreign 
3 
otf'ioe will probably never be known. About three weeks a£ter this. Sir 
Cecil Spring Rice. the British Ambassador in Washington. notified the State 
Department that Great Britain had changed her mind and that she would 
recognize Huerta. Franoe. Germany and Spain tollowed England's example. 
4 
and later in the summer. Japan did likewi see 
It is interesting to note that the first mistake in the Mexiou. atf'air 
lay with the British Foreign Otf'ioe. and produoed a most unpleasant etf'ect 
in Washington. The impression is given that the Administration believed that 
the sudden change in the British attitude was the result ot pressure on the 
Foreign Of'f'ioe by oommeroial interests. Lord Cowdray was a rich liberal 
who had gotten valuable ooncessions trom President Diaz. It was known that 
Huerta intended to rule as Dias had done and so preserve order. It was also 
known that the British navy had a contract with the Cowdray Com~ for oil. 
Oil was necessary tor battleships and European war olouds hung heavy on the 
horizon. In suoh circumstances the British Government might almost become 
a champion ot the Cowdray interests.S 
Another personality which must be noted at this time is that ot the 
British Ambassador in Mexico City. Sir Lionel Carden. Carden had been in 
Cuba during the Ta£t administration, and Ta£t had tried to have him removed 
2 Burten J. Hendrick, The Lite and Letters of' Walter H.PaSe, 2 vol.,Doubleday. 
Page and Co., Garden City,New York. i92~, Vol. t; 1 • 
3 Ibid. 180-181 4 Ibid. 181 5 Hendriok 181. 
r 
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.' from Havana in 1912. It was kIlown that he disliked Amerioans and that 
British oommeroe was his deity and British advantage his duty. 
Against this baokground, Huerta beoame an epochal figure in the history 
of Amerioan foreign policy; a representative of a passing historical period; 
a symbol of the new, and incidentally a thorn in the side of at least two 
great nations. The first diplomatie task assigned to Ambassador Page was to 
induce England to remove Carden and withdraw its reoogni tion of Huerta. 6 
ThiS was a task before which a more experienced ambassador might have 
quailed. 
The "dollar diplomaoy" of the United States bad left in Mexioo City, 
Henry Lane Wilson, who had been appointed ambassador by President Taft. 
Ambassador Wilson owed his appointment to the political influence of his 
brother who was the Republioan boss of the State of Washmgbn and a olose 
personal friend of Richard Ballinger, President Taft's first Seoretary of 
Interior. Ballinger had been oonnected with the Guggenheims, ..mo owned vast 
smel ting interests in Mexico under the name of the American Smal ting and 
Refining Company. All this had been disclosed by the Ballinger-Pinchot 
1 
controversy. On July 11, 1913, President Wilson recalled Ambassador Wilson. 
President Wilson could not appoint a new ambassador without tacitly reoog-
nizing Huerta's administration. Mexioo was thus without an Amerioan minister 
8 
when she most needed one. 
6 Hendriok, 183. 
7 Earnest Gruening, Mexioo ~ ~ Heritage. The Century Company, New York, 
1928, 561. 
8 J.S. Bassett, A Short History of the United States, 3 vol., The Macmillan 
Company,-New York, 1929,"ToL3, 869. 
19 
.' On August 14. 1913, Ambassador Wilson stated in a newspaper interview 
that the oongratulatory address whioh he had made to Huerta upon his 
presidency had been written by the British and Spanish ambassadors; that the 
British had reoognized Huerta's provisional presidenoy as they had all done. 
and that the British Foreign Offioe knew about it.9 On August 13, 1913, 
president Wilson prepared and dispatohed a note of apology to the British 
Government. The note follows: 
The interview given to the press yesterday by 
Mr. Henry Lane Wilson whose resignation as ambassador 
to Mexioo has been aeoepted to take effeot at the end 
of his vaoation, Ootober 14, having been brought to 
the President's attention, he direots me to ask you to 
oall at the British Foreign Offioe and say to Sir 
Edward Grey that he disolaims all responsibility for 
Mr. Wilson's aotions in the matter and for the language 
employed by him. in his interview and that he regret. 
exoeedingly that a diplomatio offioial in the employ 
of this govermaent should have been gull ty ot suoh 
impropriety. "10 
In an interesting letter written to President Wilson on November 16, 
1913, Anlbassador Page told Wilson that in his talk with Sir Edward Grey, 
he explained that the foreign polioies followed in Latin Amerioa must give 
way to the new prinoiples of the Wilson pronounoement. He then said he 
fea~ed the British oonoern for oommeroial interests never slept, that it 
would oome up oontinuously, and that their first impulse was to regard an 
unselfish aot with what Ceoil Rhodes termed "unotuous reoti tude. a He then 
added that it was worth something to di seover that Downing Street made many 
mistakes, among them being the reoognition. of Huerta and the sending of Sir 
11 Lionel Carden to Mexico. 
9 Chioago Daily Tribune, August 14, 1913. By Staff Correspondent, 1. 
10 Ibid., August 15, 1913, 1. 
11 l.reliCIriok 1 5 
r 
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About the time that Page was writing to Wilson concerning British 
-unctuous rectitude," Wilson sent John Lind, a former governor of Minnesota, 
and a olose personal friend of William Jennings Bryan to Mexioo. Lind was 
definitely instruoted to obtain oertain information for President Wilson. He 
also carried speoific instruotions for, and requests of the Huerta govern-
lIent. Huerta was to call 8.ll early and free eleotion in whioh the people of 
Mexico were to take part and the result of this election was to bind all 
12 
parties. The Lind mission failed, Huerta remained President of Mexico, and 
Sir Lionel Carden, the British Ambassador, was still the friend of the 
Mexican dietator, for in a newspaper interview he had stated that -Safety 
in Mexico oan only be secured by punitive and remedial methods 8.lld a stro~ 
13 man." Ambassador Page paid a hurried visit to the British Foreign Offioe; 
and then reported to Washington that Sir Edward Grey showed him the copy of· 
the telegram sent to Carden asking for information in regard to the Carden 
newspaper interview and Carden's answer, whioh was a flat denial. ~age 
stated that Grey showed him another telegram to Carden concerning the boasts 
Huerta had made that he would have the baeking of London, Paris and Berlin 
against the united States. In this telegram Grey advised Carden that British 
policy should be kept aloof from Huerta's boasts 8.lld plans. Grey also 
showed Carden's answer to which,which was another flat denial. Greywanted 
Wilson to know about the telegrams. Page then intormed Grey that the 
government at Washington resented the British attitude in Mexico, that they 
regarded the problem as wholly American, that they suspeoted the British 
interests of extending finanoial aid to Huerta, and lastly, that the 
12 Gruening, 577. 
13 Hendrick, 198. 
21 
.' president's polioy was not aoademio, but was the only one that would square 
'With Amerioan polioy, and that it was unohangeable. 
14 
During the summer of 1913, Colonel E.M. House nsited Europe; he had a 
conferenoe with Sir Edward Grey on July 3, 1913. The oonference was held 
16 
in the home of Sir Edward Grey, 33 Eocleston Square, London. Among the 
questions disoussed were the Mexioan situation and the Panama tolls. Grey's 
attitude may have been sympathetio, but it was certainly delayed. On 
Ootober 27, 1913, Wilson took another definite stand against "eoonomio 
imperialism" before the Southern Commeroial Congress in Mobile, Alabama. 
Whether the attitude of the President on the Mexican question had at last 
oonvi~ced the Foreign Office that Wilson's stand was unohangeable, or the 
substance of House's oonferenoe was agreeable, will probably never be known; 
but evidently the British gover.wnent felt that the whole question needed a 
oomplete understanding, and steps were taken to bring about that condition. 
Early in November, 1913, Sir William Tyrrell, the private seoretary of 
Sir Edward Grey, announoed his arrival in Washington. The purpose of his 
16 
visi t was not diplomatio, but many questions were disoussed. Ambassador 
Page wrote to Colonel House as follows: 
Newton Hall, Newton, Cambridge 
Sunday, October 26, 1913 
Dear House;- "Sir William Tyrrell, the seoretary of Sir Edward Grey, himself, 
I think, an M.P. - has gone to the United States to visit his friend, Sir 
Ceoil Spring Rioe •••• He of course has Sir Edward's oomplete oonfidenoe, but 
14 Hendriok, 199. 
15 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Houghton Mifflin 
Company, The RIVerSide Press, Cambrrdge, Boston, 1926. Vol.I, 194. 
16 Hendriok 200. 
22 
be is also a man on his own aooount. I have CODle to reckon it worth while 
to get ideas that I want driven home into his head. It's a good head and a 
good plaoe to put good ideas • 
••• I want him. to get the President's idea about Mexico, good, and firm. 
and hard. They are so tar trom altruistic in their politics here that it 
1fOu1d be a good piece ot work to get our ideas and aims into this man's 
bead. His going gives you and the President and everybo~ a capital chance 
17 
to help me keep our good American-English understanding.a 
Very hastily yours, 
Walter H. Page. 
Tyrrell had oonferences with President Wilson, Secretary ot State Bryan, 
and Colonel HOuse: The conversation with President Wilson was most agreeable, 
and Tyrrell was able to convince Wilson that the British oil interests had 
no power over such a statesman as Sir Edward Grey. At the same time Tyrrell 
was acquainted with the taot that the President was untavorable to the 
18 
exemptions of Amerioan vessels trom the Panama tolls. In justice to 
Wilson, it must be stated that the Panama question was no political expedient 
at this time; tor as early as AprillS, 1913, he had made this same statement 
19 to Seoretary of Agriculture, David Houston. The oonversation with Bryan 
was punctured with opposing ideas - "The Foreign Ottice had simply handed 
its Mexioan polity over to the oil barons;" "The British oil men were the 
paymasters ot the British Cabinet;" and when Sir William laughingly replied 
that the oil barons did not have money enough to purohase the British cabinet, 
20 
Bryan quickly retorted "Then you admit the charge?" 
17. Hendrick, 201. 
18 •. J.FradRippy, The United States and Mexico. Altred A. Knpot Inc.,New 
York 1926 -s'3'6. -
23 
.' Later in November, 1913, Sir Lionel Carden led the European diplomats 
into the presence of President Huerta and announced that the European 
coUntries were supporting President Wilson's M8%ican polioies. Sir Lionel 
Carden also announced that the English goverzrm.ent would make no loans to 
Huerta. Huerta was advised to yield to the American demands and withdraw 
21 
from Mexioo. So far as the British government was concerned, the Mexi~ 
affair was closed, only to be opened later on, over Sir Lionel Carden and 
the Panama to lls. 
Sir Edward Grey stated that the Foreign Office had no intention of 
interfering or trying to influenoe the situation in Meneo. That the only 
interest they had was to protect long established and legitimate British 
commeroial interests with whatever power was in force, when there was no 
22 
authority with which diplomacy could deal. 
Sir Lionel Carden's removal was the last step in the diplomatic problem 
which Ambassador Page was to solve. On January 8. 1914, Page wrote to 
Colonel House: 
TIIO cla.ys ago I sent a telegram to the Department 
saying that I had information from a private unofficial 
source that Carden would be transferred was true, and 
from another source that Marling would succeed him. 
The government here has given out nothing. I know 
nothing from official sources. Of course the only 
decent thing to do at Washington was to sit still till 
this government should see £it to make announcement. 
But what do they do? Give my telegram to the press. 
It appears here almost verbatim in this morni~' sMail. 
I have to make an humiliating explanation to the -
Foreign Office •••• They now deny at the Foreign Offioe 
19 D.F. Houston, Eight Years With the President's Cabinet. Doubleday Page & 
Company, New York, 19~59. 
20 Hendrick. 202. 
21 Rippy, 336. 
22. Viscount Gre of Fallodon 
that anything has been decided about Carden, 
and this meddling by us - will surely cause 
a delay and may even cause a change of purpose • 
• • • Lord Cowdry oame here to the house and 
.' 
stayed two and a half hours talking about possible 
joint intervention in Mexico. Possibly he oame 
from the Foreign Office •••• By the way, Cowdray 
said to me today: '\{hatever the United States 
and Great Britain agree on the world must do.' 
He is right. The President must come here, 
perhaps in his second term. These two govern-
ments must enter a oompact for peaoe and for 
gradua 1 disarmament. 23 
Heartily 
W.H.}). 
On February 12, 1914, Sir Lionel Carden was promoted to an ~portant 
diplomatic post in Brazil. Page had solved his diplomatic problem to 
24 
President Wilson's liking, and the Foreign Office had protected the diplomat 
24 
whose "diety" was British connnerce, and whose "duty" was British advantage. 
In January 1914, Wilson took up the question of the Panama tolls with 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The time and prooedure of taking 
this step had been left to Wilson in the conversation Colonel House had 
held with Sir Edward Grey on July 3, 1913. On March 5, 1914, Wilson 
appeared before the two houses of Congress and in a brief speeoh asked for 
the repeal of the clause in the Panama legis lation whioh granted preferentia 
treatment to American ooastwise shipping. He made his plea on two grounds, 
25 
the honor of nations and the sanctity of treaties. The request was 
granted him on June 11, 1914, by a Senate vote of 50 to 35, and a house 
vote of 216 to 71. The debate was heated, the olaims being that the govern-
22 (continued) Frederiok A. Stokes Company, New York, 1929, Vol.I, 98. 
23 Hendrioks, Vol.I, 223. 
24 O'Shaughnessy, 189. 
25 Hendriok, Vol.I, 253. 
26 
ment had sold itself to British influence. 
that a national dishonor had been atoned for. 
.' There were others who felt 
On February 3. 1914, President Wilson lifted the embargo on arms to 
provide munitions for the factions of northern Mexico who were rising 
27 
25 
against Huerta. Huerta, cut off from European loans, with the Constitu-
tionalists under Carranza and Villa, leading an open revolt in the north, 
28 
fled July 15. 1914. On August 20, 1914, Carranza entered Mexico City. 
With the entrance of Carranza into Mexico City, the British Foreign Office 
reenter the diplomatic picture. 
The British Government had not reoognized the Carranza Government. 
The United States Government withheld reoognition until Ootober 19, 1915. 
During this time property rights and humanrights had seemingly passed 
beyond the power of any government. The diploIlBtio stand taken by Carranza 
was as follows: rederess for life or property could not be made by the 
British Government, through diplomatic ohannels to him, but they oould, 
however, extra-offioially make representation to him, but they must not 
29 
oome byway of the United States, There was a disposition on the part of 
the world at large to hold the United States responsible for aots of 
violence to~ foreigners in Mexico. Sir Edward Grey announced in the House 
of Commons, that if the British GovernIrent did. not obtain satisfaction from 
the oonstitutionalists through the good offioes of the United States, it 
reserved the right to obtain reparation by other means when the oiroumstance 
26 Hendrick, Bol.I, 267. 
27 Robinson and West, 26. 
28 Bassett, Vol.3, 870. 
29 Gruening, 579. 
r 
.' 30 V{ould permit. A mental reservation must have been made by Mr. Wilson 
on March 2. 1914, When he denied that any pressure had been brought to 
bear on the United States by other countries. 
On April 24. 1914, Ceoil Spring Rice wrote to the Seoretary of State 
26 
and agreed to cooperate with the American Gover.nment for the proteotion of 
humanity in Mexico. This was not to be on an offioial basis. He stated 
that he had so notified the British Minister at Mexico City and the British 
Admiral and oonsul at Vera Cruz. This agreement was made to resist mob 
31 
violence. 
On April 28. 1914, Secretary of State Bryan instructed speoial agent 
Carothers at El Paso by telegram, to go at onoe to Chihuahua and seoure 
from the Constitutionalists an agreement for the neutralization of. the 
great oil produoing seotion or zone between Tampico and the Tuxpam River, 
and also at Exbano and vioinity west of Tampioo. It was in this region 
that many Amerioan and British and other foreign produoers had been 
oonduoting operations. A written agreement was desired from the Constitu-
tionalist Party and an immediate notifioation to all field oommanders of 
the neutralization move. 32 Instant aotion was demanded of Carothers. 
Mr. Bryan then notified Sir Ceoil Spring Rioe at the British Embassy 
in Washington and explained to him that the neutrality arrangement being 
sought was not asked for the port oities but just for the wells and pipe 
lines with the terri tory surrounding them. Apparently they feared to ask 
30 Robinson and West, 27-28. 
31 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, United States Printing 
Offioe, Washington, 1928. 677, Doc. 312.11/3822 
32 F.R. 1914, 690-691, Doo., 8l2.6363/29a 
27 
., 33 
for the neutralization of the port oities lest they arouse antagonisms. 
In his reply to this letter, Sir Ceoil Spring Rioe was of the opinion 
that the original agreement oalled for the neutralization of the port 
oities: that this was quite neoessa~ as the oombatants had seized large 
quantities of goods in those oities whioh belonged to British, Frenoh and 
spanish subjeots, and that these goods had been sold in the United States 
as the arohives of the Amerioan State Department would show. He also 
announoed that he had telegraphed to the British Admiral and British Consul 
34 
at Tampioo and had reoeived no answer. 
On May 1, 1914, a telegram was reoeived from the speoial agent of 
the Amerioan Government at El Paso stating that on April 30, 1914, Carranza 
had telegraphed him that employees had left on their own motion and oould 
return and also that an order would be sent to respeot foreign property. 
This telegram was sent to Sir Lionel Carden at Mexioo City and in response 
Carden telegraphed that Huerta had promised the same. Huerta to Id Sir 
Lionel Carden that while issuing this order he oould not guarantee the 
35 
safety of anyone returning to work in distriots not under his oontrol. 
The next move was made by Sir Edward ·Grey on May 26, 1914, and shows 
how British trade and investment are proteoted. Grey telegraphed Sir Ceoil 
Spring Rioe that diplomatio proteotion should not be given after normal 
condit ions had returned to any oomp9.D¥ or individual who obtained a title to 
oil leases on the grounds that owners had not Illid rent due, when in reality 
this oondition had been brought about by the disorders then existing in 
33 F.R. 1914, 692-693, Doc., 8l2.6363/60a 
34 F.R. 1914, 693. Doc. 812. 636~46Z 
35 F.R. 1914, 696-697, Doc. 812. 6363/52 
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Mexioo. A suggestion was made by Seoretary Bryan that this agreement 
should include Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands; on 
June 2, 1914, the three governments agreed to this, and the blaok gold 
rolled down to the east ports of Mexioo, and here it was oaught again. 
On June 3, 1914, the American Consul at Tampico, wired the State 
Department at 2 P.M. that official notioe had been issued that all oustom 
oharges for taxes, exportation charges, oil production taxes and similar 
oharges must be paid in Mexican gold; that in lieu of Mexican gold, Amerioan 
gold would be accepted at the rate of two for one. This order was onoe 
37 
withdrawn and twioe issued between 2 P.M. and 8 P.M. of June 3. The 8 P.M. 
order stated Sr. F. Villareal, Secretary of Communication of Constitutional-
ists informed the United States Consul that the rule was based on the theory 
that all exports were sold abroad on the gold basis. The British Embassy 
delivered a memorandum to the State Department on July 13, 1914, and stated 
that the rate of two pesos for one could only be considered in the light 
of a forced contribution; that the uncertainty of never knowing from day to 
day what further taxes might be imposed made the exportation of oil almost 
an impossibility. The British government considered the condition called 
for redress; and called on the United States Government to exercise their 
good offices in having the Constitutionalists rescind the order.38 
In a letter remarkable for its fairness, the American Consul General 
at Monterey answered this memorandum; a digest of which was forwarded to 
the British Embassy on July 22, 1914. The letter follows: 
36 F.R. 
37 F .R. 
38 F.R. 
1914, 705, Doc., 812.6363/95. 
1914, 741, Doc., 812.512/266. 
1914, 748-749, Doc., 812.512/340. 
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1 American Consulate General 
Monterey, July, 1914. 
Department's July 15. The Secretary of Finance 
informs me again that production taxes, etc. are payable 
in Mexican gold ooin, according to decree of March; that 
neither bank bills nor silver are acceptable for suoh 
export duties and production taxes and that the status 
of the so oalled ordinary peso is not being oonsidered 
in this connection. What I mean by one for two is that 
Mexioan gold coin is required and that the Mexioan gold 
peso is quoted in the United States as being worth 
forty nine oents and a fraotion as oompared with the 
American dollar, whioh is praotically one for two or 
one American dollar New York exchange for two Mexican 
gold pesos, but the Secretary says in lieu of Mexican 
gold New York exohange will be aocepted at the Mexioan 
gold rate if suoh is more oonvenient to producers. It 
seems he is within his rights in this natter, and by 
referring to the baok of our national bank notes, we 
are reminded that the United States does not aooept 
all kinds of money for similar duties and taxes. I 
also understand that the Constitutionalists have foreign 
obligations whioh have to be paid in gold or its 
equivalent.39 
Hanna. 
The introduotion to this set of diplomatic representations had been 
in the name of humanity but as it developed it bec8lll9 mostly oU with 
little of hwmmity about it. Why there should have been any misoonoeption 
concerning the oollection of export duties under the plan laid down by the 
Constitutionalists is hard to understand. England had set the rate of 
exchange for years and the United states had been an apt scholar as pointed 
out by Consul General Hanna. 
One more question in Mexico assumed diplomatic proportions at this 
time and entangled in its web, Villa, Carranza, Mexico, Great Britain and 
39 F.R. 1914, 750-751, Doc., 812.512/349. 
30 
.' the United States and remains today an unsolved question in many of its 
ramifications. 
On February 19, 1914, the State Department wrote to special agent 
Carothers in El Paso that a communication had been received that morning 
from the British Embassy in regard to a British subject, named William 
Benton, held prisoner by Villa at Juarez. It was stated that Mrs. Benton 
feared for her husband's life. Carothers was instructed to give the matter 
his immediate attention. On the same day Carothers replied that Villa had 
informed him, Benton Was not under arrest but that Villa did seam to feel 
that Benton was in a plot to take his life. Special agent Carothers felt 
that Benton was not dead but would be held a prisoner until Villa went 
40 
south. The same day Consul Edwards, at Ciudad Juarez, wrote to the State 
Derartment and informed Bryan that Benton Was dead. Villa had communicated 
this informtion to him personally. Villa stated that Benton came to his 
house armed with a large pistol and in the encounter which followed he, 
Villa, bad shot Benton. Consul Edwards promised to send full particulars 
by next mail. On February 20, 1914, the particulars followed and were as 
follows: 
Villa said, "Senor Benton is dead. He cane here to this house and 
attempted to kill me, he was armed and came for that purpose. He was a 
dangerous man. I knew him, he had killed several nen in Mexioo. I could 
not afford to let such a man live •••• " Edwards promised to investigate all 
Villa's charges against Benton and stated Villa would not confiscate the 
property or permit the body to be removed.41 Later, on the same day, word 
40 F.R. 1914, 843, Doc., 312.41/94. 
41F.R. 1914, 843-844, Doc., 312.41/119. 
~. 
came that Benton had been given a military trial and shot. 
31 
.' 
The next day, Februa~ 21, speoial agent Carothers telegraphed the 
state Depar"bnent that the oourt nartial sentence just given him was too 
lengthy to send by wire so extraots were sent as follows: Tribunal was 
composed of seven offioers. Two witnesses were present at the quarrel; 
that Benton draw his pistol on Villa; that Villa disarmed him; that Benton 
1V'as known to be an enemy of the Constitutionalists and had assisted Huerta 
and Orozoo. The sentence was signed by Major Jesus M. Rodriguez as Military 
Judge and Raoul Lopez Seoretary. As an after thought the message oarried 
the information that a nass meeting of protest had been held in EI Paso 
42 
and ex-Governor Curry of New Mexioo had presided. 
It is a dangerous thing to use any phrase diffioult of aooomplishment 
in a diploma tio note to the British Government. It has a peou1iar way of 
coming home at inoonvenient times. Just when the State Department was 
making desperate efforts to locate Benton, his remains, or a settlement of 
the question, a memorandum arrived from Sir Ceoil Spring Rioe, who noted 
the disorepanoies in the evidenoe so far presented but was sure that in the 
cause of humani~. the Amerioan government would oontinue, in an energetic 
43 
manner, to use her influence in this case. The oause of humanity was the 
foundation of Wilson's Mexioan po1icye On February 22, 1914, Ambassador 
Page wrote to Bryan as follows: 
Amerioan Embassy, 
London, February 22,1914 
Sir Edward Grey showed me a telegram he is sending 
to Spring Rioe asking the United States permission 
42 F.R. 1914, 845, Doo., 312.41/103. 
43 F.R. 1914, 847, Doc., 312.41/112. 
for a British Consul to investigate Benton's 
death. He thinks suoh an investigation. in 
addition to our awn or in oonjunction with it. 
.' 
will quiet exoitement here. House of Commons 
summoned him today. our of regular order to 
question him. He informed lIe that he wishes the 
truth to be got at independently of Yilla' s 
version, and he expressed confidenoe in our good 
will and in the effeotiveness of our investigation, 
if we take it vigorously in hand and summon all 
pos sib Ie witnes ses .44 
Page 
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On February 23, 1914, Bryan wrote to speoial agent Carothers to "get 
the body" and to the American Consul in Juarez to "get the body and look 
at it, if that is all you oan do. and be sure and nark the grave." Villa. 
refused in the following words: "Yery sorry oan not deliver Benton's body 
at present time. When time:. comes to do it, I will oomply with my obliga-
tions and will give an aocount of my prooeedings to the whole world.n45 
February 24, 1914 was a rusy day. The Seoretary of State wrote to 
Vioe-Consul Simpioh at Nogales. to get in touoh with Carranza and see what 
he could do about Benton's body, also if the oharge that court nartial was 
held after death was true. He also wrote to Consul Letoher at Chihuahua 
who had notified him earlier in the day that Villa would permit Mrs. Benton 
and. any government representatives to visit the oemetery and that the body 
would be exhumed. but: mUst be interred again in the same spot, that he 
would like two Amerioans and two British subjeots to attend Mrs. Benton, and 
to have the body delivered to her, if possible. Bryan also reoeived three 
telegrams: One from Consul Edwards at Juarez stating that all the officials 
at Juarez were new men, strangers to border people. Villa had taken with 
44 F.R. 1914, 848. Doo., 312.41/106. 
45 F.R. 1914. 849, Doo., 312.41/108. 
rf·
·,.'· 
., 
., 
i hinl everyone connected wi th the affair. 
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., 
Consul Edwards was sure the body 
1f'as buried, for the law called for interll8nt wi thin twenty-four hours. 
Another was from Consul Letcher, to whom Bryan had wired earlier in the day, 
stating that the body must be returned to the grave from which it waB 
exhumed. The third was from the British Embassy stating that owing to the 
condition of affairs and the fact that two other Englishmen had disappeared, 
they considered it neoessary that a British Consular officer should go to 
Chihua hua, under adequate seour ity t to report to His :Majesty's Government. 
The British Consul at Galveston was ordered to proceed to El Paso and there 
await further orders. A public inquiry was asked for, so that foreign 
witnesses might testify and the faots be published to the world. If this 
public inquiry was held then the British Goverbment would like the British 
Consul present though not neoessarily to take a part. All this was asked, 
not that the British Government doubted the efforts of Washington, but to 
appease popular exoitement in England.46 
The next day Consul Letoher notified Washington that a statement 
obtained from Villa had been suppressed in the telegraph office at 
Chihuahua. The statement was that Villa himself ordered the exeoution and 
said nothing of a oourt IIB.rtial. Villa was incensed and threatened to out 
the telegraph wires if bothered further. 
Then Vioe Consul Sbapich at Nogales reported that Carranza pointed out 
that representation regarding the Benton case should not be made through an 
American Consul but through some diplomatic representative of Great Britain 
and that Carranza was dissatisfied that oommunications ooncerning the Benton 
46 F.R. 1914, 851, 852, Doc., 312.41/132. 
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case were being addressed to Villa instead of to him. as he and no~ Villa. 
was in supreme command of the Constitutionalists. On February 29, arrange-
meIIl;s were made for a special train to carry the cOllDllission of two Americans 
and two British, the British'Consul from Galveston and Mrs. Benton to 
Chihuahua. Villa had provided for this. On February 27. Bryan oonsented 
to the arrangement with minute instructions for the care of the British 
47 
Consul from Galveston. 
On the same day a letter was received at the State Department from the 
British Ambassador at Washington. Spring Rice stated: that he had received 
a telegram from Sir Edward Grey of the Foreign office; that in the telegram 
Grey stated that a statement from the goyernment concerning Benton would be 
demanded by the English people; and that the British government for obvious 
reasons would not take any action themselves at this time. They reserved 
the right to see that justice was secur.ed at the earliest moment. Spring 
Rice was not instructed to make any representation to the Department of 
48 State, but he did so, so there would be no misunderstanding. 
On March 1, word was received from Villa's commander in Juarez for the 
conmdssion to proceed by regular train to Chihuahua. The Commission 
accompanied by the British Consul from Galveston and Mrs. Benton. gathered 
in the office of Colonel Avila in Juarez. Avila's legal adviser was 
present. They confirmed the order given by Villa. but stated that Villa 
must have done so under misapprehension that Carranza had authorized the 
srune. although Carranza had not done so. They stated the commission could 
not proceed without Carranza's permiSSion.49 
47 F.R. 1914, 855, Doc., 312.41/137. 
48 F.R. 1914, 856, Doc.~ 312.41/149. 
49.F.R. 1914 857-858 voc. 312 1 150 
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.' On Maroh 2, it was reported that Carranza ordered Villa to drop the 
Benton case. That no further disoussion be carried on with either the 
Bri tish government or the government of the United States. Bryan sent an 
identic note to Edward, Consul at Juarez; Cobb, Collector of Customs at 
El Paso; Carothers, Special Agent at El Paso; Letoher, Consul at Chihuahua 
and Vice-Consul Simpich at Nogales to await further orders due to the 
complications which had arisen. 
On March 3, 1914, the British Ambassador presented the following 
memorandum to the Department of State. The nemoramum follows: 
In Sir Edward Grey's opinion the situation is 
as .fo llaws : 
Her Majesty's Governnent do not ask the 
Uni ted States Governmen t to take any steps to 
secure justioe, though they would welcome any 
action on their part to tmt end. His Majesty's 
Government ake no complaint of the United States 
Government for reasons of their own. But His 
Majes~'s Government wish it to be clearly under-
stood that they will take whatever steps are 
possible to secure justice being done whenever 
opportunity offers. 
If General Huerta were in anyway responsible 
for a crime against a British sub jeot His Majesty's 
govermnent 'WOuld aot in exactly the same manner. 
They are aware that they can take no neasure 
against Villa at the present tine, but they must 
reserve their liberty to aotwhen contingencies 
arise in the future .'50 
Bri tish Embassy 
Washington, Maroh 3, 1914. 
The que stion threatened to darken the horizon once more when on 
June 18, 1914, a plea came from the British Embassy in regard to the 
sequestration of Benton's property by Villa; but the comedy in Mexico was 
swallowed up by the tragedy in Serajevo. 
50 F.R. 1914, 858-859, Doc., 312.41/181. 
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.' In a little investigation of my awn to satisfy a curiosity whetted by 
such unusual diplomatic procedure, I wrote to Mr. Edward M. Pooley, Editor 
of the El Paso Herald Post, for information. His letter and the enclosed 
memorandum follow: 
Miss A.E. Pyne 
5527 W. MOnroe Street 
Chioago, III ino is 
Dear Miss Pyne: 
May 28,1937 
In the story of Willi8.ll S. Benton you 
have run across one of the most interesting mysteries 
of the border. I don't believe you will ever be able 
to round out your thesis by locating the burial place 
of Benton. 
Attached is a memorandum from a member of 
our staff who has spent many years on the border. 
Yours very truly, 
E.M. Pooley. 
The memorandum follows verbatim.: 
Benton went to Juarez to see Villa about damage to 
his rahch property. What became of him. no one knaws, 
members of the family in El Paso say. Various stories 
are told. One is that Fierro, Villa's chief of staff 
started to shoot Benton, and Villa beat him. to the 
draw and killed Benton. One &tory is that Benton's 
body was taken on a train to Villa Ahumada, south of 
Juarez. There a mock military trial was held and 
Benton sentenced to death for insulting Villa. His 
body was buried near Villa Ahumada according to this 
version. Another story is that Benton's body was 
placed in the firebox of a railroad engine and burned. 
Newspaper men established, to all practical purposes, 
that Benton was shot to death in the presence of Villa 
in Juarez. 
Benton's r~nch property was not confiscated by Villa. 
In later years agrarians have settled on part of the 
property under Mexico's agrarian laws, just as other 
property has been taken over. Under this procedure 
the government pays the property owner with govern-
ment bonds. 51 
.' 
There is a change in the tone of the memorandum from the British 
Embassy in WaShington. delivered at the State Department on November 17, 
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1914. President Wilson based his Mexican policy on the rights of humanity, 
and here the note was struck. Trouble rose about Tampico again and Spring 
Rice stated: "His Majesty's Ambassador has the honor under instructions from 
Sir Edward Grey to request "the Secretary of State to be so good as to ask 
the Secretary of the Navy to cause directions to be sent to the United 
States Naval Senior Officer in Mexican waters to give such protection as 
may be possible to British lives and interests and to afford refuge to 
British subjects.,,52 
On November 19, 1914. Secretary of State Lansing communicated ~th 
Secretary of the Navy. Daniels, in the interests of British subjects and 
property, along the east coast of Mexico. Secretary of the Navy Daniels 
replied on November 20, 1914 that the Commander in Chief of the Detached 
Squadron in Mexican waters had been detailed for this duty.53 The great 
engines of war that President Wilson had noted in his speech to the United 
States Military Acade~, June 5, 1914,54 did fulfill at least a part of 
the mission he so desired for them. 
President Wilson's foreign policy in Mexico, came in contact with the 
British foreign policy which had been developed there under our "Dollar 
Diplomacy" days. The "Dollar Diplomacy" days were the years of Secretary 
51 Personal letter from E.M. Pooley, Editor of El Paso Herald Post, El Paso, 
Texas. 
52 F.R. 1914. 865-866, Doc., 312.41/300. 
53 F.R. 1914 866. Doc., 312.41/305. 
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.' gno~'S peaceful development of Mexico, from 1909 to 1913. They marked the 
olosing days of the reigh of Parfirio Diaz, the days "when financial sound-
neSs and political stability had the authority of the national government 
.t "55 behind ~ • 
The people appeared divided in their opinion between the "Dollar 
Diplomacy" and the "Idealism" of Wilson. It was stated that a well develop 
e~pression of our foreign policy and the uses to which our diplomatic corps 
1f'8.S put might clear the situa.tion. Some felt Mr. Wilson was both a states-
man and a politician in domestic matters but was wrong in his foreign policy 
t h · ·d 1· 56 due 0 ~s ~ ea ~sm. 
The Mexicans had no illusions; they were a unit in their fear of 
England and the United States. They felt that the Monroe Doctrine protected 
and covered the depredations of Anglo-American big business in exploiting 
the magnificent natural resources of Mexico.57 The foundation for all this 
dissatisfaction was ably expressed by a member of the United States diplo-
matic corps 'When he stated "Suppose you wanted to know every place in the 
world where a new brand of hair-pins, or steam shovels or lithographs would 
find a market. A circular letter - and as fast as steamships and railroads 
and couriers could bring them to your desk you would be in possession of 
reports from each of your 570 branch offices. Then you would know your 
58 
market; also the industrial and commercial si tmtion." 
In an estimation of the results of this chapter the writer feels that 
55 Henry M. Hyde, "Dollar Diplomacy" Everybody's Magazine, XXV, 758-759 
July-December, 1911. 
56 Editorial, "The Idealism of Wilson" Current Opinion, LVII, ale July-
December, 1914. 
57 J. Fred Rippy, "Literary Yankeephobia." The Journal of International 
Relations, XII, 526, 1911-1922. 
~ .anY understandings between governments are arrived at in an .' informal 
manner; ~hat ~he understandings are no~ always for ~he best in~erests of 
the people who form. and pro~ect ~hat governmen~; and that the Consular 
Offices are the advance agen~ for business rather ~han expounders of 
culture. 
-58 (continued from p.38) 
George E. Hol~, "A Business Proposi~ion" ~ Independen~, Vol. LXXV, 
737 July-Sep~ember, 1913. 
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CHAPTER III 
TEE NEUTRALITY OF 1914-1917 
The neutrality which the United States proclaimed in 1914, was the 
neutrality of Washington and his immediate successors. It was the 
neutrali ty which had about it the sanctity of public opinion and the long 
years of a nation's belief in "No entangling alliances." 
American neutrality was proolaimed on August 4, 1914, by President 
Wilson; two weeks later Wilson oalled upon the oitizens of the United 
States "Ix) remain neutral in thought as well as in deed. Wilson then 
instruoted Ambassador Page to obtain an audienoe with King George and to 
present the following note: 
Sir: 
As offioial head of one of the Powers signatory 
to the Hague Convention, I feel it to be my privilege 
and my duty under Artiole 3 of that Convention to 
say to your Majesty in a spirit of most earnest 
friendship, that I should welcome ~n opportunity to 
aot in the interest of European peaoe either now or 
at any time that might be thought more suitable as 
an ocoasion, "Ix) serve your Majesty and all oon:cerned 
in a way that would afford me lasting oause for 
gratitude and happiness. 
Woodrow Wilsonl 
An identioal note was sent to the rulers of all the warring oountries. 
On August 4, 1914, Wilson wrote to Colonel House and asked him if he 
2 
considered that Wilson could aot in the interest of peace at that time. 
1 Hendrick, Vol. I, 320. 
2 ~., 318. 
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.,> 
House answered that in view of the Senate Resolution on neutrality, it 
3 
would be unwise to tender any further good offices. 
The II!l.chinery to protect the great neutral trade of the United 
states was the next problem which awaited solution. On August 5, 1914, 
the Washington government was presented with a communication from the 
American Ambassador in London, which contained the British lists of 
condi tional and absolute contraband. The lists were the same as t~ose in 
Articles 22 and 24 ot the Declaration of London which had been set up in 
1909; the single exception being the transfer of aircraft from the 
4 
conditional to the absolute list. 
On August 6, 1914, the Secretary of State torwarded a oommunication 
to Ambas sador Page whioh he was to present to the British government. 
In it the request was made to observe the Deolaration of London as the 
working agreement on trade between the belligerents during the war. The 
Secretary of State remarked that by adopting the Declaration of London 
as their working agreement, grave misunderstandings between neutrals and 
belligerents might be avoided.5 Evidently a delay occurred in the answer 
to this note for on August 19, 1914, Secretary Bryan again addressed a 
communication to Great Britain, Franoe, Russia, Germny and Belgium~ 
preSSing for a reply and announcing that Austria had instructed her govern-
ment to use the Declaration of London, conditional on like observance on 
6 
the part of the enemy. On August 20, the Washington government received 
3 Hendrick, 318. 
4 F.R. 1914 Supp., 215-216, Doc., 763.72112/26. 
5 F.R. 1914 Supp., 216, Doc., 763.721l2/48a. 
6 F.R. 1914 Supp., 217, Doc., 763.72112/81. 
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a dispatch from the American Ambassador in London setting up a request 
from Sir Edward Grey of the British Foreign Office. Sir Edward wished to 
knOW what a tti tude the Aus tro-Hungarian and German governments intended 
7 
to adopt toward the Declaration of London. 
On August 26. an undated communication was received by the Secretary 
of state from the American Ambassador in London. The Ambassador's note 
contained a copy of a note from the British Foreign Office dated August 
22, 1914. The British note set up the procedure which the Allies intended 
to follow during the duration of the war. The note was courteous, defin-
ite and self explanatory. The British would not adopt the Declaration of 
London as a working pact, without modification; the language used in this 
note was extrelOOly diplonatic. The changes in the Declaration of London 
would be enacted by Orders in Council. The first order in Council had 
been held at Buckingham Palace on August 20, 1914 and the necessary modi-
fications to the Declaration of London had been nade. The communication 
was signed by E.A. Crowe, and closed with the following paragraph: 
I may add that His Majesty's government in 
deciding to adhere to the rules of the Declaration 
of London, subject only to the aforesaid modifications 
and additions have not waited to learn the intentions 
of the enemy government, but have been actuated by a 
desire to terminate at the earliest moment the condition 
of uncertainty which has been prejudicing the interests 
of neutral trade.B 
The modifications contained the right to change the Declaration of London 
as they pleased and even to aboliSh its measures entirely which they 
eventually did. 
7 F.R. 1914 Supp., 217, (No file No. given) 
8 F.R. 1914 Supp., 218-220, Doe., 763.72112/111. 
43 
.' In a letter covering seven pages and redounding to the everlasting 
glory of Robert Lansing, whose name is signed 'b:> it, the state Department 
set up the case of the neutral world on September 26, 1914. A digest of 
the pertinent statements follows: 
Gernany and Austria-Hungary had agreed to abide by 
the Declaration, the United States gpvernment felt 
keen disappointment in Great Britain's refusal; the 
United States government had depended on the application 
of the International Prize Court which nachinery had been 
set up by Article 7 of the Hague Convention in 1907; 
Great Britain proposed to keep all the provisions of the 
Declaration which were for her benefit and recast those 
that benefited neutrals; Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Order 
in Council of August 20 were entirely unacceptable for 
they set up a "paper blockade" which had been repudiated 
by the old Deolarat ion of Paris in 1856; the term "any 
sufficient evidence" included in Article 3 was vague 
and indirect and left the neutral trade in a position of 
ignorance as to what was expected of them; during the 
Boer War in South Africa, when Lord Salisbury spolm as 
Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, he made the statement that foodstuffs with a 
hostile destination could be considered contraband of 
war only if' they were supplied for the enemy forces; 
it was not sufficient that the forces use the food, it 
nrust be consigned to them at the time of seizure. In 
olosing, the State Department announced that the United 
States government reserved all its rights under the 
law of nations. 9 
. One or two conn:nents are necessary at this point: The British govern-
ment had not waited fo r the answer from the belligerents. The United 
States Department followed its strong note of September 26 by another on 
September 28, and olosed the second oommunioationwith this paragraph: 
In presenting the substance of this instruction 
to Sir Edward Grey you will assure him of the earnest 
friendship in which it is sent. The President is 
anxious that he should realize that the terms of the 
Declaration of London represent the limit to which 
this government could go with the approbation and 
9 F.R. 1914 Supp., 225-232, Doe., 763.72112/126. 
support of its people. Telegraph result of 
interview as soon as possible. lO 
Lansing. 
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On October 3, 1914, Colonel House wrote to Page in London as follows: 
I have just returned from Washington where 
I was with the President for nearly four days -
I had the good fortune to be there at a time .wb9n 
the discussion of the Declaration of London had 
reached a critical stage. Bryan was away and 
Lansing, who had not 118ntioned the matter to Sir 
Cecil, prepared a long communication to you which 
he sent to the President for approval. The 
President and I went over it, and I strongly 
urged not sending it until I could have a conference 
wi th Sir Cecil. I had this oonf'erence the next day 
without the knowledge of anyone excepting the 
President, and had another the day following. Sir 
Cecil told me that' if the dispatoh had gone to you 
as written and you had shown it to Sir Edward Grey, 
it would almost have been a deolaration of war; and 
the. t if by any ohance, the newspapers had got hold 
of it, the greatest panic would have prevailed. 
He said it would have been the Venezuela incident 
xmgnified by present oonditions. At the President's 
suggestion, Lansing them prepared a oablegram to 
you. This wo was objeotionable and the President 
and I together softened it dawn into the one you 
reoeived. 
Faithfully yours, 
E.M. House 
In justice to Mr. Lansing, Page stated that in a later letter Mr. House 
said Lansing did not write the dispatch but that he did submit it to the 
President. Page also stated that the suppressed oommunioationwas 
11 
probably lost forever. Apparently the bark of neutrality had been 
launched on a stormy sea. 
An investigation of the Declaration of London brought forth the 
following information: The Declaration of London whioh was drawn up by 
F.R. 1914 ., 232-233, Doo., 763.72112/359a 
r 
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.' Naval Conference of London, held in 1909, was closely bound up with the 
convention which established an International Prize Court. This convention 
was drawn up by the Hague Peace Conference in 1907. The Conference of 
1899 had set up rules for war on land. The Conference of 1907 bad set up 
the Court to deoide on maritime oases, but there was no law against which 
this court could function; so in Deoember of 1908, the representatives of 
all the important c ountrie s, ten in all, met in London and del ibera ted for 
three months under the presidency of the Earl of Desart. It was England 
12 
who called the meeting and it was an Englishman who presided. Any 
examination of the document, which resulted from these deliberations, must 
13 
present the gains resulting to neutrals. The Court which had been set 
up in 1907 was to consist of 16 judges, of whom nine were a quorum; 
the judges named by eaoh of the eight Great Powers were always to sit, 
and the other members were drawn from a fixed rota of judges named by the 
14 
Lesser Powers. 
Another consideration enters at this point, that is the ratification 
of the instrument known as the Deolaration of London, which oonsisted of 
the codification of all maritime regulations from 1856 down to and includi 
1909. The Declaration of London had been signed by the English represen-
tative. A me~e teohnicality made the consent of Parliament necessary. 
The International Prize Courts were to supersede the authority of the 
12 NorIllln Bentwich, The Declaration of London. Effingham Wilson, 64 
Threadneedle-street, LondOn,-r911, 6-7. 
13 Ibid., 39-40. 
14 ma., 5. 
r 
!5 
English Prize Courts, and this needed the consent of Parliament. The 
treaty between England and Belgium had not been ratified by the English 
16 
Parliament, and yet England had gone to war over it. Now they were 
withdrawing the docu.nent which guaranteed the very life of neutrals and 
17 
which had been ratified by the United States Senate. If no injury was 
done to neutral trade, then no injury was done to Germany, and the whole 
matter was just a blunder. 
The records of the 1907 oonference disclosed that the United States 
was not entirely free from taint. The English government agreed to give 
46 
up the principle of contraband between the Powers 'Who signed the covenant. 
The right of searoh was kept merely to determine the character of the 
vessel. Twenty-five nations voted for this proposal; four passed their 
vote; five voted in the negative; and they were, Germany, Franoe, Russia, 
Montenegro and - the United States. When the attention of the American 
delegation was oalled to the vigorous letter of Seoretary Marcey in 1856 
on this question they bluntly said that America had learned muoh in the 
meantime and was following the polioies of Roosevelt rather than those of 
18 
Maroey_ The British set up their defense on the ground that the Declara-
tion had been drawn too hastily and that it was a mere codification of 
laws and had never been ratified by Parliament, consequently it was not 
19 
binding on them. 
15 H. Sidebotham, Et.Al., Freedom of the Seas, Towards A Lasting Peace. 
The Macmillan Co., New York, 1916, 69. 
16 Ibid _, 69. 
17 F:R: 1914 Supp., 248-249, Doc., 763.72112/164. 
18 John M. Davis, "Anglo-American Relations" Foreign Affairs, An American 
Quarterly ReView, Vol. 7, 351-352, October 1928-July !929. 
19 Gilbert MUrray, Great Britain's Sea Policy, T.F. Unwin, London, 1917, 4-5. 
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.' England went merrily on her way unheeding the storm of protests. 
On October 9, 1914, the Declaration of London was again modified in its 
conditional and absolute contraband features. The Orders in Counoil of 
August 4, and August 20, also those of September 21, were withdrawn. In 
the communications whioh .flood the Foreign Relations at this time is one 
which oaused trouble. Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Sir Ceoil Spring Rice 
to the effect that the United States government had made certain proposals 
to place on the unconditional contraband list such articles as motor oil, 
motors, and barbed wn-e. Lansing at once telegraphed Ambassador Page that 
the suggestions had been made by Spring Rice and not by the State Depart-
20 
ment. The discuss'ions over oontraband and Orders in Council continued 
throughout 1914, 1915 and up to the spring of 1916. On April 4, 1916 
"The Declaration of London Order in Council, 1916" gwept away the last 
remining difference between conditional and absolute contraband. It also 
21 
removed the difference between blockaded and open ports. 
On April 8, 1916, Lansing addressed a oommunication to Page and told 
him that as the Washington government was at that time considering a 
former Order in Council and as the British Government had not replied to a 
former protest of the American Government, the Order in Council of April 
22 
~, 1916, would be considered an intentional discourtesy. PagelS) reply 
is an excuse for the long delay of the answer to the Washington protest of 
October 21, 1915, and a promise that an answer would be immediately 
20 F.R. 1914 Supp., 247, Doc., 763.72112/157. 
21 F.R. 1916 Supp., 361, Doc., 763.7211212398. 
22 F.R. 1916 Supp., 362, Doc., 763, 72112/2398. 
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.' forwarded to the State Department. There is no oritioism of the new 
. C 'I 23 order ~ ouno~. 
On April 10. 1916. the Consul General in London, Robert Skinner, 
fl'ote to Lansing that the Judioial Committee of the Privy Counoil had that 
day rendered a deoision that the British Prize Courts must be ruled by 
interna tional law as against Orders in Couna 11. The same day the President 
of the Prize Court stated that as :rm.tterw stood: "'it might be found that 
right dootrine now was tmt Orders in Counoil which proposed to alter 
international law were invalid, in whioh case he would have to prooeed 
24 
without the assistanoe of any orders in oounoil.,11 Ambassador Page 
stated that the deoision delivered by Lord Parker for the Judioial 
Committee of the Privy Council April 7, 1916, in the appeal from the prize 
courts's decision in the oase of the S.S. Zamora was as follows: 
The law which the priz e courts was to administer 
was not the national, or as it was sometimes called. 
the munioipal law, but the law of nations; in other 
wo rds. international law. If a pri ze oourt in the 
Uni ted Kingdom was bound bY', and gave effect to the 
order of the King in Counoil. purporting to presoribe 
or alter tile international law, it was administering 
not international.law but munioipal law. 25 . 
There were no more Orders in Council; the need had passed. Condit 
and absolute oontraband were the same. The deoision of Lord Parker does 
no·t; appear again in the Foreign Relations. We IID.lst turn to some pronounce-
ments of our statesmen for the solution of a question that touched so many 
lives and yet was left unsolved. 
23 F.R. 1916 Supp., 362-363, Doc. 763.72112/2423. 
24 F.R. 1916 Supp., 364, Doc. 300.115/8039. 
25 F .R. 1916, Supp., 367-368, Doc., 300.l~5/8071. 
Viscount Grey implied that it was our awn fault. He said, ~he 
united states was able to do Whatever it felt to be right or desirable 
.ithout fear of the consequences. It was factor so potentially important 
49 
tba.t its attitude might be decisive in deciding the war in favor of either 
26 
of the belligerents. It Our Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, explained 
the si tua tion as follows: "The notes that were sent were long and 
exhaustive treatises which opened up new subjects of discussion rather than 
olos ing those in controversy. Everything was submerged in verbosity. 
It was done with deliberate purpose - continuance of the controversy -
questiOns unsettled - country free to act and even to act illegally when 
27 
it entered the war.1t 
The Orders in Council were only one step in the British war on 
neutrals. The orders must function on goods and gpods meant ships so the 
next move was to intercept the ships. On March II, 1915, England deolared 
a blockade of all Ger.man ports. This was illegal for the reason that 
28 
England could not maintain this blockade. England declared that every 
ship destined for or coming from a German port was liable to seizure. 
England also claimed that Germany was laying mines and using submarines so 
she issuedthe following order on October 2, 1915: 
In order to reduce risks to non-combatants the 
Admiralty announced tm tit was dangerous for ships 
to cross the area between latitude 510 15' north 
and longitude 10 35 1 and 30 east. 
It also called attention to the fact that the southern limit of the German 
mine field was 520 north and that no part of the southern waters of the 
29 North Sea was safe for neutral shipping. After November 5, all vessels 
26 Viscount Grey, 168. 
27 Robert Lansing, War Memoirs Bobbs-Merrill Co. New Y 1935 128. 
50 
.' passing a line drawn trom the northern point ot the Hebrides, through the 
Faroe Islands to Ioeland, did so at their awn peril. Ships bound tor 
Denne. rk, Norway and Sweden had to oome by the English Channel, to the Strait 
30 
of Dover, and there get their sailing orders. 
On June 2, 1915, the Amerioan Ambassador announoed a oommunioation 
from the Foreign Ottioe which set up a blockade ot Asia Minor. The area 
o 
of this blockade was to extend trom latitude 310 35' north to latitude 40 
5' north and included the Dardanelles. Seventy two hours of grace trom the 
moment; the blockade began were given for the departure of neutral ships 
31 from the blookaded area. England now controlled the seaJ not only that, 
she oould torce neutral trade to come to her door tor their sailing orders. 
A storm of protest tram neutral shippers met these measures. The 
State Department protested to the Central Powers and Allie·s. Secretary 
Lane at the Wilson Cabinet wrote to Colonel House and said the British had 
32 
made new international law by making a toll road ot the ocean. Secretary 
Bryan said it was needless to point out to Great Britain, usually the 
champion ot the treedom ot the seas, that trade between neutrals should not 
be intertered with by nations at war unless absolutely necessary to protect 
33 
the ir s atety • 
In a further investigation of this question, I tound that the United 
States retulJed to join the North Sea neutral countries in a protest against 
34 
the mining of the North Sea. Dispatches trom Amsterdam stated that up 
28 (continued trom p 50) Hacker and Kendrick, 488. 
29 F.R. 1914 Supp., 460, Doc., 163.72/1104. 
30 McMaster, 54. 
31 F.R. 1915 Supp., 161 Doc., 763.72112/1212. 
32 Seymour, The Intimate Papers ot Col. House, Vol.I, 458-459. 
33 McMaster, 54-55. 
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.' to March 10, 1915, f1-oating contact mines bad been taken up and rendered 
ba~less along the Dutch coast to the number of 378. Of these 214 were of 
35 British origin, 22 German, 33 French, and 109 unknown. 
The next step in the complete control of the highways of the sea was 
the BritishOLack list and the refusal of bunker coal to ships that denied 
England's right to bend neutral trade to her liking. These measures coma 
under the title of Trading with the Enemy {Extension of Powers) Act of 
December, 1915. It is with the Extension of Powers tha. t the black list 
was brought into being. On February 16, 1916, Sir Edward Grey announced to 
the American Ambassador that the act was framad to bring the British 
Trading with the Enemy Act into closer conformity with the French Act. To 
do this nationality as well as domicile was necessary for trade. They did 
not intend to apply the nationality test in all cases but; would pick and 
36 
choose, so as not to disturb trade too much. In reply to a request from 
the State Department, Robert P. Skinner, Consul General at London trams ... 
mitted a corrected list of blacklisted ships, up to March 31, 1916, and 
the total tonnage was 115,268 tons. There were 169 ships of which fourteen 
37 
were American. 
The letters that passed between the American Ambassador and the State 
Department were interesting. In the letter of October 11, 1916, Page 
requested, at the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, that no statement be given 
out till the full text could be published at the same time in England and 
the United States. He closed this letter by saying that he had had a long 
35 Clapp, 142. 
36 F.R. 1916 Supp., 352-353, Doc. 763.72112/2303. 
37 F.R. 1916 Supp., 364, Doc. 300.115/7978. 
38 F.R. 1916 Supp., 455-456, Doc. 763.72112/3049. 
~ oonter""". with Lord 52 • Grey on the subjeot and was to have oonf'erenoes with 
, 
other nembers of the British government. Page stated that the British 
Government saw the blaok list as a mistake but oould not ohange it on 
t f "t"" 38 aoooun 0 or~ ~o~sm. 
On Ootober 13, 1916, Page had a oonferenoe with Lord Robert Ceoil 
and Lord Grey in oonneotionwith the blaok list and as a result Page 
stated to the governnent at Washington that the British government had not 
the sl ightest idea of entering any trade agreement after the war whioh 
39 
would disoriminate against trade with the United states. On Ootober 14, 
1916, Page proposed that he should be permitted unoffioially, to propose 
that the entire list be withdrawn in the United states but that Great 
Britain be granted the legal right to forbid its subjeots from trading with 
their enemies wherever domioiled. If the United States government agreed 
40 
to Pag6s plan they oould instruot ~im offioially. A legal blookade was 
never established by the Allies. They did oontrol all the sea-routes to 
the Central Powers and to the neutral powers near them. Over every avenue 
leading to these oountries stood the Royal Navy. From the very first the 
projeot of starving the Central Powers into submission was oheerfully 
announoed by the Allied press and publio lD3n. In the way of this projeot 
41 
there stood but one dif fi oulty • Tha t was the United State s • 
There was a renarkable sympathy among Grey, Page and House on the 
question of Anglo-Amerioan friendship. Th~ felt that the arbitrary British 
39 F.R. 1916 Supp., 456, Doo. 763.72112/3056. 
40 F.R. 1916 Supp., 456-457, Doo. 763.72112/3058. 
41 Walter Millis, Road to War. AIoorioa 1914-1917. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
New York, 193"5'; '83-"84"; --
.' 42 trade regulations must never be allowed to estrange the two countries. 
Mr. Page was called home during the summer of 1916. Secretary of State 
53 
Lansing states that Page certainly sought to have us surrender many of the 
legal fights of American citizens on the hi~ seas instead of trring to 
•• 
persuade the British to cease their illegal interference which seamed 
43 
needlessly annoying. 
Those who seek for the honest values in 'iplorm.cy, whether it be new 
or old, must experience apprehension at what the documents reveal. The 
great question back of it all is yet unrevealed, bub of one thing we are 
sure, the official representative of a government should consider the 
interests of his own government as paramount. 
Along with the questions arising from trade and the great highways 
of the sea ran the more obscure thread of peace; from the first there were 
those who felt t:mt the problems which led to the war could be answered if 
only the belligerents would state them. 
In August of 1914, President Wilson had pr~red his good offioes in 
an identioal note to all the belligerents and on October 3, 1914, Colonel 
House wrote to Ambassador Page in London the following letter: 
Both Bernstorff and Dumba say that their 
countries are ready for peaoe talks, but the 
difficulty is with England. Sir Ceoil says 
the ir statements are made merely to place 
England in a false position. The attitude, I 
think, for England to maintain is the one whioh 
she so ably put forth to the world. That is;. 
peaoe must come only upon oondition of disarmanent 
and must be permanent •••• When the war is over and 
42 David S. Muazy, "Review of Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916" in Political 
Science ~uarterly, Vol. 41, 289. January 1925-Deoember 1925. 
43 Lansing, 166. 
.' the necessary territorial alignments made, it seems 
to ~ the best guarantee could be brought by every 
nation in Europe guaranteeing the territorial integrity 
of every other nation. By confining the manufacture 
of arms to the governments themselves end by permitting 
representatives of all nations to inspect, at any time, 
the works •••• 1 em writing you this with the President's 
knowledge and consent and with the thought that it will 
be conveyed to Sir Edward.44 
The second drive for peace began on December 4, 1914, when Colonel 
House again wrote to Ambassador Page as follows: 
The President desires to start peace parleys at 
the very earliest moment, but he does not wish to 
offend the sensibilities of either side by making a 
proposal before the time is opportune •••• Our people 
are beooming restless. Would you mind conveying this 
thought delicately to Sir Edward Grey and letting me 
know what he thinks •••• This nation would not look 
with favour upon a polioy that held nothing but the 
complete annihilation of the enemy.45 
On Deoember 12, 1914, Ambassador Page replied. Page stated that if 
anyone could set up a basis for the complete restoration of Belgium and 
for the elimination of militarism in Genmny, he was sure the English 
would talk on that basis. Page questioned the elimination of militarism. 
54 
It would be hard for Englend to demand that Gerrmny should give up her artrr;! 
while she retained her navy. When he reported upon the feeling in England, 
he said: "The plain fact is that the Engl ish people, and especially the 
English military and mval people don't care a fig what the Americans think 
and feel •••• A part of the public, then, and the military part of the 
oabinet don't longer care for ~rican opinion and they resent even such a 
reference to peaoe as the President made in his message to Congress. But 
the civil part of the cabinet and the responsible and better part of the 
44 Hendric k, 412. 
45 ~., 416. 
"46 people do care very much •••• .' 
55 
On December 20, 1914, House met Spring-Rice at the home of Phillips of 
the State Department. Spring-Rice told Phillips, that he had had a cable-
gram from Sir Edward Grey concerning the peace proposals and that Sir 
EdWard Grey felt it would not be a gpod thing for the Allies to stand out 
against the peace proposals of Deoember 12, 1914. It was understood that 
47 
this was the personal opinion of Sir Edward Grey. On December 23, 1914, 
House nade the following notation, ''When I met Spring-Rioe, he said he had 
received another cablegram from Sir Edward Grey and while he was personally 
agreeable to the suggestion made, he had not yet taken it up with his own 
cabinet, much less with the Allies. He felt there would be difficulties 
with France and Russia, and great difficulty in effecting a plan by which 
48 
a permanent settlement might be brought about." 
This marked the end of the first drive for peace. Several ideas take 
shape in the documents of this period: they are, (1) In the President's 
message of December 8, 1914, he had called upon Congress to consider a 
measure of self government for the Philippines to demonstrate our prinoiples 
49 
of justice and unselfishness. (2) Colonel House states that Wilson's 
conviction was firm that the winter of 1914-1915 was the time to bring the 
warring nations together and that he never departed from that conviction. 
Also that his peace terms considered the elimination of militarism on land 
and sea. This llBant that Gernany should give up her army and England her 
navy. House states that they heeded the wishes of the Allies with the 
46 Henrick, 417. 
47 Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol.I, 341. 
48 Ibid., 341-342. 
49 Scott, 75-76. 
50 
result that the war fastened itself on Europe. .' 
56 
In January, 1915, House wrote to Page and asked for advice in regard 
to the peace conditions in England. House s~ated that he believed the Dual 
51 
Alliance was thoroughly ready for peace. In a rather tangled memorandum 
Page' notes that the Kaiser had asked President Wilson to transmit to 
Great Britain a suggestion for making peace on the basis of surrendering 
Belgium and of Plying for its restoration. Field Marshal French, who was 
52 
home on leave, had told Page about this. It was decided to send House to 
Europe. The warnings he received are interesting: Spring Rice told him 
there was a group in England Whom he compared to the Northern Copper Heads 
of our Civil War and that they would seize upon any excuse for peace; and 
53 
that there was another group which would be hostile to any peace. On 
January 22, 1915, Sir Edward Grey wrote to House and warned him. that the 
feeling in England was hostile, as the United States had singled out Great 
54 
Britain as the only great Power whose conduct was worthy of reproach. 
On January 13, 1915, Colonel House, Sir Cecil Spring~Rice, Jusserand 
and BaKnmetieff, the English, French and Russian Ambassadors respectively, 
met at the home of Phillips of the State Department. Spring-Rice was sulky, 
and Jusserand and Bakhmetieff were violent in their criticism of the whole 
55 
affair. 
Colonel House reached London early in February. He carried with him. 
a letter of credentials which made House the confidential agent of President 
50 Hendrick, 423-424. 
51 Ibid., 424-425. 
52 IOfcr., 426-427. 
53 Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol.I, 356-357. 
54 Ibid., 347. 
55 Ibid., 350-352. 
57 
~ ~ 
Wilson. House ~de no progress in London at this time, so he went to 
Gernany to see wmt the real conditions were. On March 26, 1915, House 
wrote to Page and stated tm t in his opinion no government could live here 
at this time if peace was proposed upon terms that would have any chance 
of acceptance. House said the people had been so misled and their minds 
~ere so inflamed by the press, speeches and otherwise that no peace 
57 
impressions registered. House returned to England and was there when the 
Lusitania was sunk by a German torpedo on May 7, 1915. 
Two ideas grew out of this peace move. President Wilson demanded two 
conventions; one by belligerents to settle their quarrel, and a second by 
belligerents and neutrals, to settle questions of general importance growing 
oul; of the war. Page's idea at this time was a partnership composed of the 
United States, Great Britain, and the British Dominions for a trusteeship 
58 
for democratic civilizations. The writers are divided in their opinion 
of Wilson's course in 1915. Certain groups believe that about the middle 
of 1915, Wilson was a partisan of the Allies, but tmt he held himself 
neutral, partly because of the idea of peacemaker, that began to develop in 
59 
his mind. Others state that he had a half hearted notion of bringing all 
the combatants together on a basis of good will. That with these thoughts 
in mind )Ie made statements which served only to bewilder the American people 
60 
and caused the Germans to let loose a few more submarines. 
56 Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol.I, 354. 
57 Hendrick, 433. 
58 A.A. Asquith, M.P., The Genesis of the War - Cassell and Company, London, 
1923, 156. - ---
59 Wark Sullivan, Our Times. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1933,Vol.5, 
220. 
60 W.E. Woodward, A New American History. Literary Guild Inc., New York, 
1937, 743. 
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.' Colonel House sailed for home on the St. Paul on June 5, 1915. "He 
had been given a private code that would perWit him to communicate speedily 
and informally with Sir Edward Grey, and the British Foreign Secretary 
61 
promised to write him frankly and frequently." 
Following the sinking of the Arabic, Secretary of State Lansing said 
in August 1915, "The sinking of the Arabic has stirred the people deeply 
and there is much indignation against Germany. This is especially true 
of the Eastern States. The reports from the West show that the region is 
disposed to be indifferent to this last outrage. This lack of unity in 
popular feeling made the adoption of a stronger policy in discussing the 
62 
matter with the Gennan Ambassador very difficult.1t The attitude of 
England was expressed by her Minister of Munitions in an interview with 
NT. Roy Howard, United Press of America. "The right must be to a finish 
- to a knock out •••• " His words were obviously addressed as much to 
63 
America as to Germany. 
On August 26, 1915, Sir Edward Grey wrote to Colonel House as follows: 
"If the end of this war is arrived at through mediation, I believe it must 
64 
be through that of the United States. On September 22, 1915, Greywrote 
again and stated that "To me the great object of securing the elimination of 
militarism and na.valism is to get seourity for the future against aggressive 
wars. How much are the United States prepared to do in this direction? 
Would the President propose that there should be a League of Nations binding 
themselves to side against any Power whioh broke a treaty, or which broke 
61 Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. I, 470. 
62 Lansing, 45-46. 
63 Irene Cooper WilliS, England's Holy War. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1928 
64 Se 22£.:22~e Intimate Pa ers of Colo~ u 
59 
.' oertain rules of warfare on sea or land, or Which refused, in case of 
65 
dispute, to adopt some other method of settlement other than that of war?" 
It was this letter which House took to Wilson and to which House and 
Wilson drafted the reply. Wilson wrote the letter; document follows: 
Since it seems probable that this country must 
break with Germany on the submarine question unless 
the unexpected happens, and since, if this country 
should once become a belligerent, the war would 
undoubtedly be prolonged, I beg to suggest that if 
you had any thought of acting at an early date on 
the plan we agreed upon, you might wish now to 
consult with your allies with a view to acting 
immediately. 66 
House had made plain to Sir Edward Grey the terms that he regarded 
as a reasonable peace; France was to have Alsace-Lorraine; Belgium and 
Serbia was to be restored; Russia was to get Constantinople; and there was 
to be a league of nations to prevent aggressive wars. House doubted that 
the Allies could give Germany the "knock out" blow Page desired, and he 
doubted the unselfish attitude of the Allies. House felt that such a 
peace would hold the Allies back and be a death blow to German militarism.67 
House wrote to Sir Edward Grey and stated that the matter had better 
rest between Sir Edward and him until the time was propitious. He also 
stated that he had better visit Europe again as he felt he should acquaint 
the Central Powers with the peace measure and if they were obdurate then we 
68 
would join the Allies. On November 9, 1915, Sir Edward Grey cabled to 
Colonel House and asked if the proposal was to include the League of Nations 
as set up in Grey's letter of September 22, 1915. To this House, with 
65 Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol.II, 89. 
66 Ibid., 232. 
67 Ibid. ,135:-136.. 
68 'I'I5IQ. 90-91. 
60 
.' Wilson's approval, answered in the affirmative. Colonel House states that 
69 
Wilson had begun to take his place in world affairs at this point. 
Toward the close of November, 1915, Colonel House received a reply 
from Sir Edward Grey. Sir Echvard stated that he was so sure the Allies 
.ould refuse the plan that he had not discussed its possibilities with 
them. He must have a more definite 0 fier. The remainder of the letter 
emphasized the feeling in allied countries over the refusal of the United 
70 
states to accept the principle of the blockade. President Wilson felt 
Ambassador Page would not help as he was so pro-ally that he did not have th 
Washington point of view at all. On Septeniber 26, 1915, Page had written 
a letter to President Wilson and told him that American prestige in England 
.as gone. That England regarded us as credulous to the point of simplicity 
and that we would learn the German's real character when it was too late 
71 
to save our honor or our dignity. It was determined at this point to 
send House to England to see What the real situation was. 
In a memorandum to Colonel House on November 16, 1915, Sir William 
Wiseman stated that he had been selected as a discreet channel through 
which communications between Colonel House and the British Embassy might be 
72 
conducted. Sir William WiseIIEln was the head of the British Secret Service 
in Washington at tmt time. One wonders just what messages passed back and 
73 
forth between Sir William and the British Embassy. 
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.' At home the real peace lovers had attempted to put through Congress 
a measure which would prevent Americans from traveling on armed merohant 
or passenger ships. The measure was known as the Gore-MoLemore resolution. 
president Wilson opposed this resolution. The MoLemore resolution was 
defeated while the Gore resolution was never submitted to a vote.74 The 
significance of this measure lies in the division of opinion whioh it 
reveals. This legislation was foroed in January and February of 1916. The 
vote as reoorded on the tabling of the McLemore resolution was as follows: 
For tabling 
Republican 93 
Democrat 182 
Against tabling 
RepUblican 102 
Democrat 33 
This vote is interesting as it shows the division which existed among th~ 
75 
members of Congress in February 1916. 
The first peace move drifted naturally into the second and on December 
15, 1915, House sailed for Europe on another peace quest. An agreement 
had been entered into by President Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing, and 
Colonel House. By this agreement Colonel House superseded all other 
ambassadors. President Wilson gave House the "To Whom It May Concern" 
letter as his trusted and confidential spokesman. In effect, those in 
Europe to whom the letter was intended to be shown, realized at once that 
76 
House reflected the President's mind. 
Colonel House was in England at the time carrying the President's "To 
Whom It May Concern" note. On January 16, 1916, House wrote to Wilson, 
74 Hacker and Kendriok, 494. 
75 Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 217. 
76 Henry Stoddard, As I Knew Them. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1927. 
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.' It would be a calamity if anything should 
happen to prevent Sir Edward Grey's continuance 
in the government until peace is I1Bde. And yet 
if we push them too hard upon the question of 
neutral trade he is likely to go •••• Nearly every 
American here and this inoludes our entire 
Embassy, I think, would be glad to see us come 
into the war on the side of the Allies. This 
feeling is shared, of course, by many Englishmen 
and by all the French, althougll. one is constantly 
told that this is not desired. 77 
62 
Shortly after Colonel House arrived in England he must have felt the 
need of greater assurance from Wilson than the letter he carried for he 
cabled Wilson as follows: "It would help in the conference Monday if you 
would cable me some assurance of your willingness to cooperate in a policy 
78 
seeking to bring about and maintain permanent peace." Wilson at once 
cabled Ho'Use that he might convey the assurance that he, Wilson, would be 
willing and glad when the opportunity came, to cooperat.e in a policy seeking 
to bring about and maintain permanent peaoe among civilized nations. House 
states that this telegram is historic as it marked a clear cut departure 
79 from the American policy of isolation. 
Colonel House made an interesting statement at this point. House 
stated that he advised Wilson not to have an actua~ break with Germany at 
80 
this time, but that Lansing advised th~ measure. The modus vivendi of 
January 18, 1916, was a Lansing measure designed to regularize our position 
in the struggle. The subIlBrine was to be bound by the rule of visit and 
searoh and the merchant vessel was to be armed for defensive powers only. 
On Februa~ 16, 1916, the Secretary of State sent a circular letter to all 
77 Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 133-134. 
78 Ibid., 116-117. 
79 I'I3"ia., 117. 
80 ~bid _, ll8. 
the American Diplomatic Offices in Europe, in whioh he stated 
'that a merchant vessel is presumptively armed for 
offensive purposes if it carries in these days an 
armament which makes it superior offensively to the 
submarine, which is now a reoognized naval weapon, 
it feels that the present rule of international law 
permitting belligerent merchant vessels to arm ought 
.' 
to be changed; that nevertheless the government does 
not feel tha t during the war it can change or disregard 
the established rule without the assent of the con-
tending belligerents; that the proposal to the Entente 
powers of a modus vivendi for tile protection of unarmed 
merchant vessels against attack without warning by 
submarines was made in the interest of obtaining for 
humanity's sake the assent of the warring powers to 
the removal of armament of any sort from merchant 
ships during tile present war; •••• ,81 
Then on January 18, 1916, the modus vivendi was sent to the British 
Foreign Office for acceptance or rejection. Two letters of Ambassador 
Page at this time are significant. On January 25, 1916, Page wrote to 
63 
Lansing. "I have only once before seen Sir Edward so grave and disappointed 
and that was when he informed me that the British had sent the German 
government an ultimatum. Then he asked me for House's address •••• 
tilt has been rumored here in well informed circles for several weeks, 
and I believe it is true, that the British Government have been constructing 
extra munition works in England and Canada which can on short notice be 
manned and used to make as many munitions as the United States now supplies. 
The reason given for this expensive preparation is the fear of Bernstorff's 
Success in his efforts to cause the Administration to embarrass the Allies. 
If necessary, orders placed in the United States could now be stopped within 
a month without diminishing the total supply. If no merchantman may carry 
a defensive gun into an American port this change my precipitate a cutting 
81 F.R. 1916 Supp., 170, Doc. 763.72/2412b 
rr 64 
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off of American orders not from any wish to cut them off but for fear that 
ot.~r embarrass ing acts by us Tray follow." 82 
The other letter was written on January 28, 1916, and sent to 
secretary of State Lansing. The pertinent paragraph follows: "Should such 
a proposal be urged, it would probably provoke a sharp and perhaps angry 
reply from all the Allies, if I judge correctly from what I hear. If it 
should be made public with your comments it would inflame British public 
opinion against us, and it therefore seems to be prudent, after my conver-
sation with Grey, to advise strongly against pressing your tentative 
suggestion and that you treat it as you did the proposal about the Declara-
83 tion of London." On March 23, 1916, the reply of the allied governments 
was sent to Washington. The French language was the medium. used for 
communication. The letter was long but at last the Foreign Office managed 
to convey the understanding that the modus vivendi proposed by Lansing 
84 
was unfavorable to the Allies. 
In February, House and Grey formula ted the following agreement. The 
agreement is headed "confidential" and is as follows: 
"Colonel House told me that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from 
France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose that a confer-
ence should be summoned to put an end to the war. Should the Allies accept 
this proposal and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably 
enter the war against Germa.ny~ Grey states that House told him that if this 
conference failed, the United States would leave the conference a belliger-
82 F.R. 1916 Supp., 151-152, Doc. 763.72/2355 1/2 
83 F.R. 1916 Supp., 152-153, Doc. 763.72/2356. 
84 F1R. 1916 Supp., 211-212, Doc. 763.72/2525. 
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.' 
.nt on the side of the Allies. Grey did not commit his government in any 
85 
On February 7, 1916, House canvassed the whole matter with the French 
representatives. He told them that the lower the fortunes of the Allies 
86 
ebbed the closer the United states would stand by them. When House 
returned to Washington he brought with him his copy of the confidential 
memorandum drawn up by House and Grey in London. President Wilson accepted 
it as written with the insertion of the one word, "probably," in the last 
phrase. The memorandum as set up by Sir Edward Grey and accepted by Wilson 
follows: 
Colonel House told me that President Wilson was ready 
on hearing from France and England that the moment 
was opportune to propose that a conference should be 
summoned to put an end to the war. Should the Allies 
accept this proposal, and should Germany refuse it, 
the United States would probably enter the war against 
Germ ny .87 
It was this word "probably" that raised a vital question as to whether 
President Wilson would be able to carry the American people with him in an 
88 
appeal to arms. 
The summer of 1916 produced a lull in the diplomatic battle with the 
odds in favor 0 f the Germa.ns. Page had been called home to obtain a better 
understanding of the American point of view and a Presidential election 
was in the offing. President Wilson was reelected on the slogan "He kept 
us out of war" but all the governments of Europe knew that the end must 
come soon. The German General Staff warned of the approaching end of their 
85 Grey, 126-127. 
86 Seymour, 163. 
87 Grey, 126-121. 
88 G.P.Gooch,Reoent Revelations of European 's Green &Co J.63 
.' resources. The French, worn by the battles of Verdun and Somms, depended 
~ore and more on the English, and Grey's memorandum showed that England's 
support of shipping or finance, or of both, must be curtailed in a few 
89 
~onths. From September 22, 1916, to January 22, 1917, the peace moves 
and counter moves were many. On September 22, 1916, at Shadow Lawn, 
66 
president Wilson had announced to Ambassador Page that he would begin peaoe 
~ves soon. Page did not want this done. On October 9, 1916, the Kaiser, 
in so mny words, had notified Wilson that peace measures must be taken or 
the German government would be forced to regain the freedom of action which 
she had retained for herself in the Sussex note of March 4, 1916. On 
December 12, 1916, Germany proposed a peace conference in England. 
Ambassador Page delivered the communication to Sir Robert Cecil who was 
acting for Mr. Balfour. At the same ti~, President Wilson sent a confi-
dential telegram to Page to find out what the Allies' peace terms would 
incl ude. The German peace note and Wilson's inquiry for confidential 
90 information, came on the same day, December 12, 1916. On December 18, 
1916, Wilson sent a note on the peace aims of the United States and used 
the following words, "The President takes the liberty of calling attention 
to the fact that the objects 'which the statesmen of the belligerents on 
both sides have in mind in the war are virtually the same, as stated in 
general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to 
make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states as secure 
against aggression and denial in the future as the rights and privileges of 
91 
the great and powerful states now at war." 
89 Seymour, 409-410. 
90 Hendrick, 201-202. 
91 Ibid., 204-05. 
67 
.' The British government read to the comma after same, and stopped. A close 
censorship of the press followed, for this was no time to show displeasure 
to the United States. Page states that Wilson was merely preparing for his 
role as mediator. That as mediator he wished to remain unprejudiced. The 
conditioh of Europe at this moment made the English gover.nment hesitate to 
refuse aid. Rumania had collapsed, the Russian revol ution was a certainty, 
British finances were in a desperate condition, and England well knew the 
92 
German su'bnarine horror threa tned. The President had asked for confiden-
tial peace terms from England. Lord Robert Cecil said that it would be 
difficult to grant the request as the President's note or comments on it 
had been made public, therefore the reply should be given to the press. 
93 This was the procedure followed. House states that Wilson did not press 
further for information but he did press for delay. It appears from the 
communications at this time that none of the Allies cared to know what the 
German terms were. Page says Wilson was determined to oompel the warring 
powers to make peaoe and in this way keep the United States out of the 
conflict. 
On Janua~ 16, 1917, the American Embassy began reoeiving a long 
Cipher dispatch of a speech Wilson was soon to make to Congress. In this 
speech he used the phrase, "It mus t be a peace wi thout victory." The 
Germans in the meantime, had again asked for a conference but had stated 
no terms. The British reply was prepared by Balfour and stated definite 
terms suggesting a victorious 
92 Hendrick, 207. 
93 Ibid., 211. 
94 Ibid., 211-212. 
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peace. Page cabled Wilson and asked for 
68 
.' tbe removal of the objectionable phrase, but the request was not granted. 
In the Ireantime, Germany began to move toward an unrestricted submarine 
.arfare. In a memorandum of January 16, 1917, Page again refers to Wilson's 
95 
intentions to play the part of peaceIlRker. 
When Balfour sent his reply to the State Department in Washington 
stating the Allied terms, Nelson Page, the American Ambassador in Italy, 
sent a telegram to Lansing. The telegram is one of protest. Nelson Page 
states: 
Learn goodauthority Balfour note to the President 
much criticised Vatican where it is said cruelties by 
Turks not true reason Allies wish their expulsion 
from Europe; allege France promised Constantinople to 
Russia in 1913 and oonfirmed promise after Poinoaire's 
election, and England agreed thereto autumn 1914 before 
oommitting any oruelties. Great oritic ism still made 
of partition of Europe desired by England.96 
Nelson Page 
Wilson addressed the Senate on January 22, 1917, and stated, "They 
imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory ••• 1 am 
seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft oonoealments • 
• • • And the pa. ths of the sea mus t alike in law and in fact be free. The 
freedom of the seas is the sine qua ~ of peace, equality ahd oooperation. 
97 
••• They are the principles of mankind and must prevail." 
On January 31, 1917, Germany declared submarine warfare on all ships 
found in waters near Italy, France, and Great Britain. The order was to go 
into effeot February 1, 1917. On February 3, 1917, diplomatio relations 
95 Hendriok, 212,,:,,2:1.3.· , .. . . . 
96 F.R. 1917 Supp., 22, Doo., 763.72/3149. 
97 F.R. 1917 Supp., 24-29, Doc. 763.721l9/405a. 
.' "ith Gerrmny were broken off and Bernstorff sent home. The Foreign 
Relations lists the destruction of ship after Ship but no loss of life 
--among Americans. On March 3, 1917, Page wrote to Wilson and Lansing and 
it is lIRrked for them only. "I find that continued delay in sending out 
American ships, especially American liners, is producing an increasingly 
69 
unfavorable impression. In spite of all explanations, which are imperfectly 
understood here, delay is taken to mean the submission of our government 
to the German blockade ••• The feeling which the newspaper dispatches from 
the United States produce on the British mind is that our government is 
holding back our people until ••• the British Navy shall over come the 
98 
German submarines." On April 6, 1917, we declared war on Germany. 
The long road from "neutrality" to participation had been travele d. 
Page added a second paragraph to a memorandum. written January 16, 1917. 
The paragraph follows: "Just when and how did the President come to see 
the true nature of the GerllRns? What mde him change from Peace-maker to 
War-maker? ••• Was it the pressure of public opinion, the impataence of the 
people tla t pushed him in? ••• Peace without vic tory brought us to the very 
depths of European disfavor ."97 It is interesting to note how many 
historians blame Page for contributing to this change. What the President 
called patience, Page condemned as timidity and later as cowardice. Page 
knew little of American opinion and shared the views of Kitchner and 
French, that only the entry of the United States could turn campromise into 
Victory, so he beoame the interpreter of British views t:l WaShington rather 
100 
than the spokesman of Washington in Downing Street. 
98 F.R. 1917 Supp., 170, Doc. 763.723458 
99 Hendriok, 213 -214 • 
00 198. 
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.' One is safe in saying that President Wilson was a humanitarian • 
. filson was always expecting human beings to act upon the highest motive -
,nd for public rather than private ends. It was one of the great elements 
101 
ot his power as a leader - as it was one of his weaknesses. The 
conflict, which Page questioned, is found not between Gernany and England, 
but in one way between the old tradition of isolation and Wilson's strong 
teeling for humanity which he expressed over and over in his public 
utterances long before there was a war; and secondly, could that humanity 
of his function best as a neutral all the way, or should he join the 
102 
Allies. Wilson was pro-ally from the first; that was because all his 
baokgrounds and traditions were English. He felt that England represented 
all that was democratio in Europe and that the humanities flourished best 
103 
in Democratic soil. 
A growing feeling of indignation against the Allies was refleoted in 
Congress and on September 7, 1916, legislation was passed which contained 
provisions for drastic retaliation against them. The Department of State 
sent Mr. Woolsey, a solicitor of the Department, to consult with the 
Department of Commerce and to request a statement. The memorandum whioh 
the Seoretary of Commerce submitted October 23, 1916, stated significantly: 
101 
102 
Probably the most effective remedy would be to 
refuse clearance to vessels carrying war supplies 
until the orders in counoil and the blacklist are 
wi thdrawn •••• In effect however this would be laying 
an Amerioan embargo, and Congress failed to authorize 
expressly the laying of an embargo. Moreover it may 
be doubted whether an embargo on arms and ammunition 
would be as successfUl now as a year or so ago. More 
factories in the United Kingdom have been converted 
R.S .Baker,Woodrow Wilson - Life and Letters. Doubleday, Page and 
New York, 1927, Vo1.2, 2~---
D.L. Dumond, Roosevelt to Roosevelt. Holt & Co. New Yo 
Co., 
into munitions plants • ••• As a result, the 
embargo might prove in som cases more 
injurious to American manufacturers than to 
countries at war. We have suffered the 
effect of embargoes and orders in council 
for so long a period, under protest but 
without retaliation. The restrictions are 
no more hurtful now than a year and a half 
ago. But the weap on then in our hands, an 
embargo" on war munitions and supplies, has 
beoome dulled. 
.' 
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The Secretary of Commerce's remarks were made at the height of a two and 
one-half billion dollar increase in our war trade and at a time when it 
was perfectly clear that England proposed to continue her uninterrupted 
violation of our neutral rights. In effect our awn high public officials 
recognized that our powers of retaliation conferred upon the President by 
Congress could not be invoked, without endangering our huge war time trade, 
which had grown up by that time. Trade with the Allied countries increased 
approximately 141 percent from 1914 to 1915, and jumped to 289 percent 
in 1916 as over 1914. Trade with the Central Powers dropped in 1915 to 
7 percent of its 1914 figure and to 0.68 percent of that figure in 1916. 
The net outstanding indebtedness of the Allies in the United States had 
been increasing by leaps and bounds. On June 1, 1916, it was approximately 
$899#000,000, and in six months it doubled itself and on December 1, 1916, 
104 
stood around $1,794,000,000. 
When Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith resigned just a few days before 
the German peace note of December 16, 1916, the cabinet which followed them 
was predominantly conservative and stiffly opposed to a negotiated peace 
settlement. The popular press of England elegantly remarked that the 
103 (continued from p.70) P.J. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him. 
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"peace prattlers had been removed in the nick of time." 
considered in explaining the change noted by Page. 
.' This must be 
There are those who feel that Wilson's great powers were held aloof 
from the intense conflict until the last in the hope that he might be the 
106 
central figure in the making of an arbitrated peace. 
The English Press expressed it tersely, "America in wi th all her 
Resources," and laid great stress on the ships and money we would bring. 
Mr. James Douglas gave his version in verse as follows: 
nAnd Britain with her sea knit brood 
Locked fast in world wide conflict grim 
Hears the high call of her awn blood 
I W d W"l ' Battle li,rnm."107 n 00 row ~ son s , __ 
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CHAPTER IV 
SEA LANES 
By common consent, the oceans are the public highways of nations. As 
a relic of ancient barbarism a belligerent may, if it has the power, drive 
from the ocean the ships of its foe. It may also prevent contraband goods 
from reaching the enemy, and if it is able to blockade all its ports, may 
put a stop to all commerce. That was the substanoe of international law 
in August, 1914. 
Through a policy of action, retaliation and counter-retaliation, the 
ocean highways became a battlefield where the citizens and commerce of 
neutrals ventured in fear of destriction or capture. 
The control of England over the food supply of the world was exercised 
at once after the declaration of war. England ordered to her ports every 
British ship on the seas then carrying foodstuffs to Europe. Their cargoes 
were unloaded and sold in the British markets. These markets became glutted 
with grain. English vessels carried most of the world's trade. The order 
threw into the British markets not only the grain going to Germany but also 
the grain going to every neutral country in Europe. This movement gave 
England control over the grain market at the very beginning of the war and 
1 
was a measure used in exercising pressure immediately upon neutrals. 
l... On September 28, 1914, The American Ambassador in England, Walter 
~ 1. Clapp, 20 73 
74 
.' IIines Page, presented to the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, 
a protest from the British government in connection with the laying of 
mines in the North Sea. The protest was lengthy and set forth the abuse 
in international lawby such procedure and closed with the following: 
"His Majesty's Government desire to place on record their strong 
protest against the illegitimate means of conducting warfare which has been 
resorted to by their adversaries. They feel that its manifest inhumanity 
must call down upon its authors all the censure and reprobation of civilized 
2 
people s ." 
Foreign Office 
September 26, 1914 
No signature 
On October 28, 1914, Page communicated with the State Department again 
and warned them that a mine field had been discovered off the north coast 
of Ireland; also that the British Admiralty warned shipping not to pass 
within 60 miles of Tory Island. He then used a sentence which is worthy 
of direct copy: "One British ship bound from ~~nchester to MOntreal struck 
a mine there and went down. This mine field is in a location which suggests 
that it was meant rather for merchant than for naval ships. Part of channels 
3 
of the Thames have been closed by Admiralty." On November 2, 1914, Page 
wrote again and said that the mine fields north of Ireland had been laid by 
the Germans flying neutral flags. That the danger was spreading and 
4 
included the paths of some of the trans-Atlantic ocean liners. On November 
3, 1914, the British Ambassador in Washington notified the Secretary of 
State as follows: 
In compliance with instructions received 
2 F.R. 1914 Supp., 460-462, Doc.763.72/1075. 
3 Ibid., 463, Doc. 763.72- '/1141. 4 Ibid. 463 Doc.763.72 lI6'!. " 
from Sir Edward Grey, His Majesty's Principal 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I 
ha~e the honor to enclose herewith copy of a 
telegram which he has addressed to me 
recommending certain routes to be followed for 
ships wi shing to trade to and from Norway, 5 
the Baltic, Denmark and Holland. I have •••• 
Cecil Spring Rice 
75 
.' 
On August 13, 1914, we protested against either belligerent scattering 
contact mines. The protest is not filed in the Foreign Relations but the 
British answer to it, which is dated August 19, 1914 is, and closes with 
the following paragraph: 
His Majesty's Government share the reluctance 
of the Secretary of State to see the practice 
extended and the danger to neutral shipping 
increased. At the same time His Majesty's 
Charge d' Affaires is instructed to point out 
that if-Great Britain refrained from adopting 
the ~thod of Germany the result is that GerIIllny 
receives immunity unless the neutral powers can 
find some means of making Germany feel that she 
cannot continue to preserve all facilities for 
receiviIlg trade and supplies through neutral 
shipping while impeding British commerce by 
means the use of which by Great Britain is 6 
deprecated by the United States government. 
Two comments are necessary at this point: (1) When the mines of the 
North Sea were taken up by the HollaDd government, the majority of them 
7 
were found to be of British origin. (2) The communication of November 3, 
1914, by His Majesty's government brought the trade of northern Europe to 
his door for final directions. 
There was no union of neutrals to protest the measure. "Unfortunately 
as it would seam in the light of later events, America refused to join the 
North Sea neutral countries in a protest against the mining of the North 
5 F.R. 1914, -SUpPa 463, Doc. 763.72: ~/117l. 
6 ~.,457-458, Doc.763.72/552. 7. Clapp, 142. 
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.' Sea. Suoh action might have made more effective the protest of all neutrals 
8 
against the later German War Zone about the British Isles." The offer of 
the neutral oountries to join in a protest, or the refUsal of the United 
states to do so were not found in the Foreign Relations. 
With the northern routes controlled England's next step was to manage 
the produce carried by the ships. This was accomplished by the many 
Orders in Council. The British Order in Council of August 20, 1914, stated 
in effect that goods could be consigned to no one in Genmny; they could not 
be shipped to Germany at all. It is clearly seen that after this action 
any addition to the British conditional contraband list was as complete a 
ban on commerce as an addition to the absolute contraband list. The two 
9 
were the same. 
The Complaints poured into the state Department. On August 20, 1914, 
Robert L. Owen, a Senator, requested the Department of state to use its 
good offices in the interest of ootton. He stated that the cotton growers 
10 
stood to lose one third of their orop of $250,000,000. On October 24, 
1914, the New York Chamber of Commerce protested against England's attitude 
towards shipment of cotton to neutral countries, and said that ootton for 
Germany had been put on the prohibited list. They stated that they did not 
want the ootton sent to a British prize oourt and they requested the state 
Department to demand of Great Britain an authoritative statement of her 
11 
attitude so that neutrals would know what to do. 
8 Clapp, 9. 
9 Ibid., 11. 
10r:R; 1914 Supp., 284, Doc.763.72l12/104 
11 ~., 287, Doc.763.72112/2l6. 
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.' The next protest came from the Galveston Cotton Exchange and Board of Trade 
on October 20, 1914. There were several statements and questions in this 
letter that revealed a keen insight into just what the English government 
1'Ias doing at this time. They stated (1) that England intended to divert 
the cotton cargoes to Demmrk and Sweden as she feared they were going to 
Germany. (2) The steamer. Camperdown, from Galveston and headed for a 
Danish port had been sent to a port in Scotland. (3) Buyers were demanding 
pay:rrent when goods were delivered. (4) All the war risk and marine insur-
ance was being written by English companies. They wanted to know if Sir 
George Paish, special adviser to the English Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and Sir Basil P. Blaskett of the British Treasury were in Washington on a 
12 
conference with reference to the marketing of cotton. 
On October 24, 1914, Secretary of State Lansing wrote to Ambassador 
Page in London and told him t:ta t large numbers of American citizens who 
were engaged in the cotton trade believed that the British government was 
influencing insurance companies in Great Britain to place such limitations 
upon policies covering raw cotton shipped in neutral vessels that it was 
. impossible for Amrican exporters to obtain marine insurance. The British 
underwriters would not insure against war risk unless the owner would 
warrant the cargoe free of capture, seizure, or detention by the Allies. 
This action of British underwriters had influenced American insurance 
companies to follow the same course and refuse to insure without such a 
warranty clause. The result was that exportation of raw cotton from the 
13 
United States was practically impossible. 
12 F.R. 1914 Supp., 285-286, Doc. 763.72112/349. 
13 Ibid., 289, Doc. 763.72112/252. 
r 
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On October 25. 1916, Sir Cecil Spring Rice notified the State 
Department that Sir Edward Grey had sent him assurance tm. t cotton would 
not be seized and that it had not been put on any contraband list. The 
14 
cable stated that cotton was on the free list and would remain there. 
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The South suffered the loss of the three best months of the year for 
the sale of the cotton crop. The crop begins to move in August and the 
movement continues throughout September and October. The cotton exchange 
in New York and New Orleans closed July 31, 1914. The price of cotton fell 
to six cents on the farm and renained there during September and October. 
15 
It was the six cent cotton which forced the United States to act. 
The story of the quiet English ban upon our cotton trade and its 
removal in October is interesting. The cotton moves in tramp steamers 
mostly under the British or Gernan flag. Those under the German flag were 
chased from the seas. The English tramp steamer was simply not available 
when it was a quest ion of carrying cotton to Germany. The neutral ships 
which might have carried the 1914 crop were prevented because of the 
peculiar conditions surrounding hull and cargo insurance, without which no 
shipowner or shipper can let his property sail. "This difficulty is con-
nected with British control of the vessel insurance business for the whole 
world, a control which was naturally exercised to injure the enemy of 
16 
England." 
The United States instituted a War Risk Insurance Bureau in ~eptember 
for American vessels only. The mrine insurance companies did not want to 
14 F.R. 1914 Supp., 390, Doc. 763.72112/251. 
15 Clapp, 119. 
16 ~., 121. 
r 79 
.' insure American vessels for they were not bui~~ for crossing the ocean; 
they were used for coastwise trade. This condition was known by the marine 
insurance companie s and they refused. Washington threatened to enter the 
17 
insurance field against them and they capitulated. The first American 
ship in the trade was the Greenbriar. It reached Breman on January 9, 1915 .• 
Some idea of the damage done to the cotton area of the south is obtained 
by the cotton report from August 1, 1914 to April 1, 1915. It lists a 
18 
shortage of 2,000,000 bales in the German trade. 
On October 20, 1914, a letter was received from Page in London. The 
cotton question was at its most dangerous angle. The letter carries this 
notation: "To be deciphered by Lansing only and shown to the President." 
In the letter Page told Lansing we had signed a treaty with England that 
required questions in dispute to be submitted to a commission. That the 
cOImllission would do no more for the United States in the settlement of these 
questions than Sir Edward Grey would do. He asked Lansing to have Wilson 
19 
send House to England for a conference before any final action was taken. 
The commission feared by Page was set up in the Bryan Peace Treaties. The 
Commission was to be composed of five members. Two members from each 
country connected with the dispute. In the case of the British only one 
of the two could be a nation84 the other must be a stranger to the dispute. 
To the four members thus selected, a fifth was added. The fifth must be 
selected by the governments in the dispute, by common accord and the under-
20 
standing that this member was not a natioml of either country. This 
17 Clapp, 122 
18 Ibid., 124. 
19 rIIr."1914 Supp., 255-256, Doc. 763.72112/193. 
20 Editorial, "American Neutrality" .American Journal of Internatioml Law, 
Vol. 9, 494-495, 1915. 
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.' letter was received on October 20, 1914,and on October 26, 1914, Sir Cecil 
Spring Rice notified the Secretary of State that cotton was on the free 
list. In the Senate on December 21, 1914, Senator Walsh llB.de the following 
statement, "No blockade has ever been declared, and yet it is notorious 
21 
that such cotton as goes 'Ix> GerllB.ny, goes with the permission of England." 
When the cotton began to move, every form of restraint on the trade 
known to the mind of man was practiced. English Consuls watched the loading 
of the cotton and sealed the ships' hatches with the consular certificates 
and the British seal. A further suggestion was mde by England that the 
cotton bales be photographed by X-ray process and the photographs sent 
along with the British consul's certificate. The first of the photographing 
episodes took place on December 20, 1914, at a pier in New York. The car@a 
was placed on the City of Macon bound for Bremen. The shipper paid for all 
22 
this expense. 
On October 27, 1914,came the note that the waters of north of Ireland 
were mined. On November 2, 1914, England c10s ed the North Sea and ordered 
all vessels trading with the Scandinavian countries to come to them for 
shipping orders, bub no orders were given for Germany. This order terrorizai 
ship owners. Insurance men again refused insurance. Governor Colquiett of 
Texas proposed sending ".A.nsrican ironclads to England's door to enforce our 
23 
rights." Germany retaliated with her submarine decree of February 4,1915, 
and on February 5, England warned of a complete stoppage of our exports to 
21 Clapp, 139. 
22 Ibid., 141 
23 Ibid., 145 
r 
.' Germany. ItThese warning oorrbinued up to February 17, 1915. The American 
24 
answers showed no evidence of any direct action against such a move." 
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On March 11, the Order in Council which stopped all goods moving to or from 
Germany was issued and cotton was again a drug on the market. 
On March 8, 1915, the British Embassy in Washington made the following 
announcement: ItAll cotton for which contracts of sale and freight engage-
ments had already beeh made before March 2, to be allowed free, or bought at 
oontract price if stopped, provided ship sailed not later than March 31. 
Similar treatment to be accorded to all cotton insured before March 2, 
provided it is put on board not later than March 16._25 It was far from a 
handicap to the British manufacturer that he was assured of a plentiful 
supply of oheap cotton while his competitors had to get their supplies as 
best they could. "At the same time that our exporters were hindered in 
their exports to European neutrals, British raw-cotton dealers expanded 
their re-exportation of cotton imported from us. In June, 1915, Holland and 
Sweden, each took from England five times as much raw cotton as in June 
26 
1914." 
The Augusta Cotton Exchange and Board of Trade of Augusta, Georgia, 
and the Galveston Commercial Association telegraphed the Secretary of State, 
27 
but there was no official pronouncemmt. Many of the American cotton 
deale rs belonged to the Liverpool Cotton Exchange. The Exchange sent the 
following agreement to the American members for their signature: 
24 F.R. 1915 Supp., 111-112, Doc. 763.72112/806a 
2~ Ibid., 189, Doc. 763.72l12/949~ 
26 Cla.pp, 157. 
27 F.R. 1915 Supp., 192-193, Doc. 763.72112/1263 a.nd Doc. 763.72112/365. 
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Declaration 
"I, •.•.•...•.• , an Associate member of the Liverpool Cotton Association, do 
solemnly and sincerely declare that neither I nor my f'irm nor any partner 
in the same nor any branch house or other f'irm or f'irms in which I or any 
one of my partners may be directly or indirectly pecuniarily interested 
will trade or have dealings with any person or a member or representative 
of any f'irm or person domiciled or carrying on business in any state at 
present at war with His Britannic Majesty until such time as peace may have 
been declared, and I further undertake when trading with subjects of neutral 
countries to make all necessary inquiries in order to satisfy myself' as 
to the ultimate destination of' the goods and that none of' them are intended 
for consumption in or for transit through any state at war with His 
Majesty. 
Declared this day of 
Witness 
28 
Address of' Witness." 
Those who signed this agreement had their names posted in the Liverpool 
Exchange and received pref'erence by the Liverpool members. Those who did 
not sign were blacklisted by implication. On November II, 1916, Great 
Britain put cotton on the absolute contraband list and it remained so until 
29 
our entrance into the war. 
The history of cotton was the hiswry of' copper. The order in Council 
of October 29, 1914, put copper on the absolute contraband list. From this 
date on, according to England's interpretation of' the law, she had a right t 
28 Clapp, 322. 
29 F.R. 1916 Supp., 483, Doc. 763.72112/2527. 
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.' stop copper from entering Germany either directly or by way of a neutral. 
The 1914 Foreign Relations Supplement prepared an explanatory paragraph 
on the copper section. So interesting is this paragraph tl'at it is 
presented here in full: 
The placing of 'unwrought copper' on the list of 
absolute contraband in the British proclamation of 
October 29, called forth a great volume of protest 
from American interests urging the government toward 
action in their behalf. These protests reached the 
Department from Governors, Senators, more than a 
score of Chambers of Commerce and other organizations, 
besides numerous firms and individuals in all the 
western mining states and some districts of the East. 
The Department did not contest the classification 
adopted by the British gpvernment, though it sought a 
more precise definition, but directed its efforts 
mainly ~gainst interference with copper cargoes 
consigned to neutral countries. 30 
The first complaint came from the United States Chamber of Commerce 
on November 13, 1914. It stated tl'at in 1912, the world production of 
oopper was 2,200,000,000 pounds. Of this, the United States had produced 
1,200,000,000 pounds. They set up the importance of the forty-one plants 
doing this work. Another important statement in the protest was that 
neither England nor France had formally declared a blockade of any of the 
ooast or ports of the countries with which it was at war; that in the 
modification of the Declaration of London on August 20, 1914, in Article 
23, the statement was made that only an article used entirely for war 
purposes could be taken from the conditional list and placed on the absolute 
31 
list, and that this was not true of copper. 
An inquiry from the State Department at this time shows how carelessly 
the products which gave employment to thousands of people werabeing handled. 
30 F.R. 1914 Supp., 278, No file number. 
31 Ibid. 281-282. No file number. 
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.' On November 25, 1914, the State Department addressed a communication to 
the British Ambassador in Washington asking for the follOWing information: 
In the conditional list of contraband which had been effected by the Order 
of October 29, item 7, listed copper rnateria1$ for telegraph, wireless 
. .., 
telegraph and telephones. On the absolute list copper was listed as 
unwrought in item 5. Vfhat did they mean? The Ambassador's answer arrived 
on December 19, 1914, and is given as printed:. 
My dear Mr. Counsellor: 
With regard to the definition of the 
expression "unwroyght" I have been informed by Sir Edward 
Grey that the subject is being carefully studied and a 
decision will be made shortly which will be communicated 
at once. 
Yours truly, 
32 Cecil Spring Rice. 
An item was placed in a document which affected the lives of thousands of 
workers, and great industries, yet neither the government creating the 
phrase, or the one being affected by it, knew what it meant. 
The Perth Amboy Board of Trade, of Perth Amboy, New Jersey, protested 
on November 6: against Great Britain placing unwrought copper on the abso-
... 
lute contraband list, and against Great Britain stopping neutral vessels 
bound for neutral countries with cargoes of copper. They stated "that only 
ten to fifteen percent of copper exported was used for industrial purposes. 
United States produced 1,200,000,000 pounds each year and of this seventy-
32 F.R. 1914 Supp. 284, Doc. 763.72112/576. 
.' five percent or 900,000,000 pounds was refined in New Jersey; 55 percent 
of this 900,000.000 was exported and if the export trade was stopped, New 
33 
Jersey must suffer." These were only a few of the protests. The 
oonditionwhich demanded such action must have been acute. 
The August Order in Council called for evidence of a consignment of 
85 
goods to ultimate Gernnn destination on "any sufficient evidence" and that 
the cons ignee mus t prove that the shipment was not go ing to GernRny. The 
difficul ty was that the shipper never !mew what evidence would be required 
of him. 
In November 1914, Mr. Gardner, Chairman ,of the board of Henry R. Merton 
and Co., Limited, of London, the world's leading copper merchants, arrived 
in America. He brought with him a plan for the revival of the copper 
industry. Mr. Gardner had powers from his government which have never been 
questioned. Mr. Gardner'S plan was as follows: England would agree to 
. take a large fixed monthly output of copper, upon the condition that 
American producers should ship to Europe through no other channels than 
British merchants. This offer was rejected by the oopper industry, and 
34 
Ir. Gardher went home to England on November 16, 1914. 
From October 10, 1914 to November 1, 1914, the British government 
detained 14 shiploads of American oopper bound for Italy. Two of these 
ships were American, two British, eight Italian and two Norwegian. The 
35 ~tal tonnage was 9555 tons. These shipments were from the largest and 
33 F.R. 1914 Supp., 278-279. Doc. 763.72112/312. 
34 Clapp, 193. 
35 Ibid., 323. 
-
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.' IIOst reliable firms in this country such as the American Smelting and 
.efiniDg Company, the United Metals Smelting Company and the American Metal 
eo]!!.f8.ny. These 9555 tons of copper were detained at Gibraltar; they never 
o~ before His Majesty's prize courts. Four months to a day after the 
last seizure it was bought by the British government. Their first offer 
ps less than the cost of producing. The final arrangement was as follows: 
.!be British Admiral ty agreed to have 1,000 tons of copper that was held at 
Gibraltar sold on the London market. The rest the Admiralty was to take 
at an agreed price. The Americans were to pay the expense of transporting 
36 
the copper to London on a British collier. 
The English government was on record as willing to let the neutral 
oountries have as much copper in 1914 as they had imported in 1913. England 
oohtended that Italy was getting more copper from the United States than it 
did in 1913. There were reasons why that would be necessary. Italy was 
tearming and that meant copper. Her normal supply from Germany was cut off 
«ad that meant greater imports from some other source. England's imports 
of copper from us in August, September and October of 1914 were over 
:84,000,000 pounds. Including these imports and including the copper d'"IT~~"'T~A"JI 
'tJoom Dutch warehouses and the quanti ties taken off steamers bound for Dutch, 
80andinavian and Italian ports, England in those three months received 103. 
,000 pounds of copper, an increase of 69,000,000 pounds over the same 
'eriod in 1913. In August, September and October, 1914, there left the 
~ted States for Italy 25,000,000 pounds of copper, 16,000,000 more than 
those months of 1913. England, in suspecting and stopping those ship-
Clapp, 191-192. 
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.' ~nts, was refusing to allow Italy an increase less than one-fourth as 
37 
great as England itself took. British exports of copper manufactures and 
38 
copper sulphate mounted steadily in the fall months of 1914. Italy 
needed great quantities of the copper sulphate, or blue vitriol, for des-
troying the philloxera pests which infest vineyards. 
On November 7, 1914, Sir Edward Grey sent a telegram to the British 
Ambassador ~n Washington as follows: 
You should take steps, without the appearance of 
an official communique, to make known to the press 
the following facts which I am communicating to the 
United States Ambassador. We are infonning sone of 
the correspondents here in the same sense •••• The 
American copper refiners appear to be quite capable 
of protecting their own interests since they usually 
insist on payment in cash before they allow copper 
to be shipped and it is well known that certain 
prominent firms of bankers in New York are making 
these payments on German accounts. 
In view of all this accumulative evidence there is ;0.0 alterm tive left 
to the British Government but to stop contraband trade in copper with 
39 
Germany through Italy. 
On January 20, 1915, the American Ambassador in London, notified the 
State Depar"bnent that at last the British government had figured out what 
the term. "copper unwroughb" meant. It defined the term to include all copper 
in such form as to render it usable for manufactur'ing purposes. They also 
stated that as the forner term was vague the phrasing now would be "copper 
unwrought, part wrought and copper wire." This would include copper sheets, 
oircles, slabs, bars, pipes, ingots, scrap, rods, plates, solid drawn, 
tubes, etc. and all grades of copper wire. It also inc luded alloJS in which 
37 Clapp, 196. 
38 Ibid., 197. 
-
39 F.R. 1914 Supp., 338-339. Doc. 763.72112/513. 
40 
oopper is the min ingredient. 
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In January 1915, the Italian government capitulated and the following 
agreement was announced at Washington: 
"Under this agreement the Italian Foreign Office makes an investigation 
of the business of the consignee and the purpose for which he seeks to use 
the import of copper. On learning that copper is strictly for home con-
sumption, it authorizes, a certificate to that effect to be issued by the 
Italian Embassy at Washington, which is submitted to the British consul at 
41 
the port where the shipmnt is being loaded." 
The American copper mn obtained no relief from their government and 
finally asked the State Department to authorize them to deal directly with 
the Bri tish Ambassador. The authorization was granted. Soon after the 
middle of March, 1915, an agreement between the Americans and His Majesty's 
government was made. The agreement was a long document in which the right 
of search was retained. A few paragraphs follow: 
••• It is agr~ed that the undersigned will 
not export copper to Sweden, Norway, Denmark 
or Italy, except in compliance with, and subject 
to, the conditions of Article 3 ~ereof, and that 
it (the under signed company) will not exp ort 
copper to other neutral countries except subject 
to permit of British Admiralty •••• 
Shipments of copper to Great Britain or 
her allies may be mde without restriction. 
All sale contr~cts for neutral countries 
to be forwarded to the British Admiralty, either 
through its London representative or through His 
Britannic Majesty's consul at the port of New York. 
42 
Blank Comp"ny 
40 F.R. 1915 Supp., 183, Doc. 763.72112/642. 
41 Clapp, 203 
42 ~., 324-325 
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.' One of the last companies to sign this agreement was the great 
Guggenhe im group. Its hand was forced by an announcement mde in reply 
to a question in parliament that the firms whose consignments were safe-
guarded by agreements with Great Britain were welcome to announce the fact 
so that orders might be placed with them. Thereupon Guggenheims cabled 
their representative in London to sign an agreement with the Admiralty. 
By the beginning of March, 1915, the English had secured control of 95 
percent of the exportable copper of the United states and the powerful 
influence of the Copper Trust was no longer a menace to good relations 
43 
between England and the United States. 
Th.a t which happened to cotton and copper happened to all the other 
exports of the United States until they were directed into one main channel 
and one nain purpose. The channel led to England and the purpose was for 
war. Goods not used for war show a decrease as follows - for nine months 
ending May 31, 1914 and nine months ending May 31, 1915: 
Nine Months Ending 
May 31,1914 
Group I Munitions $ 6,283,953 
II Materials for 
Making 
Munitions 16,291,642 
III War Supplies 25,856,921 
IV Textile Mfgs 5,293,155 
V Hide s, Lea ther 
& Footwear 20,599,959 
VI Foodstuffs 218,390,743 
__ VII Forage 
Total Groups I-VII 
Nine Months Ending 
May 31, 1915 
$ 34,421,595 
62,360,423 
147,702,807 
35,239,110 
60,150,388 
627,417,302 
Increase in 
1915 
$ 28,137,642 
46,068,799 
121,845,886 
29,945,955 
47,550,429 
409,026,359 
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.' There was a deorease of $216,000,000 in ootton exportation during this 
nine month period. Naval stores suoh as turpentine and resin showed a 
~rked deorease. Iron and steel manufaotures fell off $17,000,000. 
Agricultural implements deoreased $20,000,000. Lumber and manufaotures of 
.ood dropped $41,000,000. There were similar deoreases in many other 
articles suoh as phosphate rook, mineral oils, electrical machinery and 
copper. Copper fell off l'a6,000,OOO but there was a later piok up in this 
45 
when we began to manufacture munitions in large quantities. 
It is necessary at this point to set up a brief history of the machin-
ery whioh was created to care for the trade as direoted by England. In 
Holland it was the Netherlands Oversea Trust and in Norway it was the 
stavinger Packers Import Union. 
On Deoember 21, 1914, Consul General Listoe, at Rotterdam, wrote to 
the Secretary of State in regard to the Netherlands OVersea Company. The 
company consisted of six of the leading bankers and twelve prominent ship 
owners. It was to be neutral and furnish the Dutoh government guarantees 
in connactionwith imports. The Company's capital was $1,000,000. The 
communication closed with this significant paragraph: 
''While the Company bas not yet commenced to operate, negotiations are 
at present being carried on between the Dutch government at the Hague and 
the British Foreign Office at London for the purpose of obtaining the 
46 
approval of the latter." 
43 (continued from p.89) David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Little, Brawn & 
Co., Boston, 1934, 664-665. 
44 (continued from p.89) Clapp, 217. 
45 Ibid., 217-218. 
46 F.R. 1915 Supp., 268, Doc. 763.72112/608. 
.' During the year several communications passed between Van Dyke, the 
~rican representative in Holland, and Lansing. Lansing must have asked 
an investigation for on December 18, 1915, Van Dyke wrote as follows: 
"I have investigated and have had an interview with the foreign minister. 
It appears that in the original agreement wi th the Netherlands Oversea 
Trust, the British Government reserved the right to suspend or refuse the 
91 
delivery of any gpods suspected of enemy destination even though covered by 
lioense and already arrived in the Netherlands. Ships were detained in 
England for the purpose of careful search for suspected cargo thus causing 
great delay to innocent cargo. A subsequent agreement allowed such ships 
to proceed for delivery of innocent cargo in the Netherlands, but Oversea 
Trust was instructed to suspend delivery of suspicious gpods until investi-
gated by British agents here. Goods condemned were to be indefinitely 
detained by Oversea Trust or shipped back to England for the prize court." 
Van Dyke did not approve of taking the matter up forna11y in London. He 
47 
did suggest that Page might do some inforna1 work. 
On August 10, 1916, the Consul General at London, wrote to the 
Seoretary of State and stated that he had been informed that the British 
Government was refuSing to allow American shippers of coffee to consign 
goods to Holland. He stated that he had inquired informally if this was 
the case and had been informed that within the limits of the rationing 
allowance American shippers would have the same rights as British shippers 
to export to Holland. He then wrote to the American COlmnercia1 Attache at 
48 
the Hague. 
47 F.R. 1915 Supp., 280. Doc. 763.72112/2018 
48 F.R. 1916 Supp., 587-588, Doc. 763.72112/2870 
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.' On August 5, 1916, Consul General Skinner had written to the Commercial 
Attache' at the Hague and asked to be informed upon the new Trust agreement 
-
respecting supplies of coffee for Holland. He wanted to know who apportion 
49 
the coffee supplies and why the United States was excluded. 
The American attache', Thompson, answered as follows: "All coffee from 
the Netherlands colonies came in free of Netherlands Oversea Trust 
restrictions. Forty thousand bags per month was allowed with certai n 
restrictions as to ownership. Only sixty thousand bags per month admitted 
from elsewhere and all under Netherlands Oversea Trust. Theoretically 
'elsewhere' signifies only coffee growing countries. This shuts us out and 
should shut out England and France, but actually these two countries are 
shipping about thirty thousand bags per month out of the 'elsewhere' allot-
50 
ment of sixty thousand. t1 
Thompson's comment at the close of the diplomatic correspondence in 
regard to coffee was as follows: "The sixty thousand pounds is supposed to 
oome from the "elsewhere" but if the Netherlands Oversea Trust is ordered 
by the Brit ish Government to take the entire amount from the Allies it 
51 
must do so, because the British can coerce them, we cannot. 
"While the trade of Holland was being made the tool of England, the 
same condition was being brought about in the Scandinavian countries. It 
is true that these countries put up a more determined resistance, apparently, 
than did Holland. In making this statement, we must not forget that Holland 
lay between the two great warring nations and therefore could be more easily 
crushed. 
49 F.R. 1916 Supp., 587-588, No file numbe~. 
50 Ibid., 587-588. 
51 l'13Id'. 
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.' On February 14, 1916, the Scandinavian countries :rrade a move to pool 
the resources of the world neutrals, under the leadership of the great 
neutral power of the United states. The Swedish minister in Great Britain, 
Wrangel, wrote to Colonel House and in the name of His Swedish Majesty's 
government called upon the United States government to lead the neutrals 
in a protest against the violation of international rules and usages which 
were their just heritage as a result of centuries of toil. He stated that 
the violation of those rules now being practiced, would under changed 
circtUnstances, be the ruin of the countries now practicing them. He 
de~lored the obstacles placed in the pathway of the United States each time 
she proposed a just consideration of international law and affirmed Sweden's 
just and neutral approach toward both belligerents. Wrangel then offered 
the services of the Swedish gpvernment either in collaboration with, or in 
parallel efforts, with the other neutral nations in as powerful a contribu-
tion as they could toward the maintenanc e and restoration of the law of 
52 
nations. 
There is nothing in the Foreign Relations touching this subject until 
December 4, 1916. Then Lansing wrote to the American diplomatic officers in 
European countries and stated that he had had a conference with the Swedish 
Minister on December 1, 1916. That the minister had asked for a conference 
of neutral powers on certain subjects, but that the United States was not 
formally invited. Lans ing then stated that he had a conference with the 
PreSident and that they arrived at the conclusion that it wou1db:linadvisable 
for the United States to participate in the proposed conference. The letter 
52 F.R. 1916 Supp., 689-690, Doc.763.72l12/2277 1/2 
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.' to the diplomats closed with a short statement tl~t the letter was for the 
53 
confidential informat ion of the diplomat. 
On December 6, 1916, Ambassador Page in London wrote to Lansing and 
asked for the questions under discussion and Lansing replied on December 7, 
1916, and said that the questions up for discussion were submarines and 
airships; destruction of neutral prizes; granting of asylum to prizes; 
issuance of blacklists by belligerents and the economic situation after the 
54 
war. 
A student of history who doubts that trade is closely connected with 
war has but to glance at the above list of questions to have all his doubts 
vanish. Nothing came of Sweden's efforts to pool the neutrals' powers 
under the leadership of the United States. They tried to protect their 
trade in their own way and on April 15. 1916, the American Consul at 
Stavanger, Dunlop, wrote to Secretary Lansing as follows: 
Sir I have the honor to enclose a confidential report 
on the Stavanger Packers Import Union, ••• a list of packers, 
members, and non-members of the union •••• 
While I have marked the information' confidential' 
because of its relation to a political question. there is 
still nothing contained in it that is not generally known 
here. -- 1~urice P. Dunlop. 
The enclosure conbained the following information: The Stavenger 
Packers Union was an organization of canning factories which desired to 
obtain their foreign supplies without interference from the British author-
ities, and which had therefore given guarantee that these supplies would 
not in any form reach the powers at war with Great Britain. Of the 53 
packers in ~~w.n thirty-five are members and these compose the so-called 
53 F.R. 1916 Supp., 696-697L Doc •• 763.72112/3039a 54 ~., 697, Doc. 763.72/3043. 
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.' "i'Thite list." Other packBrs are on the "black list." The union has been 
discussed for some time but final arrangements were only made a few weeks 
The British authorities in turn p~omised not to hinder the delivery 
of goods necessary to the canning trade, such as tomato paste, tin and 
oil to the "white" factories. Patrol ships regularly stopped most of the 
merchant vessels coming to Norway as they passed the British Isles, and so 
could exercise this supervision; also regular Norwegian lines depended on 
England for coal, hence they were in no position to object to English 
restri ctions • 
The point of the matter with relation to the United states is that 
goods addressed to factories on the "white list" will probably reach the 
buyers without; delay; -those addressed to "black list" buyers may never get 
them. The Union does not include any members outside the town of Stavenger 
55 but about two thirds of all the fish factories in Norway are located here. 
One more letter must be included in this list and then the condition 
of trade in the Scandinavian countries becomes clear. On October 17, 1916, 
the Anerican Minister in Norway, Schmedeman, wrote to the Secreta.ry of 
Sta.te in regard to new trade agreements and closed his letter with this 
significant phrase: 
"Mr. Ihlen stated that he had every reason to believe that such an 
agreement would be most pleasing to the Norwegian traders 'who have been 
forced in a great many cases since the outbreak of the war to submit their 
books to the control of British authorities, which would thus be obvi.ted.~6 
55 F.R. 1916 Supp., 588-589, Doc. 763.72112/2540. 
A.G. Schmedeman 
56 ide 589-590 Doc 763 130 
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.' The mine fields created the narrow highway of the sea: Over these the 
British patrol boats exercised their authority. The bunker coal of Great 
Britain went to those who obeyed and the Norwegian trade books disclosed 
their secrets of obedience and disobedience •. 
There is another side to this picture in which the British government 
is accused of oarrying on a trade which deliberately helped Germany. On 
November 17, 1914, a member of Parliament call~ attention to the large 
increase in exports of British coal to Holland and Scandinavia. The member 
implied that some of this coal might be going through to Germany. He 
called attention to the fact that A~. Asquith's friends were interested in 
the mining of it and Asquith explained that Britain was merely making up 
the supplies whioh the Scandinavian countries had had cut off from neutral 
57 
sources. 
From the beginning of the war, Rear Admiral Consett of the British 
navy protested that British as well as American traders were cooperating 
with Scandinavian traders to keep Germany in the war. The following table 
of exports of metric tons of food from Scandinavia to Germany are perplex-
ing: 
To Great Britain To.Germany and Austria 
1913 344,785 252,128 
1914 359,820 262,376 
1915 275,473 561,234 
1916 191,916 620,756 
1917 172,103 315,205 58 
While England regimented the foreign trade into its proper channels, 
57 Clapp, 196-197. 
58 Geor~~.Seldes, Iron, Blood and Profits. Harper & Brothers,New York,1935 
97 
.' the United States had not esoaped her kindly ministrations. 
On August 2, 1914, our Ambassador in Great Britain wrote Colonel' 
House an interesting letter. In the letter he said: "Today the German 
Government asked the United states to take its diplomatio and Consular 
business in Russia in hand. Herriok, our Ambassador in Paris, had already 
taken the German interests there •••• It will revive our shipping." In a 
jiffy, under stress of a general European war, the United States Senate 
59 
passed a bill permitting American registry to ships built abroad. 
Page wrote to House again on October 11, 1914, in regard to settlements 
which would be made after the war; he divided Europe among the Allies and 
stated that the German fleet was to beoome Great Britain's and that the 
Ger:nan colonies were to be used to satisfy such of the Allies as olamor 
60 
for more than they get. 
The legislation enacted for the ppurpose of admitting ships built 
abroad to Amerioan registry was not regarded as friendly by Colonel House, 
tor in one of his letters to the President, he stated that the bill was full 
of lurking dangers. Great Britain looked with disfavor upon the measure 
but did not think it best to voioe a protest. Early in January of 1915, the 
of the Hamburg-Amerioan line, whioh had been lying at 
her wharf in Port Arthur, Texas, was bought by Mr. E.N. Brei tung of 
Mr. Breitung plaoed the ship under Amerioan registry, 
~ed an A.m3r ioan orew, loaded her with ootton and started for Germany. 
Spring-Rice notified the State Department that the Dacia would be 
d. The cargo of cotton was not on the contraband list in January of 
B:endriok, 301 
Ibid., 340. 
-
98 
.' 1915. The Dacia carried the American flag on her fla~ staff. Just about 
the time, Ambassador Page paid Sir Edward Grey a visit and suggested that 
in this instance the French fleet should do the capturing. The suggestion 
was followed. The Dacia was captured by a Fr~ch crusier and condemned in 
. ... 61 
a Frenoh prize court. If the United States had insisted on their rights, 
the great amount of German tonnage lying in AImrican ports would have gone 
far in removing the cotton situation of the south. It should be noted that 
the Declaration of London under which both England and France were working 
62 
at the time of the Dacia recognized the legality of the transaction. 
Of this transaction Lord Grey said, Itwe used to hear it said in days when 
Bryce was Ambassador at Washington that he was the most popular European 
in America since Lafayette; but it was the rremory of Lafayette that 
persisted through the war. France was the historical friend and Britain 
63 
the historical enemy." 
The next move to get our foodstuff started to Germany was made January, 
22, 1915, when "the Wilhelmina sailed from. tlrooklyn to Hamburg. Every 
, 
precaution, to remain within the law, was taken. The goods were not 
consigned "To or for an agent of the enemy state, tt or ttto or for a merchant , 
or other person under the control of the authorities of the enemy state" 
nor were they"consigned "to order." Instead the consignment was made to 
.. 
~~. Brooking, Manager of the W.T. Green Company, who sailed in advance for 
Hamburg to receive the cargo on arrival. The Wilhelmina was of American 
registry and was under charter to the W.T. Green Commission Company of 
St. LouiS, a concern 
64 
to GernRny. 
engaged previously to the war in exporting provisions 
61 Hendrick, 392. 62 Clapp, 127. 63 Grey, 111-112. 64 Clapp, 59-60. 
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.' On February 4, 1915, the British Foreign Office issued a statement 
that it would stop the Wilhelmina which carried grain and foodstuffs only. 
The fight following this announcement was carried to the State Department. 
The case was complicated by a Gennan decree of January 25, 1915, which 
confiscated all grain and flour in Germany. On February 15, 1915, the 
state Department at once cabled the British Foreign Office that its move 
waS illegal as the modification of the German decree on February 5, 1915, 
excluded imported grains and flour. All this time the Wilhelmina was doing 
her best to reach Hamburg. On February 9, 1915, the ship ran into heavy 
gales on the North Atlantic and put in at Falmouth, England, for refuge. 
Here the British authorities promptly seized her. 
The communication from the British Foreign Office on February 19,1915, 
to the Secretary of State has many interesting points; Sir Edward Grey said 
the Wilhelmina had been seized after the Gennan decree of January 25 and 
before the modification of February 5, 1915 was known. "It was also 
advised that diplomatic aotion should wait until the British prize court 
65 had been taken full advantage of." 
It is impossible to present this note and not comment on some of its 
features. Sir Edward grey informed us that England did not mow of the 
modification of the Gennan decree when the Wilhelmina was seized on February 
9, 1915. The German modification passed the Bundesrat on February 5,1915. 
The news was cabled to the United States via London. At the head of this 
dispatch to American papers, published February 8, we read, "Berlin 
February 6; via London, February 7.1t This mans that on February 7 this 
65 F.R. 1915 Supp., 335-337, Doc. 34l.l15G82/9 
.' iIIlportant news passed through the hands of the British censor. That it 
",as not known to Sir Edward Grey on February 9. 1915. was. to say the 
66 
least, extraordinary." 
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The British gover.nment set the trial of the Wilhelmina for March 31. 
1915. Should the Wilhelmina be condemned on the ground of carrying food-
stuffs to Germany, the decision would be a direct reversal of England's 
former position and consequently a possible future embarrassment. The 
difficulty was removed by the declaration of another Order in Council on 
March 23, 1915. The rules of the Order in Council were not made known until 
Match 31, the day of the trial of the Wilhelmina; then the crown lawyers 
produced this Order in Council which authorized the crown to requisition 
any neutral ship and cargo which for any reason whatever had been brought 
before the prize court. There was no argument. The power of Britain 
under her self-made international law, to requisition the cargo of the 
Wilhelmina, made a trial of the. t cargo's right to proceed to Germany 
praoticallyout of the question. The question was settled out of court for 
$430,000, which the London Daily :Mail called a 'handsome and generous 
settlement.' The W.T. Green Commission Company felt that the surrender of 
67 
their neutral rights and interests were "WOrth mucp more. 
England had now oompleted her ohain of trade communioations. She 
controlled the roadway and the commercial items which travelled the roadway. 
In the United States. the South and West felt the economio results most 
keenly. Some form of trade was neoessary to recompense the destroyed oommu-
nications. The great munitions industry of the Atlantio sea-board was the 
66 Clapp, 70. 
67 Ibid., 73-75 •. 
~~,' 
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.' answer to the problem. 
On the question of the sale of munitions to the belligerents, the 
government of the United Sta.tes took a strictly neutral attitude which it 
stated clearly in a circular issued by the Department of state on October 
15, 1914, and is quoted as follows: 
!tIn the first place, it should be understood th!),t, generally speaking, 
a citizen of the United States oan sell to a belligerent government or its 
agent any article of commerce which he pleases. He is not prohibited from 
doing this by any rule of international law, by any treaty provisions or 
by any statute of the United States. It I1Rkes no difference whether the 
articles sold are exolusively for war purposes, such as firearma, explosive~ 
etc., or are foodstuffs, clothing, horses, etc., for the use of the army 
or navy of the belligerent. 
Furthermore, a neutral government is not compelled by international 
law, by treaty, or 2Y statute, to prevent these sales to a belligerent. Suoh 
sales therefore, by Am:lrican citizens do not in the least affeot the 
68 
neutrality of the United States." 
Sir Edward Grey tells us in his memoirs that the great fear felt in 
England was that the United States would begin convoying merchandise aoross 
69 
the Atlantic or that an embargo on munitions would be declared. 
Early "in December, 1914, Senator Hitchcock introduced in the Senate 
a resolution aimed to prohibit the exportation by private firms of munitions 
of war to any belligerent. This caused the British Government some conoern. 
Spring Rice hurried off an adroit warning to Sir Edward Grey '" that should 
68 Senate Res., 206, No. 944 , Part 5. 25. 
69 Grey, 115-116 
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.' the Administration support the Hitchcock bill it would be necessary to 
point out that such unneutral action would disqualify the government from 
the office of impartial mediator. And. this impartial mediation is the most 
70 
cherished ambition of the President}" 
On December 11, 1914, Page telegraphed the Secretary of State: 
Sir Edward Grey unofficially expressed the 
hope to me that the bill introduced b" Mr. 
Hitchcock in the Senate will not pass, aimed to 
prohibit the exportation of private finns of 
munitions of war to any belligerent. He calls 
attention to the fact that this would be special 
legislation passed while war is in progress, 
making a radical departure from a long-established 
custom and that for this re~son (it would appear) 
an unneutral act toward the belligerents that can 
profit by it. 71 
Trade in all materials of war grew to great figures. In explosives 
alone the export figures jumped from approximately $10,000,000 on June 30, 
72 1914,to $189,000,000 on June 30, 1915,and to $715,000,000 on June 30,1916. 
Lord Grey tells us in his memoirs that the allies were dependent upon 
the resources of the United States in order U,to carry on the war at all 
73 
or wi th any chance of success.' If One cannot help wondering why no' use 
was made of this great power which if rightly purposed would have saved so 
many lives. 
The munition trade took no great jump in 19~4, in faot, there was no 
great buying of war material until the second half of 1915. Then the Allies 
established a central purchasing bureau in the states whioh soon spent on 
the average of $10,000,000 a day. Between August,1914,and February 1917, 
more than $10,500,000,000 of goods were shipped out of America. 
70 Millis, 100. 72 Senate Res.206,No.944,Pt5,26 
71 F.R. 1914, Supp., 578, Doc. 863.72112/1113 73 Grey, Vol.II, 103. 
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.' Munitions played a prominent part in this traffic. In 1914 exports 
amounted to $40,000,000, in 1915 they reached $330,000,000, and in ~9l6 they 
reached the staggering sum of $1,290,000,000. From 1914 to 1914 the Allies 
bought $4,000,000,000 worth of munitions m the United States. Other war 
supplies bought in A.Irerica by the Allies inoluded iron and steel explosives, 
ootton and ootton manufaotures, wheai; copper, brass, leather, chemioals, 
firearms, automobiles, wheat flour, metal working maohinery, corn, horses, 
74 
wire manufactures, tires, airplanes, anlmotor cycles. 
The Central Powers protested against this trade with the Allies a1 
they recognized its legality. In preparing the dr~ft of a reply to Austria 
on August 2, 1915, Lansing presented the matter in a popular vein more for 
home consumption than for Austria; he forwarded the draft to Wilson for 
comments. One paragraph is worthy of notice: It follows: 
ttl hope you can pass upon it speedily beoause I believe it 'WOuld, at 
the present moment, have a very benefioial effect on public opinion. It 
is our first opportunity to present in a popular way the reasons why we 
should not restrict the exportations of munitions of war. If you have 
notioed in the papers meetings are being held under various auspices looking 
75 
to the imposition of an embargo on arms and ammunition •••• " 
Robert Lansing. 
The President answered on August 5, 1915, as follows: "Are we not 
ourselves about to urge the control of the manufacture of arms and munitions 
by every government in our proposed understandings and undertakings with 
Latin-American oountries; and do we not wish ultimately to strive for the 
same thing in the final European settlement? 
74 H.C. Engelbreoht and F C. 
-----
of Death. Dodd Mead and Co., 
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.' Of course, we are arguipg only to the special case, and are absolutely 
unanswerable in our position that these things cannot be done while a war 
is in progress as against the parties to it; but how far do you think the 
arguments we urge in this paper will estop us in future deliberations on the 
peace and security of the wo rId? 
76 (signed) W.W.1t 
In summing up the material presented on our trade relations with the 
Allies, three points are noted. (1) With all foreign trade disrupted by the 
outbreak of war the orders for munitions and war supplies for the Allies 
were a most important means of reestablishing the economic situation. (2) 
The Allied control of the sea cut off our communication with the Central 
powers and the Northern neutrals. (3) An enormous trade in war supplies 
of a one-sided nature grew up with the Allies. The follovling paragraph 
sums up the situation rather well: 
"It is poor consolation to the pinched cotton farmer to know that. the 
ammunition makers in Bridgeport are working day and night, that the maohine 
tool works in Hartford oannot fill their lathe orders, that the railroads 
haul train loads of war auto trucks from Detroit, that the harness makers 
of Cincinnati are full of business, or even that the wheat farmers of the 
77 
West and the packers of Chicago are riCh.1t 
The more the old diplomatic docwnents are examined the greater the 
wonder grows that the United states was not embroiled in the conflict long 
before 1917. In the summer of 1915, Colonel House was in England in the 
interest of "peace." A glance at his memorandum of conferences with 
important personages may give some little clew to the great burst of munit 
76 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 29. 
77 Clapp, 218. 
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trade that occurred in the last half of 1915. 
n:May 22, 1915, Lord Bryce" 
"June 2, 1915, Llo~ George - Minister of Munitions 
"Reginal d McKenna~ Chancellor of the 
Exche quer'! 
"Marquis Landsdowne" 
"June 3, 1915, Lord Crewe and I lunche d alone. It 
"June 4, 1915 Read President Wilson's cables to the 
King - Lunched with Balfour and Sir Horace 
78 
Plunkett." 
House told Plunkett that he was going to persuade the President to 
conduct such a war that Europe would remember for a cerrt;ury what it :meant 
to arouse a peaceful nation. He then stated: 
"I intended to suggest a conunission with perhaps a :member of the 
Cabinet as chairman, to facilitate the manufacture of munitions of war and 
war material. Plunkett wanted :me to see some of the British Cabinet and 
79 
talk with them before I left." 
Here is what Wilson's biographer stated in regard to the trade in 
arms: "Thus by the end of the year 1914 the traffic in war materials with 
the Allies had become deeply entrenched in America's economic organization 
and the possibility of keeping out of the war by the diplomacy of neutrality 
no matter how skillfully conducted, had reached a vanishing point. By 
<" 
October, perhaps earlier, our case was lost. 
While British diplomacy maneuvered with skill to involve American 
78 S~our, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol.I, 463-467. 
79 Ibid., 454. 
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.' industry and finance in the munitions traffic it is certain that American 
business needed no compulsion to take war orders. 
However we may repudiate the motive, the intricate business connections 
with the Allies developed during 1914, 1915, 1916, until the very economic 
80 
life of the country rested upon the munitions traffic." 
Lloyd George, in his Memoirs has also emphasized the effect on 
American policy of the connection between American finance and trade and 
the cause of the Allies: 
"If we were interfering with A..'1V3rioa's potential trade with our 
enemies, at least we were providing her with a magnificent market in 
Britain, Fnance and Russia, which stimulated her industries to an unpre-
cedented level of activity ahd profitableness. TIlis fact had its influenoe 
in holding back the hand of the American Government when ever excited to 
intense irritation by some new incident of the blockade, it contemplated 
81 
retaliatory measures." 
Andre Tardieu -who was French High Commissioner in the United states 
after this country entered the war, similarly has written that the tie up 
be~veen American commercial and financial interests and the Allies during 
our neutrality period made victory of the Allies essential to the United 
States. Tardieu places the position as follows: 
••• But the increasing volume of allied needs 
afforded the Americans almost unlimited trade 
possibilities. Prices had risen enormously. Profits 
had swollen ten fold. The Allies had become the sole 
dustomer of the United States. Loans the Allies had 
obtained from New York banks swept the gold of Europe 
into American coffers. 
80 R.S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson - Life and Letter, Vol.5,181. 
81 Lloyd. George, Voi.2, 661-662.--
.' From that time on, whether desired or not, 
the victory of the Allies became essential to 
the United States. The vacillations of Wilson's 
policy only made this necessity more apparent. 
The note of the Federal Reserve Board forbidding 
further loans to the Allies jeopardized American 
financial interests inasmuch as it did the fate 
of the Allies. This note coming too late or too 
soon placed buyers and sellers, borrowers and 
lenders in equal peril. If deprived of 
resources the Allies lost the war, haw could 
their debts be paid and what would their signa-
ture be worth? The carefully weighed policy 
of the President, permitting sales and stopping 
credits, worked against neutrality and in favour 
of a break; it worked against Germany and in 
favour of the Allies. Between the Allies and 
the her ican narket a common bond of interest 
had been created.82 
In summing up the effect of the trade policy it must be remembered 
107 
that the Central Powers could not be eliminated without the destruction ot 
about 13 percent of our foreign trade. It was a point which our own 
statesmen were slow to recognize. The British statesmen, however, had a 
shrewder grasp of the realities. Th~ never lost sight of the inconvenient 
fact that the United States hot only had a direct naterial interest in 
keeping open the trade routes to Germany but also possessed the power to do 
so if she ever ohose to exeroise it.83 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
TABLE I U.S .FOREI GN COMMERCE 
1912-1916 
Merohandise Exported and Imported in Dollats 
Exports of Domestio Produce 
2,170,319,828 
2,428,506,358 
2,329,684,025 
2,716,178,465 
4,272,177,579 
Imports 
1,653,264,934 
1,813,008,234 
1,893,925,657 
1,674,169,740 
2,197,883,510 
Exoess of Domestic Exports 
over Imports 
517,054,894 
615,498,124 
435,758,368 
1,042,008,72584 2,074,294,069 
82 Andrl Tradieu,France and Anerica,Some Experiences in Cooperation. 
Houghton MiI'fhn Co., BostO'ii';"'J:927, 150-151-.-
83 Millis, 84 84 Senate Res. 206 No.944 Part 113 
Table II U.S. FOREIGN COMMERCE 
co~mINED EXPORTS 1914-1916 
A To Allied Countries:England,France, 
Italy,Russia 
1914 
1915 
1916 
B Central Powers, Austria-Hungary,Germany 
1914 
1915 
1916 
C Neutral (Northern) Denmark,Ho11and, 
Norway, Sweden 
1914 
1915 
1916 
Dollars 
824,860,237 
1,991,747,493 
3,214,480,547 
169,280,775 
11,878,153 
1,159,653 
187,667,040 
330,100,646 
279,786,219 
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.' 
Index 
(1914-100) 
100.0 
241.0 
383.7 
100.0 
7.0 
0.68 
100.0 
175.8 
149.085 
One more bit of evidenoe that Englands
' 
interference with our trade and 
our quiet acceptance of the condition led steadily to a condition of war 
is contained in the letter of Charles Cheney Hyde to Secretary Lansing on 
January 11, 1916. The letter is so revealing in paragraphs that it should 
be given as written: 
Personal 
Hyde,Westbrook and Watson 
Counsellors at Law 
Chicagp, January 11,1916 
The Honorable The Secretary of State 
Washington, D.C. 
My dear Mr. Secretary: 
I am taking the liberty to send you 
herewith copy of a paper prepared and read by myself 
before a certain club in this city and also at the houses 
of some of my friends. It has not been made public and 
care has been taken to prevent it's being reported to the 
85 Senate Res. 206, No.944, Part 5,113. 
press •••• With assurances of greatest respect, 
I am, Mr. Secretary, 
Your obedient servant, 
Chas .Cheney Hyde 
.' 
! Question of Law and Diplomacy - The Exportation of Munitions of War • 
•••• The response of the United States has been that according to inter-
national law as exemplitied by the Hague Convention (1907) above noted, 
(Gerrmny's contention over munitions and foodstuff) a change of rule in 
the course of the war, favorable to one belligerent, and harmful to its 
enemy, would amount to unneubral conduct. 
The only ground justifying a change of the rules expressed in the 
convention - and one which the Convention itself makes note of in its 
109 
preamble - is the necessity of a neutral power to make the change in order 
to protect its own rights. As Secretary Lansing has recently said: 
"The right and duty to detelllIll.ine when this necessity exists rests 
with the neutral, not with a belligerent. It is discretionary, not 
mandatory. If a neutral power does not avail itself of the right, a belli-
gerent is not privileged to complain, for in doing so it would be in the 
position of declaring to the neutral power what is necessary to protect 
that power's own rights. If 
"That the United States does have the right, in case of need, for 
example on grounds of self-defense, to change the rules and to forbid the 
sale within its territory of arms to belligerent governments, or to prevent 
the departure from its territory of such arms when sold may prove of 
estimable value. Two reasons for the assertion of this right might cause 
us to exercise it. First the failure of Great Britain to heed American 
110 
.' American protests against unlawful restrictions imposed upon American 
commerce; secondly, belief that the unrestricted exportation of arms 
to the Allies would cause Germany and Austria-Hungary to take steps both 
hOstile and injurious to tm United states. 
It ••• It will be remembered, however, that the Hague Convention of 1907, 
above noted, recognizes the right of a neuttal to change its policy in the 
course of a war in order to protect its own rights. It would not be 
unnatural, under such circumstances, for the United States to prevent these 
powers from transforming our Atlantic seaboard into a series of foreign 
arsenal supplying expeditions against their enemies and our friends." 
~The next paragraph set up a possibility that, should the Central Powers 
be successful we might be held for damages to their commerce as England 
was held in our Civil War.) 
"The foregoing reason, and also a more sinister one - namely the 
desire to increase the market price for the bonds of two allied governments 
and now held in the United States, have ser.ved in fact to create in certain 
portions of our Country a definite and dangerous effort to cause the 
United States to join forces with the allies .•.• 1t 
86 
Chas. Cheney Hyde 
In the final summing up of this chapter, we may say t:m t the State 
Department did not see fit to use the weapon placed in its hand, for the 
protection of the people of America. It is evident that economic consid-
87 
erations have a great deal to do in precipitating war. 
86 Senate Res. 206, N,. 944, Part 5, 115-119. 
87 Arthur Bullard, The Diplomacy of the Greait; War. The Macmillan Company, 
New York, 19'I8';"214. - -- -
r ~-----------------------------------------------------------l-l-l~ 
~ 
We must consider the munition question also for the single example 
of the Du Pont Company which increased its facilities for making military 
powder from half a million pounds per month to nearly thirty million 
88 pounds. Such a situation cannot be ignored. 
The writer feels that the trade of our country was one of the avenues 
through which we were skillfully propelled into the European horror. That 
it was a very considerable cause for the final decision of the Washington 
Government must appear conclusive from the evidence presented. 
88. J.M. Clark. The Costs of the World War to the American People. Yale 
University Press. NeW Haven. 26-,-------
.' 
CHAPTER V 
THE 1HIRTr PIECES 
The sea lanes of the world yielded their diplomatio secrets for the 
explanation of our problem. The musty oounting rooms of English finanoe 
in conjunction with modern American capitalism were the next avenues 
explored and where the gold lay deepest the explanations grew strongest. 
The oo:amunioating medium between the new and the old was the diplomatio 
oorps of the gov.ernments of the United States and England. The politioal 
appointee of the United States, often Mosen to fulfill a oampaign obliga-
tion oame in contact with the best from a mrravr group of English lif •• 
In England, the nomination. for examination for a Foreign Office 
Servioe rests with the Foreign Secretary. Candidates for the Diplomatio 
serviae must give assuranoe 'that they are provided with a private inoome 
of 1400 a year. If appointed they must serve abroad tor two years without 
pay. Of twenty recent appointments one half were peers or the sona of 
peers. The Civil Servioe Commission furnished the eduoational anteoedents 
of the suocessful competitors for attache' ships in the years 1908-1913 
inolu8 ive. Twenty five out of thirty seven came from Eton. In only one 
1 
case was any university other than Oxford or Cambridge represented. It is 
not neoessary to point out that this group would throw its influence and 
power in tavor ot the group it represented. 
1 Philip Snowden, Democraoy and Publioity in Foreign Affairs, Toward A 
Lasting Peaoe. The Maamillan Company, 1916, 195-196. 
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.' Baok of all the wars for defense ot nationality', for liberty and 
bumanity are the pressure of powerful eoonomio needs and interests. We 
Jleed not aooept the DIlXim tha t, "all wars are tor DIlrkets" in order to 
r.alize the part whioh commerce and f'1m.nce play in fomenting international 
2 
dispute. 
As au evidenoe of the power of money in the tragio years of 1913-1917. 
"e offer a glimpse behind the soene in 1913. On Ootober 17. 1913, Turkey 
aooepted :the ohallenge of war from Bulgaria, Servia and rlontenegro. On 
the same day, the Bank of England's disoount rate rose from 4 to 5 peroent, 
the highest sinoe the world panio of 1907. Frenoh government bonds tell to 
the lowest price sinoe 1890 and British consols to the lowest in their 
history. In the last five months of 1912. we had imported $37,000.000 
gold, mostly in payment for our grain shipments; in the first half of 1913. 
our gold exports were $63,000,000, most of whioh went to Franoe. Gold was 
drawn trom European banks for hoarding purposes and statistioians estimated 
that in 1913. not less than $250,000,000 was already hidden away by oonti-
3 
nental Europe. 
The year 1914 began in all the markets of the world with falling 
money rates; a plain indioation of the relief Europe felt at the 8ettlement 
of the Balkan war. In January the Bank of England reduced its discount 
rate from 5 per oent to 3; rates on the New York market tell so rapidly 
that in February loans running until August were DIlde on Stook Exohange 
oollateral at 3! per cent. A vigorous speoulative DIl.rket developed in both 
2 J.A. Hobson. The Open Door, Toward A Lasting Peaoe, The lIaomillan Co., 
1916, 87 -
:5 A.D. Noyes, The War Period ot American Finanoe, 1908-1925. G.P. Putnam' 8 
Sons, 'ifeW York, 1926,18-19. --
~ . 
. London and New York, but the oondition was not a healthy one as our import 
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f 
exoess was the greatest sinoe 1895. Gold was exported to the extent of 
4 
fifteen to fii'ty millions monthly. The gold was going hODe. Then oame 
July and August and the World War. The first reaotion to tinancial 
instability showed in the Stook Exohange. They iDlt the war news by oloBing 
their doors in every lJILrket of the world. The London Stook Exohange whioh 
had never betore olosed its doors even in the Napoleonio wars, ahut down 
indetinitely the morning ot July 31, 1914, the double motive tor that 
being first, to prevent the selling ot investment seourities wnioh would 
oause a panic, am seoond, to torestall what was already apparent, the 
"unloading" ot international stooks and bonds on London by the other 
6 
uarkets ot the world. 
Haw olosely war and tinanoe are linked together is shcJlrn. in the 
aotion o~ the New York Stook Exchange. At 9:30 on July 31, 1914, the Board 
of Governors announoed that the New York Exohange would remain open, but 
so heavy were the sellihg orders listed tor the day that the Board issued 
an order through its Seoretary at a t_ minutes to ten o'olook, the regular 
opening time, that the Board would "be olosed until further notice." It 
did not reopen until April ot 1915. The Board ot Direotors changed their 
minds beoause they had obtained definite infor.mation of a wholly unpreoe-
dented array of selling orders oaoled over night from Europe to New York 
banking houses tor execution at any prioe obtaizable when the marl:et should 
6 
reopen. 
4 Noyes. 52. 
5 Ibid., 56. 
6 Noyes, 57-58. 
7 F.R. 1914 Supp., 580. Doo. 763.72111/4848.. 
115 
.' Quite evidently the government of the United States oould not r8llain 
idle while the eoonomio and finanoial maohinery of the nation was attempting 
to adjust i t8elt to the 8train plaoed upon it. On Auguat 15, 1914, 
Seoretary of State Bryan answered a oommunioation reoeived from the J.P. 
Morgan and Company a8 follows: "Inquiry having been made as to the attitude 
of thil Government in case Amerioan bankers are asked to make loan8 to 
foreign governments during the war in Europe, the following announcement 
18 made: There is no reason why loans should not be made to the governments 
of neutral nationa, but in the judgmSlt of this Government, loans by 
Amerioan bankers to any foreign nation whioh is at war are inoonsistent 
7 
with the true spirit of neutrality." 
W.J. Bryan 
Baok of this letter are two cables from J.P. Morgan and Company, one 
on August 9, the other August 12, 1914, to Morgan Barjes in reply to a 
request to float a Frenoh loan; portions of the oables follow: "In regard 
to loan, do not think in oondition our markets and sudden neoessity supply 
all neoessary oapital for United States on this side and payoff ahort 
borrowings abroad that suoh operation would be possible. Certainly until 
opening of stook exohange and relaxation of situation enables us estimate 
state of affairs here more aoourately than possible at present. 
Am oertain no loan oould be arranged for oonsiderable period involving 
Withdrawals gold and in our opinion no one oould make loan here now for any 
foreign nation invo lving export of gold. Will however ake oareful iuvesti-
gation and oable you further about as soon as p08sible." 
.' The seoond oable spoke of the effort being Dade and olosed with, 
"f(e, of oourse, however will do our very best and hope arrange moderate 
extent. Please assure Government have every desire be of servioe. For 
lour information only_ We are oonsulting our Government here as we do 
not wi sh take any aotion under present strained oircumstances which will 
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be offensive to them, although we understand there il no legal objection 
8 
to loan suggested." Events had moved swittly in the financial world. 
caution was necessary. 
August 6, 1914, the British Government deolared that all payments due 
or falling due wi thin a mantil, should be denied to be due and payable on 
a date one oalendar month. after the day on which the payment originally 
beoame due. This extension of the due date was twioe extended 80 that 
payment of debts maturing on August 4, 1914 were really not due until 
9 
November 4, 1914. On August 1, 1914, 1:he rate for oable remittanoes rose 
to $7 per pound sterling, whereas the highest tigure in the memory of 
living man was $4.91 in the panio of 1907_ England also plaoed an outright 
10 
embargo on go ld • 
The position ot the .Amerioan bankers and the government as well was 
critioal. "At the outbreak of the war, the Seoretary of the Treasury 
stated on the basis of information gathered trom the New York banks, 
merohants and bankers were indebted to London in the sum of approx*tely 
.450,000,000 maturing January 1, 1915 with $80,000,000 additional awed 
London and Paris by the oi ty of 'New York, and shortly to fall due _ The 
8 Senate Res. 206, 'No.944, Part 5, 59. 
9 Noyes, 69-70 
1O~., 7Q-72 
.' stooks and bonda held abroad, and whioh would be dumped on the market as 
11 
soon as the exOhanges opened amounted to $2,400,000,000." 
On August 7, 1914, the Seoretary of the Treasury oalled a meeting of 
the most important bankers and merohants to oonsider this urgent problem. 
The najority of the group opposed gold payments. The powerful private 
117 
bankers insisted on gold payments, , and pointed out that unless the obliga-
tiona were met the largest oity in the country would be in a position of 
12 
defaulting on its obligat1.ons. 
On September 4, 1914, the committee of bankers whioh had taken the 
task in hand reported to the Treasury that payment of New York City's 
foreign loan in gold had been provided tor. The country's banks had been 
asked for a pool of *150,000,000 more in gold to meet any future maturing 
obligation and the Bank of England agreed to reoeive all payments at its 
13 
newly established branoh at Ottawa. 
Wi th the foreign s i tua tion in hand, the banks had to meet the domestio 
problem. They invoked the Aldrioh Vreelaz:td Emergenoy Currenoy Aot by whioh 
National banks might form groups termed "national ourrency assooiations" 
and depolit not only United States bonda but other qualified seourity or 
commercial paper up to 75 peroent of their value or qualified state, oity, 
town, oounty and munioipa1 bonds, on whioh 90 per oent of value oou1d be 
14 
gotten in notes. These notes were not guaranteed by the United States 
Government: $500,000,000 was all that could be issued and in the run on 
the American banks in the swmner and fall of 1914,$563,532,080 of this 
11 Noyes, 60-61. 
12 Ibid." 82-83. 
11 I'6Id., 84. 
14 lDIQ., 77-78. 
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.' 
ourrenoy was put in oirculation. It satisfied the people and prevented the 
15 
dreaded panic. 
It was during -this IDBnipulation of the currency system that Secretary 
ot state Bryan issued the statement in regard to loans and J.P. Morgan sent 
hiS two cables w Morgan Harjes. Considerat ion of domestic finance moved 
the banking world. consideration of neutrality moved the Administration. 
but both agreed -that loans could not be made. 
On August 10. 1914, Secretary of State Bryan addressed a communioation 
to the President in which he set up three reasoDS why this government 
should refuse loans to any of the belligerent m tiona. His reasons were as 
follows: (1) Money was the worst of all contrabands because it controlled 
everything else; (2) Loans 'WOuld be taken by those in sympathy with the 
country in whose behalf' the loan was negotiated, which would have the 
effect of' dividing the United States citizens into groups favoring the 
different belligerents. The sympathy of groups was disturbing enough as it 
was - but it would be more so if a pecuniary interest was involved; (3) 
Powerful financial interests conneeted with these loans would probably exer-
cise their inf'3.uence -through the press to support the interests of the gov-
ernment to whioh -they had Dade loans because the result of' the war would 
naturally affect the value of' the :seourity. All this influence 'WOuld D18.lc8 
it all the more difficult for us to naintain neutrality as our actions on 
future questions would be thrown in the balance. Bryan added a postscript 
and said that Lansing had noted the govermrent did not protedt the citizens 
Who went abroad and enlisted in a foreign army and he saw no reason why the 
15 Noyes, 78-81. 
16 .' 
sfU116 attitude oould not be taken in regard to Amerioan dollars. 
Bryan's letter interpreted at tile present time assumu an almost 
prophetio air. Money did become the most notorious of oontrabands; we 
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could not retain our neutrality and powerful finanoial interests did diotate 
our foreign polioies. 
There oan be no question of President Wilson's position on the loan 
question in August 1914. The Chioago Daily Tribune of August 15, 1914, 
carried the following headline and news item: "Wilson Opposes Lending to 
any Opposing Nation. Inquiry of J.P. Morgan as 1x> Floating French Loan 
Reveals Attitude of Administration. 
Washington D.C. August 14: Although there was no tarnal expression from 
administration offioials today, it became known that President Wilson and 
Seoretary Bryan .... re opposed to the floating of any loans in the United 
17 
States for the benefit of the belligerent powers in Europe." 
By Ootober 1914, a ohange had gradually taken plaoe in the finanoial 
posi tion of the United States: the knowledge that the money oenter of the 
world was about to oross the Atlantio Ooean began to dawn upon our tinan-
oiers. 
The go ld pool formed in August aotually reoeived from .Amerioan bankera, 
pledges amounting to $108,000,000 but only one fourth of this subsoription 
or $27,000,000 was aotually called up, and out of the $27,000,000 so oalled 
ohly $10,000,000 went to the Bank ot England in Ottawa, Canada. The rate 
tor sterling exohqe whloh was $7 in August tell to parity by November 12, 
18 
1914. It is interesting to note that the total coat of this transaction 
16 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 160-161. . 18. Noyes, 85-86. 
17 Chioago Daily Tribune, Friday, August 15,1914, 1. 
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.' 
-.raS $16,542,67. 
The J.P. Morgan telegram to Morgan Harjes of August 12,1914, ahould be 
reread at this point, and the Seoretary of State's announoement of August 
15, 1914, should be reviewed. 
On Ootober 23, 1914, Robert Lansing, Counselor for the State Department 
made the following notation in the form of a memorandum. It is so important 
aId shows 80 olearly how the money question was. to be handled from this 
point on that it is given in full. 
"Department of State 
Offioe of the Counsellor 
9:30 P.M. Ootober 23,1914 
Memorandum of a Conversation with the President at 8:30 this Evening 
Relative to Loans and Bank Credits to Belligerent Governments. 
From my oonversation with the President I gathered the following 
impressions as to his views pOllOElIl"ning bank oredits of belligerent govern-
ments in oontradistinotion to a publio loan floated in this oountry. 
There is adeoided difference between an issue of government bonds 
whioh are sold in open mrket to investors and an arrangement; for easy 
exohange in meeting debts inourred in trade between a government and 
.Amerioan merohants. 
The sale of bonds draws go 1d from the American people. The purchasers 
of bonds are loaning their savings to the belligerent government, and are 
in fact fimnoing the war. 
The aooept~oe of Treaspry notes or other evidenoes of debt in payment 
for artioles purohased in this oountry is merely a meaiul of faoilitating 
trade by a system of oredits whioh will avoid the olumsyand impraotioal 
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.' lIlethoci of oash payments. As trade with belligerents is legitimate and 
proper it is desirable that obstaoles, suCh as interferenoe with an arrange-
JIlent of oredits or easy method of exohange should be removed. 
The question of an arrangement of this sort ought not .!? be submitted 
to this Government for its opinion, sinoe it has given its views on loans 
---- --
in general, although an arrangement as to oredits has 'b:> do with a oommer-
oid debt rather than with a loan of money. 
The above are my individual impressions of the oonversation with the 
President ~ authorized ~e ~ give them to such persons !!. ~ entitled 
.!£. ~ them, ~ ~ express understanding that theY!!!!.!2: ~ impres-
sions ~ ~! ~ ~ authority ~ speak for ~ President 2!. ~ Govern-
ment. 
Robert Lansing 
Substanoe of above conveyed 'b> Willard Straight at Metropolitan Club, 
8:30 P.M. Ootober 24, 1914. Substanoe of above oonveyed 'b> R.L. Farnham, 
19 
at the Department, 10:30 A.M., Ootober 26, 1914." Willard Straight was 
a representative of the J.P. Morgan Company and R.L. Farnham. was oonneoted 
with the National City Bank. The National City Bank and the J.P. Morgan 
interests were attempting to float at onoe a $10,000,000 loan to Franoe 
and the finanoial maohinery was being geared for that purpose. The idea 
was to introduoe a differenoe between loans and oredits and to permit the 
20 latter seoretly, while the former was publioly banned. 
Europe had been oonduoting a general war for three months at this 
period, and the trade of the United States languished. The sea lanes were 
olosed to the great neutral nations, and peaoe time needs were being regi-
19 Senate Rei. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 161-162. 
2 S 
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JD9nted into war time demands. The result to the United States was ~oted 
in any 118.1'81 The country' 8 steel plant s ope rated at 50 per cent of their 
capacity. in the first two months of 1915, the United States Steel Corpo-
ration's earnings did not cover the interest on its bonds for the same 
time; ootton sold for 7-f cents a pound, the lowest in fifteen years J new 
railway construction in the United States fell to the IGW'est mileage in 
fifty years J 1st percent of the labor in New York was unemployed and lli 
21 
percent of the labor in other oities was idle. 
The Federal Reserve Bank system began to operate in November, 1914. 
The system was adopted to increase the circulation of money when money was 
22 
needed and contract the circulation when money beoame plentiful. 
The oOIlV'ersation between President Wilson and lAnsing of the State 
Department took plaoe on October 23, 1914. On October 23, 1914, Samuel 
McRoberts, Vice President of the National City Bank wrote to Robert Lansing, 
the Counselor of the State Department, as follows: "It (American export war 
trade) may in the end come back to us, but the oritical time for .American 
financ ein our international relations is during the nertt three or four 
months, and if we allow these purchases to go el sewhere, we will bave 
neglected our foreign trade at the time of our greatest need and greatest 
23 
opportunity. " 
Ambassador Juaserand, the representative of the French Government in 
Washington, wrote to Mr:' Vanderlip, President of the National City Bank in 
New York, as follows:"I hope with you that the placing of the Treasury 
warrants will not only be arranged, but that circumstanoes will soon allow 
21 Noyes, 96 
22 W .E. Woodward, 726 
23 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 61. 
24 
an important broadening o£ the operation." .' 
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In the lIIlterial given you thus far you have the requisite conditions 
for a great war trade. (1) The depressed condition of the country in late 
25 
1914; (2) the secret arrangement for credits in October, 1914. 
The artificial distinction between loans and credits was kept a 
departmental secret tor f'i ve months. During that time the foundation for 
the great war time trade was arranged. For months the fil'll.ncial operations 
nth the belligerents were conducted under this secret distinction. Om 
year notes of both Gernany and France were sold in April 19l5J a larger 
secured loan was extended to FranCe in June and July 1915; a rwming loan 
account was opened by J.P. Morgan and Company for Great Britain. an accoUlIt; 
used in those earlier days as a source of dollars for both the purchase 
26 
of supplies and for exchange support. 
On January 8. 1915. Senator Stone, who was Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations wrote to the Secretary of State and among 
numerous questions was one munbered 13. Change of polioy in regard to 
loans to belligerents: (a) General Loans (b) Credit Loans. Senator Stone 
desired complete information on this ~estion and suggested that tba 
information be published in order to quiet the misapprehension among the 
27 
people. 
Secretary of State Brym answered Senator Stone's letter on January 
30, 1915. The matter was taken up seriatim and question 13 on loans was 
answered as fo llows: 
War loans in this country were disapproved 
because inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality. 
24 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 61. 
25 Stephen and Joan Raushenbush,War Madness Natio:cal Home Library 
There was a olear1y defined difference 
between a war loan and the purohase of 
arms and amnunition. rhe po1ioy of dis-
approving of war loans affeots all govern-
ment. alike, 1110 that the disapproval i8 
not an unneutral aot. rhe oase was 
entirely different in the matter of arms 
and ammunition, because prohibition of 
export not only might not but in this case 
would not operate equally upon the nations 
at war. • •• On the other hand oontraots 
for aDd sales of oontraband are mere 
matters of trade. rhe manufacturer, 
unless peou1iarly sentimental, would sell 
to one belligerent as readily as he would 
to another. No general spirit of partisan-
ship is aroused - no ~pathie8 exoited. 
rhe whole transaction is merely a natter 
of bus iDess • . 
rhis Government has not been advised 
that any general loans have been made by 
foreign governments in this oountry s inoe 
ths President expressed his wish that loans 
of this oharacter should not be n:ade. 
W .J. Bry&nlt28 
.' 
On March 31, 1915, the state Depar1:ment issued the following notice 
to the press: 
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Washington,Maroh 31,1915 
rhe State Department bas from time to 
time received information directly or in-
directly w the effect that belligerent 
nations had arranged with banks in the United 
States for oredit in various sums. While 
loans to belligerents have been disapproved, 
this government has not felt that it was 
justified in interposing objeotion to the 
oredit arra:ogeDSnts whioh have been brought 
to its attention. It has neither approved 
not disapproved these. It has simply taken 
no aotion in the premises and expressed no 
opinion.19 
25 (continued from p.123) Washington, D.C. 1937, l5l-J.52. 
26 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 61 
27 F.R. Supp. 1914, Preface VI. No file no. 
28 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 163-164. 
~ __ 2_9_F_._R_._1_9_l_5_S_U_P_P_._,_8_2_0_,_D_OO __ ._8_5_1_~6_1_)_3_0_. ____________________________ ~ 
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.' No name was signed to this OOJJlllunioation. 
The writer has sought to disoover what oaused the ohange in the tone 
of the oommun.ioations from the Seoretary of State. Three have been 
presented, August 10, 1914, January 30, 1915, and Maroh 31, 1915. The 
first Illd seoond are signed W.J. Bryan, the third oarries no signature. 
In the light of his earlier aotions, the seoond and third oommunioation 
have a peouliar signifioanoe. 
J .P. Morgan and Company beoame the purohasing agents for the British 
Governmnt in January, 1915, and for the Frenoh Government in :May, 1915. 
Elaborate maohinery was set up in the export department for the proourement 
of supplies. By August 1, 1916, contraots in the amount of $450,000,000 
for the aooount of Great Britain and Franoe were made while paymmtts on 
aooount of advanoes and deliveries uDder these oontraot. had amounted to 
only $174,000,000. This lett a heavy oontraotural liability on Morgan 
purchases alone. Appanmtly there was no way to oatoh upccm this debt as 
a vast amount of supplies would }:ave to be delivered in the future. The 
British GO"1erllJlBnt handled the war supplied for the Russian Government 
30 
during this time. The ability to find dollars to pay for munitions, as 
well as ootton, beoame, a souroe of 00 ns tent worry to the British and Frenc 
Some dollars had been raised by selling fra.noa and pounds but that 
depressed the exohallge rate. Some gold had been shipped but neither oountry 
wanted to part with its go ld reserves. British oitizens O1IXl8d great blooks 
of American securities but no organized effort was made to assemble the 
seourities and sell them for the benetit of the British Governmnt. What 
30 Senate Res. 206, Nol 944, Part 6, 61-62. 
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.' Frence and Eng1e.Di both wanted was to tloe. t a large loan in the Americ8ll 
-.rket. 
One at the operations conduoted by the J.P. Morgan Company tor the 
acCOunt ot the British Government was the support at the pound sterling by 
purchase at sterling in the New York market. Through. 1915 trom February 
through July_ they totaled $82_000,000_ but there were available resources 
in the New York banks in the ferm ot loan offers which could still be 
used in support of the pound sterling. On August 14_ 1915_ this support 
-.ras withdrawn. The records show no reason for it, sterling sold otf and 
reaohed a law of $4.51 on September 1, 1915. Exporters saw their markets 
disappear with the purchasUlg power of their best cus'b:>mer. The effect on 
31 
American iIldustry was apparent at onoe. 
Two notes, one from the persoml tiles of Benjamin Strong, Jr._ former 
Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York_ the other a oopy at a 
telegram from J.P. Morgan and Company to wndon, show the trend events were 
to take. The Strong note to House follOlrs: 
Colonel E.M.House 
Manchester, Mass. 
August 14_1914 
My dear Colonel House: Referring to our oonversation 
of a week ago I You have doubtless observed that matters 
are developing along the lines ot our discussion. 
SterliDg exche.:cge sold yesterday below $4.71. The news-
papers are reporting very considerable oanoellations of . 
foreign contraots tor wheat and other commodities •••• 
If exchange decliaes very 
sharply so that all the profit on a purchase of goods 
com.raoted tor in this country is gone before the goods 
are exported and the purchaser is in the position to caneel 
the coIIt:ract, he will, of course, oancel in every instance 
31 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 62. 
.' 
even though he has to buy agai~ later •••• 
The situation undoubtedly growing 
increasingly diffioult with each day's decline 
in exchange •••• I still believe that at present 
rates with the prospect ot still lower rates 
the influence is gradually growing stronger to 
curtail our export business. 
Very truly yours, 32 
Benjamin Strong Jr. 
The Morgan telegram to London is paraphrased and given belOlf: 
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J .P. Morgan and Company 
Export Department 
New York, Aug.18, 1915 
599~. As you appreciate we have continuously, 
through various oh8.Dllels sought public sentiment 
regaraing straight British Loan •••• 
For your inf'orma.tion, in view ot the 
conference R.P. Davison had with the Secretary 
of the Treasury, we have duly sent word to the 
Secretary of the Treasury that we regard the 
Exchange situation as very serious from the 
point ot view of our oommerce in order that the 
Administra tion may be fully informed and with 
hopes that they might in 80me way be helpful, 
making no definite suggestions, however •••• 
33 Morgan 
The movement to establish a system. of loans to the Allies gained in 
volume ani moved westward. On August 17, 1915, James B. Forgan of the First 
Natio:aal Bank in Chicago wrote to F .A. Delano, Vice Governor of the Federal 
Reserve Board and sought information of a very private nature as is 
in the following letter. 
Hon. F.A. Delano 
Vice Goveronor Federal Reserve Board 
Washington,D.C. 
First National Bank 
Chic~go, August 17, 1915 
My dear Mr. Delano: I want to get some information for 
a very oonfidential purpose and it has oocurred to me that 
32 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 174-175. 
33 Ibid. 175 
.' you may be in a position to help me secure it. 
It is to put it bluntly: I would like to 
knOW' 1iha.t the attitule ot the gavermDeIIt admin-
istration in Washington would be towards the 
flota tion of a large British loan in tilis 
oountry. Some time ago I remember seeing in 
the press tilat the State Department had discouraged 
New York bankers on a proposition to float a 
Bn ti sh loan in this oountry, but at the 88me 
time it was stated tilat it was not within the 
province of the government to veto such a trans-
aotion. It would seem to me that tile present 
condition ot interna.tional exchaDge would deter 
a government from entering any objection to the 
flotation of such a loan in this country, or 
to the sale by Great Britain of .Anerican securities 
in this country. One or the other of these 
transactions would seem to be a business necessity 
at the pres entt iDle •••• 
You might send me one ot the follOWing 
telegrams to indicate whioh of the positions the 
governnent 'Would take in regard w the flotation 
of a large British loan in this country and I 
will understand your meaning: 
1. Parties would be favorable to and would 
encourage suoh a transaction. 
2. Parties would take no aotion either for or 
against such a transaction. 
3. Parties would discourage such a transaction 
but would not offer any active interference 
with it. 
4. Parties attitude would be such as to make such 
a transaction practically impossible. 
With kind regards, I am 
Very truly your s. 
34 
James B. Forgan. 
Fo~ganl s letter was sent to McAdoo, but by whom the record does not 
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disclose. McAdoo wrote to Lansing on August 23, 1915, and enolosed Forgan1s 
letter. The communication is marked "confidential." McAdoo spoke of the 
seriousness of the exchange situation, ot the effect on the trade of the 
United States and of his deep regret for the attitude of the State Depart-
34 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 176. 
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.' ]I1ent in regard to the esta.blishment of foreign credits in this country; he 
olosed by hoping that the governm!lJzt would not reaffirm its position on the 
35 
question. 
Forgan's letter Dade another journey to Mr. Charles Hamlin, Govemor 
of the Federal Reserve Board. We are sure of this for the record gives two 
letters from Lansing: one on August 25 to the President of the United States 
and one on August 26 to McAdoo and in both letters 'the faot that Hamlin had 
reoeived Forgan's letter is clearly stated. We give the letter to the 
President: 
fhe Pres ident , 
The White Hous e 
August 25,1915 
My dear Mr. President: As the letter ot Mr. cJa~:s B. 
Forgan, .... hich is enclosed to me by Mr. Hamlin deals 
direotly with the general policy ot the government 
I feel 'that before answering it I should be advised 
as to your .... ishes. I :therefore enclose Mr. Hamlin's 
letter 8.lld a oopy ot Mr. Forgan' s. 
I think we must recognize 
the faot that comitions have naterially changed sinoe 
last autumn when .... e endeavored to disoourage the 
tlotation of any general loan by a belligerent in this 
couzrtry. fhe question ot exchange and the large debts 
whioh result from purchases by belligerent governments 
require lome method of funding 'these debts in this 
country. 
Faithfully yours, 
36 
Robert Lansing. 
Lansing's letter to MoAdoo is necessary for the last sentenoe whioh 
was as follows: ~ile the President did not authorize me to lend a oopy 
of his oommunication to you I feel that he .... ould wish you to know his 
37 
position." 
Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 176-177. 
==_, 177 
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.' The Presidentt s oomnunication, whioh opemd the wealth of .America to 
the fighting hordes of Europe, is given in full. 
The Secretary of State. 
The White House 
Washington,August 26,1915 
My dear Mr. Seoretary: My opinion in this matter, compendiously 
stated, is that we should say ~t "Parties would take no aotion either for 
J 
or againSt suoh transaction" but that this should be orally oonveyed, so 
far as we are oonoerned, and not put in writing. 
in the matter. 
I hope that th is is also your own judgment 
Fai tilfully yours, 
38 (Initialed) W.W. 
So far as the records are concerned, they reveal no study of the 
financial or trade problems of the oritioal period; nor do they reveal 
who depressed the pound sterling; w~t untouohed souroes'the Allies had 
to meet their obligations will never be known. The Government merely 
reversed its loan policy polioy and permitted the flotation of the 
$500,000,000 unsecured Anglo-French loan in the early fall of 1915. Look-
ing at the naDeS conneoted with this transaction and realizing its signifi"!' 
cance, the writer ~nders if this was legislation arrived at demooratioally. 
The trade flowed trom every source that could be used by the belliger-
ents. The exports were only restrioted by the American finanoial narketts 
a.bility to finance the surplus of exports over and above those paid for by 
imports, gold shipments, and seourity sales. Great contraots were let, 
38 Semte Resolution No. 206. No. 944, Partt6, 66. 
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.' plant expansion was emouraged by the British and French commercial agents 
aIJi the war boom spread to every avenue ot .Amerioan lite. Onoe started, 
loan tollowed loan: $100,000,000 to Franoe in August ot 1916; $250,000,000 
to England in September, 1916, and $300,000,000 in November, 1916. There 
39 
appeared no end to the needs ot the Allies. 
On April 13, 1916, President Wilson spoke at the Willard Hotel. It 
was a Jetterson Day address. Jetferson had been the triend ot the oommon 
man; something ot the cOlllllOn man's need must be voioed by the President. 
Wilson' 8 high note of the evening oame wi th this announcement: "As I have 
listened 1x> some at the speeches tonight, the great feeling bas come into 
my heart tilat we are better prepared than we ever were betore to show how 
Amerioa can lead the way along the paths ot light. Take the single matter 
of tile tinancial statistics, at which we have only reoently beoome preoisely 
iDtormed. The mere increase in the resources ot the national banks ot the 
oountry in the la at twelve months exceeds tile total resources ot the 
Deutscher Reiohs bank, and the aggregate resources ot the national banks of 
the United States exceeded by three thousand millions the aggregate re-
sources ot the Bank ot England, the Bank of France, the Bank ot Russia, 
the Reichsbank ot Berlin, the Bank of Netherlands, the Bank ot Swi tzerlam 
40 
and the Bank ot Japan. It 
This vast hoard ot wealth bad oome trom many points of the earth. 
At tile outbreak ot the war the Bank ot England held .185,000,000 in gold, 
and the Bablc ot Franoe $800,000,000. The greatest iart ot our 
$1,137,800,0000t 1915 and 1916 oame on acoount ot London and Paris. It 
39 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 66. 
40 R.S. Baker and W.E. Dodd, The New Democracy. Harper and Brothers, New 
York, 1936, Vol.2, 1~O-146. 
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our gold here had merely been drawn trom the British and Frenoh reserves 
ot 1914, those reserves would have been entirely exhausted before the end 
ot 1916. But in aotual faot the gold held in the Bank of England was then 
Il8ar1y $80,000,000 more than in 1914 and the gold in the Frenoh Bank's 
-vaults only $146,000.000 less. To nake up this great amount ot gold, the 
Governments took the gold .from the people. South Afrioa in 1915-1916 
produoed the largest amount ot gold in its history, more than $200,000,000 . 
worth be ing s ant 'b:> Canada. Rus s ia drp' $340, 000,000 in go ld from the 
Imperial Bankts prewar gold reserve and shipped it to London, Canada and 
New York between 1914-1917. Canada in 1915 drew $218,900,000 from her 
$451,900,000 reserve and in 1916, $577,300,000 trom a reserve ot $685,900, 
000. Wilson's boast at the Willard Hotel had bean the oontribution of the 
people, the toil ot the workman as well as the hoarded supplies ot govern-
41 
ments. 
One item of trade will show how the vioious oirole worked. The 
Bethlehem Steel Company alone, whioh had on its books a total of 24,865,000 
untilled orders at the end ot 1913 and 46,513,000 at the and ot 1914 
reported 175,432,000 at the end ot 1915. The etteot on the oountry's 
export trade was instantaneous, as against February's shipments ot only 
$6,700,000 in war munitions, that class ot export rose in August ot 1915 
to $27,000,000 and to $69,000,000 in Deoember when the value of the munl-
tiona exports was more than double than that ot the same month's export 
ot all bread stutts. For the oalendar year 1916, the stated value or 
munition exports was no less than $1,290,000,000, a sumwhioh exoeeded the 
41 Noyes, 130-133 
.' 
sum of the similar shipments of 1914 by $1,250,000,000 and those of 1915 
42 
by $960,000,000. 
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The Amrican investment narkat did not take to the Allied obligations. 
Eaoh issue dragged on the narket. The reoord shows that the British loans 
of September and November were heavily oarried by the munitions oontraotors 
43 
and the banks assooiated with J.P. Morgan and Company. 
By November ot 1916, however, it was clear 1n J.P. Morgan and Company 
that the finanoial future of the Allies in Amerioa was growing increasingly 
dark. They were partioularly fearful of the approaching exhaustion of 
.Amerioan securities to use as collateral under loans, and although by sub-
stitution of BritiSh Dominion obligations tor Amerioan seourities in the 
collateral ot loans already tloated, they were able to oonserve the supply 
to a large extent, even this was not sufticient, tor example, under a 
total par ot $aoo,ooo,OOO in British seoared loans, there were deposited 
over $400,000,000 in British railway debentures and Dominion Government 
bonds. Sinoe it is questionable whether a bond of a dominion oould have 
been paid. it the mother oountry detaulted, it is questionable how good these 
bonds were as security, particularly when they were present in such large 
quantiti es • At th is point, J.P. Mor gan and Company proposed the is sue o! 
short term, unsecured Treasury bills, poSSibly even of suoh short maturi-
ties as 90 days, figuring that in time they oould gat out and keep atloat 
a minimwn of $300,000,000 of these, thus obtaining the benetit of another 
large loan without the saorifice ot any oollateral. The Federal Reserve 
Board at the direot suggestion of President Wilson, objeoted to this issue 
42 Noyes, 114-115. 
43 Senate Res. 206, No. 944 Part 5, 66. 
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, 
.' on the ground that it was not desirable 'that Amer ioan banks be loaded with 
44 
suoh obligatioIlS if there should be any ohange in Amerioan foreign policy-. 
When the Federal Reserve Boardtf 8.!Dlounoement was uade to J.P. Morgan 
and Company, tlsy oonsidered it a blow to Allied credit. Spring Rioe 
oabled his government and the British Government ordered the withdrawal of 
the bills. Thereafter the British Government very definitely deolined to 
strain its resouroes to care for its American needs. In the next four 
months there was only a slight inorease in gold shipments and there was an 
45 
absolute oessation ot seourity sales. 
Thil apparent blow at Allied credit produoed a money oris is in the 
New York narket tlat indioated how irretrievably the Amar ioan tinanoial 
and industrial market lad beoome involved in the Allied oause. On Deoember 
5, 1916, J.P. MOrgan, through Mr. Davinson telegraphed Morgan, Grantell and 
Company in London as follows: 
llorgan, London 
J .P. Morgan and Company 
Export Department 
New York, Deoember 5, 1916 
33036. For E.C. Grenfell. Our exohange purobases this 
morning aggregate approximately 4,000,000 pounds sterling. 
We must again reiterate that this feature seems to be the 
orux of the whole situation. Payments under contracts 
olosed through us are not excessive. We figure them approx-
!nately 100,000,000 monthly during the next four months. 
But the support of the exchange market is the serious 
feature. In attempting yesterday to partioipate 1 and 
2 loans beyond our awn oircle, we found reluctance on the 
part of SOl!e insti'bltions naturally due to lOW' reserves 
and extraojdinarily high rates tor oall money. With this 
somewha t 11m xpeoted ob staole and wi th the s1 tuation as 
serious as it is, we oalled groups of confidential leading 
bankers this morning 1» point out the Deoessity of oaring 
for situe:tion and the faoility for doing so with suoh 
44 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5 66. 45 Ibid. 67 
.' large amounts of American seourities to use 
pending arrival of sufficient gold. All these 
bankers most anxious to cooperate ani express 
willingness to reduoe 'their reserves even below 
legal limit,if necessary, but as one man they 
asked the question - what are Great Britaints 
requirements going to be ~,tp.e next thirty days? 
We could not anSN'er this q~lti.on beoause the 
handling of exohange makes that feature abso lutely 
unoertain. 
It was apparent to us that our inability 
to answer this specific question or even to plaoe 
an outside limit upon the exohange item, was very 
distln-bing to these bankers. We feel, therefore, 
on this and on every other aocount, that we must 
have some early expressions as to plane (plan) of 
authorities on this point. We, are not fully 
acquainted with what is in their minds. Perhaps 
they have some undisolosed resouroes that we are 
not aware of, but at the present rate of go iDg 
they will soon exhallS t all gold available in 
transit, ani also available ~rioan seourities 
even going so far as to assume that we oan possibly 
secure loans up to 80 per oent ot the value ot 
these seourities. We do not presume to suggest the 
polioy ot the authorities but our responsibility 
oertainly requires our pointing out the dangers in 
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the 8i tuat ion so tm t it we should suddenly tind ~, 
thai:; we had exhausted all available resources of 
this market, the knowledge ot that taot would DOt 
CODle as a shook to authorities. Our Olm interest 
this morning in numbers one ani two loans was 
$90,000,000. Owing to previously explained limitations 
upon amount anyone promssor nay borrow, it may be 
neoessary for us in the near tuture ourselves to 
become the obliger tor your account. You oan under-
stand our reluctanoe to do this as taot would amost 
undoubtedly beoome known and oreate bad etfect.45 
On December 7, 1915, J.P. Morgan again wrote to Morgan in London as 
tol1ows: 
To Morgan, London. 
J .P .Mor gan and Company 
Export Dept., 
New York, December 7,1915 
33131. 28017. 28017. As we are now advancing on 
45 Senate Res. 205, No. 944, Part 5, 214-215. 
loans one and two aggregate of 115,000,000, 
an additional loan of 150,000,000 during the 
next three weeks is a very large amount for 
this market, quite irrespective of the collateral 
and plrticularly in view of the tact that we wish 
to lIuldle the matter quietly and mke no public 
issue. Our talk with the institutions had been 
along the line that the action of the Federal 
Reserve Board has given such a set back to the 
issuing of loans that it has been necessary to 
make other arrang ements pending an improvement 
in the si tua tionJ that we have on hand this large 
volume of American and foreign securities, and 
tlat the shipping of gold to 'this market is being 
expedited to the tullest extent; that your estimate 
is "that an additional amount of loans, say 
$150,000,000 during December will take care of the 
entire situation as you see it for that period. 
Our important banking friends bave assured us they 
will stand by and assist and as a result of various 
conterences today, we expect that we will be able 
to carry through the business if no unforseen 
obstacles aris e • To give you so.thing of the 
pioture this would involve our having a participa-
tion in excess of $100,000,000, the National City 
Bank, say $40,000,000, the First National Bank, 
say $30,000,000, and so on. Naturally these 
insti tutions ask 'What is going to happen after 
the first of the year and to that we are unable to 
reply_ We of course cannot encourage an operation 
which will bind up the New York market without 
some way of liquidating it. WhU.e 'We now have 
the authority '00 pledge all or any part of the 
oollateral in suoh a manner as in our judgment 
seems neoessary or wise you appreoiate that, as 
the amounts of these loans increase, there will 
oertainly be inquiries from Boards of Direotors 
or bank examiners for so_ speoifio evidenoe of 
our authority. In order therefore that we my 
have something to show when required, 'We suggest 
that you cable us in sub stantially the to llawing 
form: (quote) The Chancellor of the Exohequer and 
the Bank: of England have written us letters 
instruoting us to advise you that for all loans 
'Which you have mde or may hereafter make either 
to the Briti sh Treasury or the Bank of England, 
you are a~o~ized to hold as collateral all or 
any part of the Amerioan or other aedurities in 
your possession or in transit to you and all or 
any part of the gold in transit to you, you to 
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r , 
hold or use all or any part of the foregoing 
oollateral in such a manner as in your disoretion 
seeDlS neoessary or wise. Your authority oontinues 
as heretofore 1x> make such advanoes either to tile 
British Treasury or to the Bank of England as in 
your disoretion seems neoessary or wise. 
47 
Morgan 
137 
.' 
Morgan, Grenfell's answering inquiry in regard to exohange indioates 
further how the fate of the Allied financing would involve the Amerioan 
market. This letter is not given in :f'ull, tile quotation follOW's: 
"I presum.e that if a break were allowed in exchange or any oanoella-
tioD of orders were to begin, there might oocasion a big squeeze in your 
stook marmt and ourtailment of loan faoilities by bankers. Do you 
48 
endorse this opinion?" 
There is no answer to the Morgan letter of Deoember 7, 1916. No 
equities were ever sent. In short, from Deoember 1916 on, that is, after 
President Wilson's intervention in the Treasury bill episode, the British 
handled their demand loans a:t; Morgan's in suoh a way that there was never 
49 
any olear way to liquidate them. 
A letter from the files of the Federal Reserve bank of New York shows 
haw the lives of thousands of man were laid daw.n to continue the then 
oonditions; how the peaoe moves of PresidantWilson were but idle gestures 
in the faoe of the trade and finanoe condi tiona of the United States. 
Exoerpt of a letter 
Benj. Strong Jr. Esq. 
4100 Jiontview Boulevard 
Denver, Colo~ado 
Federal Reserve Board 
Washington,November 23,1916 
Dear Strong: I have just finished dio*ating a letter to 
r~----------------------------------------------~ 138 
.' Mr. Treman,' in whioh I gave him the meat of our last oonference 
with the Advisory Council and also of our meeting with Mr. 
Davinson who was here last Saturday. 
Davinson (of Morgans) took the point of view that they 
only wanted w do what was good for the country, but tlB.t the 
British Government was buying about tlO,OOO,OOO worth a day, and 
if we did not plaoe these loans were taking the responsibilit,y 
of outtiIJg dawn the trade of the country, a very serious respon-
sibility as we were now in a fair way of beoomiIJg the masters of 
the world. The more we stimulated this trade, and the more loans 
we made to these foreign countries, the more would we increase 
our pre cio minano e. 
GoTemor Harding (who had taken the precaution dur~ 
these last weeks to place himself in touoh with the leading 
authorities in questions of foreign polioy in order to be sure 
that we were acting in fullest aocord with what generally would 
be oons idered the best interests of the oountry) pointed out to 
Mr. Davinson tla t the re was so_ danger of a oredi tor beooming 
so muoh involved with 0118 debtor that finally, no matter whether 
the creditor wanted to or not, he would have to go in deeper and 
deeper. In otha:- words, while you thought you had the bull by the 
tail, as a matter of fact that bull had you by the tail. In 
this case, it is ~ ~ who would have us by the tail. 
England has now outstanding in short loans an amount 
which must be as large as between one and two billions of poUDis. 
How the se are to be iUnded nobo dy knows. EIJglend t s per oapi ta 
debt next year will have multiplied by seven as against the 
beginning of the war. The continual; ion of the war, therefore, 
appears madness, and as long as nobody knOWlJ hOW' long this mad-
ness will last, there is no saying in what oondition Europe will 
be when the war ceases. The fee ling generally appears w be 
breaking through here at WashiIJgton (and I think: also amongst a 
substantial part of the oooler elements of the oountry) that the 
end of this war will be a draw; that the sooner it ends the 
better and that continuing the war means only a needless and 
fruitless saorifioe of life and treasures. To think that this 
war must go on to keep our trade going on is an abomination. To 
think that it ought to be the duty of the government or the 
Federal Reserve Board~ prevent disastrous economio consequenoes 
by proloIJging it is unjustifiable. And we said to Mr. Davinson 
tha tit was the general feeling tha t we had grown enough and that 
we should be in a position of contemplatiIJg the "breaking out" 
of peaoe without a thought of alarm: that to our mind it VIaS 
better to let this extraordim.ry trade gradually down to more 
nearly nornal proportiollS than to have it stop with a vengeance. 
47 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 215-216. 
48. Ibid •• 68 49. Ibid., 69-70. 
Davinson hims elf' said tba t he thoU&ht there were 
$500,000,000 or $800,000,000 whiCh we might still reoeive in 
payment of goods that we are sending •••• 
.' 
As long as Europe seUs us secured investments and 
as long as the investors take them there is no harm done. 
Altogether, we do ~ feel ~ we have ~ duty ~ proteoting 
t~ investor:out we are oonoern8d Iiithe strength of the banking 
iItlBtion, and1.t was generally telttliat these exohequer boDds 
While they were made up in a form whioh made them appear self-
liquidating as a natter of faot what in the aggregate would 
oonstitute a look up of the funds of our banks and in the em 
would probably have to be turned into long term bonds. 
Always oordially youra, 
50 
Paul M. Warburg. 
The revision of the Federal Reserve Aot whioh ohanged Regulation J 
139 
and permi tted the renewals of Bankers Aooeptanoes was given to the publio 
on September 7, 1915. It was at this time that the real trade in munitions 
61 
began. 
On November 27, 1916, the Federal Reserve Board issued a warning to 
banks and investors in regard to investments in foreign oredits. The ex-
oerpt from the minutes of the meeting of the Federal Reserve Board on 
November 27, 1916, is as tollows: 
"The Board read and again revised the proposed statement for the press 
regarding foreign. oredi ts. In its revised form the statement was approved 
and ordered turnished for use in the morning newspapers of November 28 as 
a state_nt to be issued in the forthooming number of the Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. 
On Motion it was voted tba t the Governor send to the firm ot J.P. 
Morgan and Company a short telegram advising them that the board intends to 
52 
issue today a statement relating to foreign. oredits. 
50 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 196-198. 
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.' aimed at any foreign government. 
Advised him to ask permission of Iansing to talk with Harding. Said 
question of liquidity first aro se in connection with French credits in 
~hich Kent pointed out that the acceptances could at once be rediscounted 
in F.R. banks. 
I advi sed him to talk wi th Davinso n 
I referred to N.Y. Tribune statement and said Board felt it must warn 
banks 1x> lee ep 1 iquid • 
(New York Tribune had said a thousand million bills of the treasury lIOuld 
be issued) 
Said he lIOuld cable his government that it was a purely interIl8.1 bank 
matter 
C.S .H. said, to Cable nothing until his talk with Lansing and Harding. 
Morgan announces loans will be made notwithstanding warning. 
NovElDber 30, 1916 
Said President told him (Harding) at his interview - our relations with 
England were more strained than wit h Germany 
Deoember 1, 1916 
Lamont (of the J.;p. Morgan firm) wires British notes plan abandoned. 
December 4, 1916 
Harding said Spring Rice said no further statEment was necessary; that 
the proposed plan did not meet with his or Sir Richard Crawford's approval, 
as if only a few notes were sold it would do no good, while if sales were 
large it 'VIOuld put Grea.t Britain and France at mercy of U.S. Banks. 
142 
.' Maroh 8~ 1917 
Sec. M. (MoAdoo) said Ambassador Page had cabled President that Board's 
warning had scared investors and injured British credit; that neither 
Great Britain nor France could continue shipping gold to the U.S.; that if 
something not done Great Britain would suspend speoie payment. 
Board pretared new draft with Sec .M' s. consent voted to publish it 
53 
tomorrCJllf." 
Ironically enough it was the deputy governor of the Bank of England~ 
Brien Cokayne~ in a letter to Governor Strong of the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank, on January 15, 1917 in regard to the Reserve Board warning 
who pointed out very clearly the dangers in the way of the United States as 
it has prooeeded. The letter follows: 
(From the files of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) 
Benjamin Strong Esg. 
Dear Mr. Strong: 
Bank of England, 
15th January 19a7 
As a na tter of fact the announoement though 
premature, was probably useful as it tended to allay the 
feeling of soreness which has been oaused by the Federal 
Reserve Board's warning against taldng either long or short 
loans of the belligerents. We ourselves while declining to 
regard tmt warning as intemionally un:f"riendly, are still 
somewlat at a 108s to divine its real purpose. I almost 
wonder tmt the Board, (Reserve) when it saw that millions 
of money were being invested in ephemeral works to supply the 
enormous temporary requiremems of the Allies did not issue a 
warning in time to check such dangerous expansion. And if it 
had done so a year or two ago it would have benefitted not 
only the United States but also perhaps, indireotly, ourselves 
by forcing us to beoome more self-supporting. 'WlIen however, 
the huge outlay had been incurred and the gigantic orders 
plaoed, it did seem rather odd that a warning should have been 
53 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 206-210. 
54 Ibid.. 216-217. 
given against facilitating the raising of funds with whioh to 
pay for them •••• 
Yours sinoere1y, 
54 
Brien Cokayne. 
.' 
It was during this troubled time that John llayIllrd Keynes, C .B. who 
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'8.S the official. representative of the Brit ish Treasury at the Peace Con-
~erellOe and a deputy for the Chancellor of the Exohequer on the Supreme 
~oonomio Coumi1 stated: "The fiIl1noial history of the six months from 
~he em of the summer of 1916 up to the entry of the United States into the 
rar in April 1917 remains to be written. Very few persons outside the half 
:iozen officials of the British Treasury who lived in daily contact with 
the immense anxieties and impossible financial requirements of those days, 
can fully realize what steadfastness and courage were needed and haw 
entirely hopeless the task would soon have become without the assistance 
55 
of the United States Treasury. 
In Governor Strong's confidential memorandum of the last months of 
1916, he referred to a confidential letter written to him by President 
Wilson, and commented upon it on November 27, 1916. The letter is not 
given in S8Il8.te Resolution 206 but we do know that it was about this tiD 
that President Wilson called upon Seoretary of state Lansing for a detailed 
report on trade and trade conditions. In a document entitled "Summary of 
Inforll18.ti on in Regard to Credits of Foreign Governments in this Country and 
the Relation to Trade" !4nsing set up the conditions as follows: The out-
break of the war found the United States a heavy debtor in short time notes 
espeoially to England. The great cotton trade of the South could not be 
55 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Conse uenoes .2!.:!?1!!. Peaoe. Haroourt, 
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.' used to cancel this indebtedness so trade in the goods the Allies needed 
was substituted. This trade had been so great that now oredits must be 
established for the Allies in Amerioa by means of short ti:D:e Treasury 
warrants _ lansing ~:m stated that the seourities oould be sold abroad 
or used for collateral in foreign loans and would be paid at naturity in 
56 
dollars or equivalent exchange. 
Wilson was not entirely satisfied by this dooument and thoroughly 
agreed to the warning is sued by the Federal Reserve Board on November 27, 
1916. At the sams time he spoke of the danger that might oocur if there 
was a change of Foreign Policy and the country was flooded with unsecured 
foreign creditB. 
The fact tmt all this wealth was passing through one financial channel 
was also a disturbing factor. Around the middle of 1915, Great Britain am 
Frande made J.P. Morgan and CompaDy their purohasing agent in the United 
States. Morgan's commission on purohases was one peroent on all transac-
tions. The Morgan profit on purchases was $30,000,000. The Morgan Company 
sold all the British and French bonds to the American people and nade m.uch 
more than they had on the purchasing game. The bom syndicate sold 500 
million dollars of .Anglo-French bonds in 1915. All the security these 
bonds had was the word of England and France. Within a year an additional 
billion dollars of Allied obligations were soattered among American in-
57 
vestors. 
The faroe of all this movement was felt in the long settled states of 
56 R.S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson's Life and Letters, Vol.5, 186-187. 
57 Wood:wa.rd, 731-732. - -
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the Atlantic Seaboard where society and publio life had always been 
moulded more or less directly by the influenoe of Europe. Here the thought 
of the people was oolored by the war news and war needs and it was here 
58 
that the credit movement began. 
The feeling in England during the troubled period was that the United 
states authorities1'lOuld stand by the British Govemment. Disputes might 
arise but they felt there was no real disposition to hamper the allied 
59 
movements. 
As the evidence developed,it presented a picture of two great forces 
contending for the power of a peaoeful country whioh in 1916 ~d two 
ambitions - to keep out of war and to make money. The President had been 
eleoted on the slogan "He kept us out of war." It was quite true that many 
who voted for the President were also in the group who wished to make 
money, and it was this element tlat oreated the daJJger. Frank A. Vanderlip 
of the New York ,banking group stated tba t the war would develop a million 
new springs of wealth. George D. Baldwin said a corporation cannot live 
on patriotism, because wtockholders must have dividends. The DuPont stook 
had gone from $20 to $1,000 a share, and it was said J.P. Morgan had made 
more money in two years than his father had made in his life. There were 
21,000 new A.meriean millionaires - each one a warm friend of the then 
60 
existing eonditions. 
To show how deep rooted and powerful this group felt aDd where they 
sensed their power to lie, we present the written words of F.Townsend 
Martin, a soion of one of the newly enrichwd Pittsburgh families: "It 
.' The banks were still carrying their subscriptions to the British 
loans of September and November 1916, and with the exception of 
those banks which had sold out at a los s, were still carrying 
their subscriptions to the Anglo-French loan of Ootober,19l5. 
By December 22, 1916, the British demand loan at Morgan's 
amounted to $268,000,000 with Morgants carrying $138,000,000 
although back in October, Lamont had cab],ed Morgan and Davison 
who were then in London tla t with tb3 ftrils participation at 
$98,000,000 they were approachipg their proper limit. By 
January of 1917 they had to go far beyond their proper l1m1 t. 
As to acceptances, of a figure of $137,000,000 held by the 
Reserve Banks in December 1916, $111,000,000 bore the endorsements 
of only seven banks. The important point'.ere is not the si*e 
of the figures but the place of strain. Most of these acoeptanoes 
were renewal credits which were substantially Baseoured, the 
original goods behind tilem had long sime passed into the nomal 
plIooesses of war, and tilerefore only as good as the endorsement 
of the accepting or dis counting bank. If anything had happeDed 
to the Allies the Reserve Bank of New York whioh held the bulk 
of these acceptances, could not have been paid by the seven 
banks who had done most of the endorsing.as 
The crumbling of this IDOtmtain of debt pointed to disaster. The Federal 
Reserve Bank represented the best in advanced banking, created by the 
Wilson Administration. 
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The problem could have been met, only at the beginning of the war. ,.,. 
The time was pa.st for a.ny remedial measure. 
64 (continued from p.147) Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1934, 76-77. 
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.' large amounts "Of American securities to use 
pending arrival of sufficient gold. All these 
bankers most anxious to cooperate am express 
willingness to reduce their reserves even beloW' 
legal limit, if ne oessary, but as one Dml theY' 
asked the question - what are Great Britain's 
requirements going to be in.t4e next thirty daY'S? 
We could not anSNer this qu8slS.on beoause the 
handling of exchange makes that feature absolutelY' 
uncertain. 
It was apparent to us that our inability 
to answer this speoifio questi.f,n or even to place 
an outside limit upon the exchange i tam, was very 
disturbing to these bankers. We feel, therefore, 
on this and on every other account, that we must 
have some earlY' expressions as to plane (plan) of 
authorities on this point. We are not fullY' 
aoquainted with what is in their minds. Perhaps 
theY' have some undisclosed resources that we are 
not aware of, but at the present rate of going 
theY' will soon exhaus t all gold available in 
transit, am also available Anerioan seourities 
even going so far as to assum.e that we oan possiblY' 
seoure loans up to 80 per cent of the value of 
these securities. We do not presUIDe to suggest the 
policY' of the authorities but our r,esponsibi1ity 
oertainlY' requires our pointing out the dangers in 
the situation so that it welhould suddenlY' find 
thai: we had exhausted all available resouroes of 
this market, the knowledge of that faot would not 
oome as a shook to authorities. Our 01Ql interest 
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this morning in numbers one ani two loans was 
$90,000,000. Owing to previouslY' explained limitations 
upon amount mY' one promssor "Y' borrow, it maY' be 
neoessarY' for us in the mar future ourselves to 
beoome the obliger for Y'0ur aooount. You oan under-
stand our re1uotanoe to do this as faot would &most 
undoubtedlY' beoome known and create bad effect.46 
On Deoember 7, 1916, J.P. Morgan again wrote to Morgan in London as 
follows: 
To Morgan, London. 
J.P.Morgan and CompanY' 
Export Dept., 
New York,Deoember 7,1916 
33131. 28017. 28017. As we are now advancing on 
46 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 214-215. , 
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.' $2_168_000,000 in the twelve months ending with June, 1915_ rose to 
$4_333,000,000 in the fiscal year 1915 and to $6_290,000,000 in the fiscal 
year 1911. Our largest surplus of exports over imports in any oa1endar 
year before the war bad been $691,421,000 in 1913. The export surplus of 
63 
1915 was $1,116_014,000, and in 1916 it was $3,089,169,000. The foroes 
back of this ava1anohe of gold was not to be stopped by a lone voioe 
crying in the wildemess. 
A g~ing irritation of the Allied course is evidenoed in Wilson's 
letters at this time. Following the b1aoklist of AJ8,erioan firms in 1916, 
he wrote as folloW's: 
ttl a.m, I must admit, about at the eni of my patienoe with Great Britain 
and the Allies. This blacklist business is the last straw. I have told 
Spring Rioe so, and he aees the reason very olearly. Both he and Juaserand. 
think: it is a stupid bl1.mder. I am seriously oonsidering asking Congress 
64 
to authorize meto prohibit loans and restriat exportations to the Allies." 
On November 24, 1916, Wilson wrote to House am complained of g~ng 
more and more impatient with the intolerable oonditions of neutrality. 
Wilson also laid that this feeling was as hot against Great Britain as it 
was at first against GerDlUlY, and that it was likely to grow hotter still 
66 
against an indefinite oontinuation of the war. 
The situation had long s inoe passed out of the hands of the Government 
The choice was bankruptcy or war. Wilson's statements were merely idle 
words. Acts of Congress were granted, but never invoked. The financial 
record of January, 1911, showed why. 
63 Noyes, 111-118. 
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.' The banks were still carrying their subscriptions to the British 
loans of September and November 1916, and with the exception of 
those banks whioh had sold out at a loa s, were still oarrying 
their subscriptions to the Anglo-Frenoh loan of October,19l5. 
By Deoember 22, 1916, the British demand loan at MOrgan's 
amounted to $258,000.000 with MOrgan's carrying $138,000.000 
although back in Ootober, Lamont had cabled MOrgan and Davison 
who were then in London tm t with the firms participation at 
$98,000.000 they were approaching their proper limit. By 
January of 1917 they had to go far beyond their proper limit. 
As to aoceptanoes, of a figure of $137,000,000 held by the 
Reserve Banks in December 1916, $111,000.000 bore the endorsements 
of only seven banks. The important point here is not the si!e 
of the figures but the plaoe of strain. MOst of these acoeptanoes 
were renewal credits which were substantially aaseoured, the 
original goods behind them had long sime passed into the n01"JlB.l 
p.,ooesses of war, and therefore only as good as the endorsement 
of the aooepting or dis oounting bank. If anything had happened 
to the Allies the Reserve Bank of New York which held the bulk 
of these acoeptances, could not have been ~aid by the seven 
banks who had done most of the endorsing •• 
The crumbling of this motmtain of debt pointed to disaster. The Federal 
Reserve Bank represented the best in advanced banking. created by the 
Wilson Administration. 
The problem could bave been met, only at the beginning of the war. 
The time was past for any remedial measure. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PROPAGANDIS T 
Long before the last belligerent of Europe had hurled his war defiance, 
the entire group recognized that the "public opinion" of .America was the 
objeotive toward which their every effort must be directed. The publio 
opinion of America in 1914 was an elusive quantity which inoluded the sturd;y" 
peaoe loving German who had left his Fatherland because he believed that 
the United States held that for which his heart longed; here too the Irish 
had found the liberty and freedom for whioh they had fought and died; 
Poland, that had been the plaything of every sordid monarch in Europe, had 
sent her sons and daughters to our shores J the Latin countries of Southern 
Europe had contributed the ir roame and oulture; the cold Soandinavian 
oountries had sent the best of their blue eyed BOns and daughters to our 
land; and following the Revolutionary War, the Atlantic seaboard retained 
most of their English groups. The English group gave us our language and 
their interpretations of the old Roman law. 
The fact that there was a common language to interpret thought to 
our diversified millions was a direct advantage J the mediums for the 
communication of tho~ht were powerful weapons in the battle; and with 
these mediums the United States was well supplied. 
The basis of power in a democratic nation is the intelligenoe am 
oulture of its people. The great free public sohool system of America 
produced a population practically ready to receive the information prepared 
for it. No country on earth. had such a powerful press - free to spread 
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the truth, or lies, as it saw fi t. Telephone systems oonneoted the remote 
village with the great news oenters of tile oountry. The radio and wireless 
were within our grasp and news oables led 1:;0 every foreign land. The 
battle of the propagandist would be a battle of note. 
The pod tion of Amerioa in the battle about to begin had been voiced 
by Woodrow Wilson in his public utteranoes prior to the war. -It is not 
possible or neoessary to discuss how far these tenets were aooepted by the 
.Amerioan people as a whole, for, as the utteranoes of their legal repre-
sent;ative at a supreme moment; of world his'lDry, they will always retain 
I 
their value." 
The position of Great Britain possessed the advant;age of a oommon 
language but the disadvanl:age of a bitter mEmory of a war tought tor 
independence, and though the England of 1914 claimed tile democratic motives 
voioed by Wilson, there were those in tile United States who oonsidered 
2 
England in the light of the eighteentil oentury. 
The weapon the propag8lldist us es is propaganda: "Propaganda is a 
oampaign oamouf1aging its origin, its motive, or both, corduoted for the 
3 
purpose of obtaining a specific objective by manipulating public opinion." 
The definition sets up no qua1it,y for the campaign whioh is to be conducted. 
The origin and motive is hidden and yet our opihion is to be moulded by 
this insidious weapon. In such a game it appears to the wri tar that the 
general public is lett in rather a defenseless position. 
1 John H. Latane, A History ot American Foreign Polioy. Doub1eday,Page &: 
Co., Garden City, N.Y. 1927, 597-598. 
2 Gre,y of Fa110don, 87 
3 Viereok, 11 
151 
An American newspaper man vm~oed his opinion of propaganda as fo11ows& 
"Over the door of an anoient struoture in Rome there stood, am still 
stands, a legend, "College of the Propaganda." For propaganda before the 
World War meant simply the means which the adherent of a political or 
religious faith employed to oonvinoe the unconverted. A ffIW years later 
the word had entered into the vocabulary of peasants and ditoh diggers and 
had begun to acquire its miasmic aura. In loose popular usage, it meant 
4 
the next thing to a damned lie.n 
If publio opinion was to be formed by lies then the lies must have 
the quality of artistry about them, and the oountry whose artistry was the 
most perfeoted would win. The historian W.E. Woodward gave the pa.lm to 
Great Britain, stating as follows: "They were specialists in lying, having 
lied all over the world - in India, in China, America, South Afrioa, for 
a hundred and fifty years. During that time they had encountered many sharp 
5 
oontradiotions and were prepared for them." The artistic imagination of 
the English and Frenoh ooined words and phrases whioh piotured the GermnB 
as impossible. "The Rape of Belgium" sounded better than "Invasion of 
Belgium," "Hun" brought Attila the Hun out of the dust of ages and placed 
6 
a spiked helmet on his head, and set him loose with his barbarian hordes. 
Having presented the definition of propaganda and suggesting tlat it 
might include the quality of falsehood, we must present the falsehood; and 
as the case is against the English, it must be an English writer who 
presents the falsehood. Arthur Ponsonby, M.P., investigated the Lusitania 
4 Will Irwin, Propaganda and the NflWs. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1934, 
3. -------
5 Woodward, 741 
6 • .Ie.!S., 739-740. 
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.' medal story and explained as follows: It was stated that the German govern-
ment had a medal struck and presented it to the submarine orew in oommemora-
tion of the sinking of the Lusitani':.. but after the Armistioe it was 
withdrawn from oiralation. The medal was made in Munioh by a German named 
Goetz, whom Ponsonby oalled a oartoonist in metal. His work was not 
offioial and only a very limited number of the medals appeared in Gernany. 
There was no insoription on the original medal, whioh merely showed the 
Lusitania oarrying munitions. 
Lord Newton was in oharge of propaganda in the British Foreign Office 
in 1916 J Newton took ODe of tla medals u, a West End store and asked for 
a reproduction. It was this repro duotion whioh was so ld allover the 
United States and in every neutral country of the 1'Drld. It therefore 
beo8lD9 olear that no medal was given to the orew of the U-boat; the German 
government oould not withdraw a medal it never issued; the large number of 
medals in oirculation was due to the reproduotion of Goetz's medal in 
Great Britain. The pro paganda value of 'the medal "as great as Lord Newton 
admitted. The impression it oreated was absolutely and intentionally 
7 
false. 
Having established the faot tmt there were falsehoods in propaganda, 
our next step is to show whether there was Britis h propaganda in the United 
States between 1914 and 1917 and how it funotioned: 
"This oonspiouous gap in the treatment of propaganda during the reoent 
war is filled by the essay of James Duane Squires. The essay is limited in 
soope to the books ani pamphlets issued by Wellington House. Only the 
7 Arthur Ponsonby, Falsehoods in War Time. E.P. Dutton and Co., New York, 
1928, 124-125. - - -
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.' 
books and p3.mphlets distributed in the United Kingdom or the United States 
are used. The material oloses with the entrance ot the United States into 
the war on April 6, 1917. This aot ot Amer ioa marked the aohievenrntb ot 
8 
the najor goal ot British propaganda." 
The study has all the qualifioations necessary: It oovers the period 
1914 to 1917. It deals with the United States am Great Britain. and only 
wi th the lIB. terial us ed by the two oountries. 
The war was not a month old betore the output ot pamphlets and books 
on it was immense and betore a year had passed. the produotion of sU)h 
material was torrential in its amount. The flood ot naterial was produoed 
by the otfioial bureau am by' volunteer organizations. Theunoffioial or 
volunteer organizations in England nay be listed as tollows: The Oxtord 
University Faoulty group whose contributions were known as the Oxtord 
Pamphlets. and lad eighty seven titles; The Cobden Club. whioh olaimed a 
cultural superiority OV'er Germany; the Fight tor Right Movement; A group 
ot Anglican clergy who issued material under the caption. Papers tor War 
Time J The council of Loyal British Subjects ot Austrian or Hungarian 
Birth. United Workers. who revealed England's industrial and tinanoial 
power; the Atlantic Union, whioh anticipated our entry into the war; and the 
9 
Overseas Club. 
Three other unoffioial British groups deserve more careful attention. 
The tirst of these was fue Victoria League whose patrons were "H.M. the 
King and H.M. the Queen." The work of this group antedated the war and was 
superior to the contemporary propaganda. 
8 Jams Duane Squires, Propaganda .!t ~ ~ ~ the United States, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1935, X of preface. 
9 Sires 16-18. 
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.' The seoond group was oalled the Union Demooratio Control. The sooiety 
was formed on November 17, 1914, and inoluded suoh men as Normal Angell, 
H.N. Brailsford, J.Ramsay MaoDonald, E.D. Morel, Arthur Henderson, J~. 
Hobson, Arthur Ponsonby, Bertrand Russell, Charles Trevelyan and Arthur 
Zangwell. Senator A.J. Beveridge visited 'this group in Jlaroh, 1915, a.nd 
was muoh impressed with its 'WOrk. The publioations of this group reve .. 1 
the dishonesty of the propaganda used in war time England between 1914 and 
10 
1915. 
The third propagan:la group deserves speoi .. l mention. It was termed 
the Central Committee for National Patriotio Organization. Aside from a 
ferr disoreet referenoes in oertain plaoes the very existenoe of this group 
has been forgotten. Some years ago the Keeper ot the Paper s in the British 
Foreign 0 ffi ce wro te as follOW's: "In the earl y days of th e war, Prothe ro 
and the late Harry Cust formed Oll their 0Wll initiative a small oommittee 
for the purpose of sending out to people in neutral countries supplies of 
literature intended to support the British oause. They interested in their 
soheme liBny well knnn people in this oountry and were thus able to give a 
persoml touoh to what was in essenoe propaganda, by direoting their 
literature from distinguished people in this ocuntry to their distinguished 
£rien.ds abroad. About the same time a more offioial propaganda organization 
was a.rising under govem_nt auspioes and the two were soon working together 
The offioial body supplied Prothero and Cust with any literature whioh they 
11 
required tor their purpose." 
In the autumn of 1914, the Central Conmittee for National Patriotio 
10 Squires, 19-22 
11 Ibid., 23 
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.' Organizations stressed the need of a propaganda movement in neutral ooun-
tries. They issued a call for .f'unds which read as follows: Equally 
important is the task of laying before neutral countries a clear statement 
of the British case. It is imperativethat immediate steps should be taken 
to present the full evidence on which our case rests in order to enable 
neutral countries to arrive at an important judgement. With this end. in 
view the Central Committee has proposed a far-reaching soheme tor the 
12 
translation and distribution ot suitable literature in these oount;ries." 
It is difficult to determ~e from the material presented whether 
Asquith or Grey favored Mr. Charles F.G. Master:nan to head the propaganda 
organization when it became orficial in the autumn ot 1914. Sir Gilbert 
13 
Parker said Lord Grey appointed Masterman. 
Ivor Nicholson had this to say "In Great Britain in the early days 
of the war the late Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, detailed his colleague, 
the later Mr. Charles F.G. Masteman, to make a beginning with the presen", 
tation to the world ot the Brittsh case in the war. A tull and authorita-
tive history of Briti sh propaganda throughout the war has never been written 
and perhaps it never will be written now. For three men, anyone of whom 
should have produced this work, are naar dead. Mr. Masteman, who died on 
November 17,1927, Mr. G.H. Mair, a great journalist who conducted a branoh 
ot propaganda work, who died January 2, 1926, or Sir James Headlam-Mor ley 
of the Forejgn Oftice aDd the Board of Eduoation, who died in September, 
1929. Personally 1 shall always regret that Mr. Masterman never tackled itl 
~t anyone can be said to have tounded propaganda in this country and to have 
14 
laid down the lines on which it should be conducted, it was Masterman. 
12 Squires, 24-25 13 Viereck. 129 
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.' In Mr. Squires' investigation, he torms the statement as tollows: 
"In September 1914, either Prime Minister Asquith or Foreign Minister ~rey 
invited Mr. Charles F.G. Masterman, then a member of the Cabinet to 
organize and take charge ot a propaganda bureau tor the British gover.nment. 
There was at that time no such department in existence and its development 
and use had tx:> be devised as the war progressed. Mr. Masterman, hCM'ever, 
was a DIm ot resourcefulness and was on terms of intimacy with Mr. Asquith. 
Indeed it is noticeable that despite his really remarkable work as chiet 
British propagaDiist in t~e first two years ot the war, Masterman's 
importance in tile organization speedily diminished atter the dCJW'nfall of 
15 
his powerful triend in December of 1916." 
The offices ot Briti sh Propaganda Bureau were located in a business 
structure called Wellington House in Buckingham Gate. Masterman established 
his propaganda headquarters here, and here it remained until its absorption 
16 
by the Ministry of Information in 1918. 
Masterman reported that Wellington House was not concerned with the 
supply ot news to newspapers, but with the production, translation and 
distribution ot books, pamphlets, government publications, speeches, and 
so forth, dealing witil the war, itsorigin, its history and all the varied 
and difficult questions which arose during its development: assisting in 
the plaoing of articles and interviews designed to influence opinion in 
the world's newspapers and magazines, espeoially .!!: Amerioa; the wide dis-
tribution of pictorial matter, cartoons, pictures and draWings, photographs 
for insertion in newspapers and periodicals, and for exhibition; the 
14 (con't from p.155) Ivor Nioholson~ "An Asp~ct of British Wartim~ Propag da." Qornh1l1 Magazine. Vol.70, 093-606, {January to June,193l) 
15 Squires, 25-27. 16. Ibid., 27. 
., 
prod uotion and distribution of oinematography films; helping to provide 
infornation and faoilities to the London correspondents of neutral, 
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espeoially Amrioan papers, personal oorrespondenoe with influential people 
abroad, espeoially in Amerioa; arrangements for the interchange of visits, 
of personal tours to neutral and allied oountries and of visits of dis-
tinguished neutrals and of representative of the Allies to this country; 
the prodmtion and distribution of maps, diagrams, posters, lantern slides 
and lectures, pioture post-oards, and all other possible means of mdsoella-
17 
neous prollaganda. 
One of the attempts of Wellington House to influenoe the Amerioan 
people met with defeat. They used the gramophone reoord and theexcelleIIt 
recording voice of Sir William Robertson. His message to America rang out 
olear and strong. He to ld of British achievement and then, in a fine 
cresoendo added "I say to America: send along every sn, gun, and aeroplane 
you oan; send them now, and help to finish the business on hand quiokly 
18 
and for all time.~ The Amerioan people did not buy the gramophone reoords 
any more than they bought the Allied loans and this form of propaganda was 
given up. 
In "An Analysis of the Hoover WarLibrary" Stanford, California, 1921, 
E.D. Ad8JJl8 has a footnote on page 30 whioh gives the reason why there was 
so muoh secreoy in oonneotionwith British propaganda during 1914-1917. 
Adams states, "In organizing the Brit!. sh propaganda to be issued by Welling-
ton House, a special effort was made by the Foreign Offioe to gather anemy 
propaganda that this might be studied and met in the British publioation. 
17 Squires, '28-29. 
18 Nioholson, 602. 
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.' There came into existence at the Foreign Ottice, theref'ore, a most unique 
library of' enemy propaganda, and into it was gathered also every kind of' 
publioationf'roDl all the nations at war and ~ ~ neutrals, ~ might 
~ study reveal governmental and popular attitude toward ~~. From all 
this somewhat ohaotio material, a speoial study" wa.s nade by experts and 
oondensed into a printed confidential analys is of' eneIllY' propaganda and 
tor ~ nation of' ~ world, showing authors, titles of' work, oharacterand 
19 
suggestion as to haw British propaganda should meet it." 
A reorganization of' the first propaganda division occurred in 1916. 
Colonel Buohan was put in oo:mmand. The new organization oonsisted of' f'our 
divisions, as f'ollows: (1) Mrl Masterman's Wellington House handled books 
and pamphlets; (2) A oinellll department; under the direotion of' Masternan'sa 
old lieutenant, Mr. Mair. This division also entertained f'oreign. visitors; 
(3) The Politioal Intelligenoe Department, whose prfmary f'ttno ti on was the 
gathering of' evidenoe on the state of' publio opinion the world over as it 
was nanif'ested in the newspaper press; (4) The News Department; which was 
20 
the " Inaginat ive department." 
Shortly atter the war broke out J8JJe s Davenport Whelpley, a oompetent 
English observer,wrote an article tor the Fortnightly Review. The subjeot 
ot the artiole was "The Courting of' America." Two pLragraphs from this 
article are ot importanoe to us at this time. The paragraphs, or their 
pertinent parts, f'ollow: "It is unfortunate that the British people, 
of'tioially, semi-offioially, or privately, should have deemed it the part of' 
19 Squires, 29-31. 
20 ~., 34-35. 
., 
wisdom to D&.lee any move toward an attempt to intluenoe .Amerioan publio 
opinion as to D&.tters oonoerned with the present war. Undue effort to 
influenoe publio opinion, and more quiokly in Amerioa than elsewhere, 
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generally reaots untavorably. The Amer iean press and people are suspioious 
of so-oalled publioity work.... It must be of the highest order to be of 
21 
value and oarry with it no suggestion of inspiration to work its end. 
This highest type of propaganda was in the United states and was 
22 
plaoed in the hands of Sir William Wiseman. Although he played a momen-
tous part in the history of the World War, his name was almost unknown to 
the general publio. The head of the British Seoret Servioe and seoret 
head of British propaganda. in the United States. he was the oonoealed 
musioian playing the ortan o£ propaganda. behind the soene. Manipulating 
23 
publio opinion, he deliberately effaoed himself. 
Sir William Wiseman had absolute authority in Amerioa. His nearest 
superior was in London. No Embassy interfered with him. In spite of 
unlimited resouroes, Wiseman did not enoourage lavish expenditures. Under 
Wiseman's guidanoe, British propaganda dedioated itself to the task of 
eduoating "publio" opinion and Congress, in order to insure the enormous 
loans and supplies that Britain required. After 1919 Sir William Wiseman 
aoted as the offioial adviser of the British delegates at the Peaoe Confer-
enoe on all matters pertaining to the United States. He is today a partner 
24 
in a oelebrated international banking house. 
21 James Davenport Whelpley. "The Courting of AllIer ioa." The Fortnightly 
Review, Vol.102, 682-689 (Ootober 1914) 
22 Viereok, 3 
23 Ibid., 3. 
24 Ibid., 135-136. 
., 
When the war broke out there were in Paris three Amerioans who at 
one time held the position of Amerioan Ambassador to France. They 'Were 
Robert Baoon, Myron ~. Herriok and William Graves Sharp. The last hamed 
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gentleman 'Was President Wilson's appointee, but did not assume his offioia1 
duties at the embassy until DeoeDi>er 1, 1914. It is with reference to 
these three Amerioans that an able French historian wrote as follows: 
"One of them who was also an intimate friend of Roosevelt t s had with the 
writer of these words an important oonversation worthy of being repeated. 
He said: 'In the United States there are at present perhaps 50,000 persons 
who feel that the nation should immediately intervene in the war on your 
side. But there are over 100,000,000 Amerioans who do not think so. Our 
duty is to reverse those figures so tmt the 50,000 may become 100,000,000.' 
In a footnote Squires gave this inform tion: ~he historian was Gabriel 
Hanotaux. His history is "Historie Illustrie de la guerre de 1914" 
(Paris 1914-1924) IX, 56. Hanotaux does not give either the time of this 
oonversation or the identity of the Amari oan. But in the prefaoe which 
Hanotaux oontribut'ed to the volume by James Brown Scott, Robert Bacon: 
Life ~ Letters (New York, 1923) page XVIII, he repeats the conversation, 
26 
giving Baoon as its author and placing the oonversation early in 1915. 
The 100,000,000 appears to have beoome the "happy hunting ground" of 
propagandists of every desoription. 
On September 10, 1914, Sir Edward Grey wrote to Ex-President Roosevelt 
as fo 11ows: 
25 Squires, 42-43 
26 Ibid." 43. 
.' My dear Roosevelt: J.M. Barrie and A.E.W. Mason, some of whose 
books you have no doubt read, are gQing to the United States. 
Their ob jeot is, I understand, not to ake speeohes or give 
leotures, but to meet people, partioularly those oonneoted with 
Universities, and explain the British oase as regards this war 
and our view of the issues involved. 
In case you have not met them before, I 
wish to tell you that I am sure you would like them, and find 
them interesting-~ I have asked Spring Rice to give them letters 
of introduotion to you. 
27 
E. Grey 
Ex-President Roosevelt answered on Ootober 3, 1914. This was not 
long af'ter PresideIXt; Wilson had called for neutrality of thought as well 
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as of aotion. To make a mild comment at this point, it would be diffioult 
to claim striot neutrality for the following letter: 
My dear Grey. -
Thir~ East Forty Second Street 
New York Ci~ 
October 3, 1914 
I have just reoeived your letter, and have 
immediately asked Barrie and Mason to lunohwith me. 
I am in opposition to the Administration and 
to say how I myself would have acted, when I am not in power 
and when the aotion I would have take is the reverse of tlat 
whioh the present Administration takes would do harm. and not 
good. This is espeoially so beoause the bulk of our people do 
not understand foreign politios, and have no idea about any 
impending military danger. When I was president, I really 
sucoeeded in eduoating them to a fairly good understanding 
of these matters, and I believe tlat if I had been president 
at the outset of this war they would have aoquiesoed in my 
taking the stand I most assuredly would have taken as the 
head of a signatory natLon of the Hague Treaties in referenoe 
to the violation of Belgium neutrality •••• 
28 
Theodore Roosevelt 
British authors inoluding Kipling, Galsworthy, Hardy, Masefield and 
2~ Gre.y of Fallodon, 143-144 
28 ~., 144-145. 
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Barrie, who came to visit us, united in a statement showing the righteous-
ness of the Allied cause and its vital import to the world. One hundred 
and fifty British professors exchanged literary volleys with thirty four 
GerllBn dignitaries. Forty-five British artists and art lovers were pitted 
29 
against ninety six German professors of art and science. 
At a dinner given by the Pilgrim Society in New York to Sir Walter 
Raleigh and Alfred Noyes, the ]a tter solemnly warned his hearers that 
Germany was contemplating establishing colonies in South America in contra-
vention of the Monroe Dootrine. Noyes told his hearers tmt he had in his 
pooket an atlas published in Gernany which contained a map of South 
.America with twenty five or thh'ty places marked in red as German colonies. 3 
On February 9, 1917, Representative Callaway inserted in the House 
Record, with unanimous oonsent of tile members the following report of 
Mr. Moore of Pennsylvania: 
In March, 1915, the J.P. Morgan interests, the steel 
shipbuilding and powder interests and their subsidiary organi-
zations got together twelve an high up in the newspaper world 
and employed them to select the most influential numbers of 
them to control generally the policy of the daily press in the 
United States. 
These twelve men worked the problem out by seleoting 
179 newspapers, and then began by an elimination process to 
retain only those necessary for the purpose of controlling the 
general policy of the daily press throughout the country. 
They found it was only neoessary to purchase the control of 
twenty five of the greatest papers. The twenty five papers 
were agreed upon; emissaries were sent to purChase the policy, 
national and international, of these ~pers J an agreement was 
reached; the policy of the papers was bought to be paid for 
by the month J an editor was furnished for each paper to 
properly supervise and edit information regarding the question 
of preparedness, militariSm, financial policies and other things 
of national and internatioml nature considered vital to the 
interests of the purchasers. 
29 Sullivan, 65-67 
30 Millis, 184 
This contract is in existeme at the present time, am 
it aoool.Ults for the news columns of the daily press of the 
country being filled with all sorts of preparedness arguments 
and misrepresentations as to the present condition of ~he 
United States amy and navy, and the possibility and probability 
of the United States being attacked by a foreign foe. 
This policy also included the sUPRlession of everything 
in opposition to the interests served •••• 
The firm of J.P. Morgan COInJ;a ny never olaimed to be neutral. It 
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aoted as the purohasing agent and chief banker for the British governmen~~ 
There is no complaint to be made of them. The government had the power to 
curb their activities when they showed the trend they proposed to take. 
Our Ambassador in Great Britain openly avowed his belief in the 
Allied oause and of him the British Foreign Secretary wrote as follows: 
From the first he considered that the United States 
could be brought; into the war early on the side of the 
Allies if the issue s were rightly presented to it 8lld a 
great appeal made by the President. Whether he 1'l8.S right in 
that opinion does not matter now. What does matter is that 
his record stands, and will stand, as a oonspicuous example 
of the highest ~pe of patriotism - that patriotism whioh is 
not only love of onets oountry, but belief in it. 
The foroes that made for dangerous trouble between 
Britain and the United States were often formidable in the 
first two years of the war. Page was eamest and aotive in 
advioe to us and by all persuasion and influenoe that he oould 
use at Washington, to counteraot and foil these foroes. The 
comfort, support and enoouragement that his presenoe was to 
the Seoretary for Foreign Affairs in London nay be imagined 
but cannot be overestimated.33 
With one of the most powerful banking institutions in our oountry to 
lead the financial interests in the Allied Channels, with his Ambassador 
openly hostile to the neutralitywhioh he had deolared, and with the trade 
directed into the ohannels of 1IB.r supplies, the hope for neutrality grew 
dim. There was no neutrality about the munitions group that had been ably 
31 Congressional Reoord, 64 Cong., 2 sess., Vol. 54, 2947-2948. 
32 Senate Res. 206, No. 944, Part 5, 75. 
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pointed out by George H. Perris of London. The statement was made at a 
Peaoe Conference at the Hague shortly before the war. The firm in question 
later beoame the celebrated "Viokers and Armstrong." The statement of 
Perris fo 110w8 : 
I will take tile case of Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth 
and oompany, as a sample of the patriotism of these traders' 
firms. The chairman is ahe Sir Andrew Noble, and I beg you 
to note the imparti ali ty of his pa tri otism. He is a baronet, 
and a knight co:mma.nder of the Bath of Great Britain, a member 
of the Order of Jesus Christ of Portugal, and a knight of the 
Order of Charles the Third of SJ;8 in. He is also a first olass 
of the Saored Treasury of Japan, a grand oross of the Crown of 
Italy, and is deoorated with Turkish and Chilean and Brazilian 
honours. His patriotism is truly the large patriotism. But 
unlike our patriotism it has a striot cash basis. Messrs. 
Armstrong will build warships for any country in the world; 
they are quite impartial.34 
The wri ter hopes tha t the large patriotism of the gentleman, above 
desoribed, Which transcended nationality, religion or raoe may be exeroised 
by the peoples whose hates are aroused only 1» destroy themselves. If the 
munition maker's patriotism is on a cash basis only, let us put ours on 
a common sense basis only. 
The claim is ade that as soon as the war broke out, Sir Gilbert 
Parker seized the reins of British propaganda in the United States. The 
statement is rather contusing, as it refers only 1» his work in England 
whioh was the development of an unheard of American correspondenoe and the 
arrangement of interviews for American newspaper men with suoh figures as 
Lloyd George, Visoount Grey, Balfour, Bonar Law, the Archbishop of Canter-
bury, Sir Edward Carson, lDrd Robert Ceoil, Austen Chaniberlain, Lord Cromer, 
Lord Curzon, lDrd Gladstone, Lord Haldane, Henry James, John Redmond, 
33 Grey of lallodon, 101-102 
34 Seldes, 25. 
.' Mr. Selfridge, the Department store king, Israel Zangwell, Mrs. Humphry 
35 
Ward, and fully a hundred others. 
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Another department of British propaganda was to supply 360 newspapers 
in the United States with an English newspaperwhioh gave a weekly review 
and oomment on the affairs of the war. It established oontaots with the 
man on the street through moving piotures of the army and navy. Sir 
Gilbert oultivated the article and the pamphlet. He made a point of 8end-
ing letters to the editor in reply to individual Amerioan critios. These 
letters were printed in the Ohief newspapers in the oities inwhioh the 
36 
oritios lived and were frequently oopied elsewhere. 
Sir Gilbert enlisted the cooperation of the Sooiety of Pilgrims. He 
helped to establish the Amerioan Offioers Club in an aristooratio mansion 
in London. This olub was under the auspioes of the Duke of Connaught. It 
was Sir Gilbert Parker who was instrumental in assuring the suooess of the 
Honorable James :M. Beok's pilgrinage to England in 1916. Beok went with 
the avowed objeot of working for unity between the United States and England. 
Ten years after the war olosed Sir Gilbert Parker stated that every penny 
of this expense was paid. by the British government exoept the oontributions 
37 
reoeived from the Amer ioans • 
James Montgomery Beok was a oongressman from the first Pennsylvania 
Distriot - he filled the unexpired ter.m of James M. Hazlitt and was re-
ele oted to the 71 and 72 Congress. In 1914, he wrote a book entitled 
"The Evidenoe in the Case." The book was pro-ally, as was his next Tolume 
35 Viereok, 127 
36 Ibid., 127-128 
37 mer., 128-129. 
-
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"War and Humanity," which he put upon the lI8.rDt in 1916. It was dur¥g 
1916 that be visited England. He was entertained royally while abroad and 
was ma.de an Honorable Benoher, Greys Inn in England and Officer of the 
Legion of Honor in France. Loyola University conferred the degree of LL.D. 
38 
on him in 1931. 
Beck's book, "The Evidence in the Case," passed through twelve editions 
within the year. It purported to be a careful examination of all the 
evidence and resulted in an overwhelming verdict of war guilt against 
39 
Germany. 
Sir Gilbert Parker did not come to the United States until early in 
1917. It was during this time that Sir William Wiseman carried on quietly 
in the United States. The referellOes are scant but they shOW' a very close 
40 
connection between ourselves and England. 
Sir William Wiseman regarded his work during 1914-1917 as counter-
propagama or unoffioial propaganda. Unofficial activites are at times 
more important than offioial activities. 11' Colol3el House was the unoffici 
Seoretary of State, Sir William WiseDlln was the secret Ambassador of Great 
Britain. Both House and Wisemn had the key tn the White House and both 
consulted almost dai ly in 1917. A private wire ran from the study of 
Colonel Hous e to the State Department: and all House had to do was to lift 
the reoeiver and he could communicate with Mr~ Polk, the Counsellor for the 
State DepartIMnt. In one of Lord Northcliff's flying visits to the United 
States, he cabled Winstnn Churchill as :follows: "Sir William Wiseman is the 
38 A.N. Marquis. Who's Who in America. A.N. Marquis Company, Chicago, 
1932, Vol. 7, m-
39 Squires, 68-69 
4:0 ~., 66 
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.' only person who has access to Wilson and House at all times. He had an. 
hour and a half with Wilson last week and a day with House. The adminis-
tration is entirely run by these two mem. Wilson's power is absolute 8lld 
41 
House is a wise assistant. Both are pro-English." 
The two letters which fbllaw are offered without comment. 
New York, January 23, 1911 
Dear Govern or : 
The echoes of the speech sound inoreasingly good. 
The Manchester Guardian, so tar, has the best comm.ent and 
warns the British Government in no unoertain terms. 
Hoover was with ne again today, and I extraoted 
this suggestion from him which seems worth consideration. 
It is 1:ha t the next move should be to ask each of the 
belligerent governments whether they agree to the prinoiples 
la id down in your s peeoh. If not to whe. t do they object? 
If they agree then it is well within your province to ask them 
to meet in conferenoe. 
Sir William Wiseman has not returned from Washington 
as he thought it best to remain there today in order to get 
the full opinion of the Allied group. 
Whitehouse (A BritiSh liberal M.P.) is tremendously 
pleased. 
Yours affectionately 
42 E.M. House 
On Janua~ 25, 1917, Colonel House wrote to the President again: 
New York, January 25, 1917 
Dear Governor: 
Wiseman brought a depressing story from Washington. 
He said tilat on the surface 8lld offioia1ly your address was 
aooepted with oordiality, but that underneath there was a deep 
teeling of resentment. The underlying feeling was that you 
41 Viereck, 125-126 
42 Seymour, The Intimate Papers ~ Colonel House, 419. 
were making a proposal to enforoe arbitration in the future 
while the Allies were giving up both blood and treasure now 
for the same purpose. If Germny had arbitrated as Grey 
demanded, this war could not have happened. Ger:uany refused, 
and the Allies are doing exactly what you suggested should be 
done in the future: that sinoe they are doing how what you 
suggest for the future, we should have more sympathy in their 
present undertaking. They oonsider it "inoonsistent tor us to 
want to let Ger.many go free from punishment tor breaking the 
very rules we wish to lay down for the future. 
He says 1his is the consensus of the Allied view at 
Washington. 
Wisemn's individual view is 'that in pressi~ the 
Allies too hard for peaoe, at this time you will be doing 
the cause of Dsnoc racy harm. He asserts every belligerent 
govemment is now in the hands of the reactionaries and umst 
necessarily be in their hands when the war ends. He believes 
if 11'8 are not oarefUl we will findtha t these foroes in the 
belligerent Governments will all oome together when peaoe is 
made, and it is not at all unlikely that their conoentrated 
ha te for Democracy will be centered upon this oountry. 
Peace, he says, must oome first, and then a plan to 
enforce arbitration afterwards. He thinks it is possible 
that after peaoe is signed, and before the arbitration agreement 
is made, the reactiomry forces might refuse to go into any 
league fo r future peaoe and make S OIlle pretext to turn upon us 
in order to save autooracy. 
This seeIIB to be a remote contingency, but nevertheless 
if I were you I would speed up the army and mvy plans as a 
lIB. tter of preoaution. 
We are in deep and troubled waters, but I have an 
abiding faith in the ultimate good that will oome from your 
noble effort. 
Your affeotiona~e 
43 
E.M. House 
168 
In an effort to be a tair and impartial recorder of the Diplomatio 
events and the results which tlowed trom the events, I insert the following 
portion of a persoml letter from Colonel House. It is his statement and 
43 Seymour, ~ Inti:mte Papers 2!. Colonel House, 420-421 
.' the only one whioh has any bearing on the material in this paper. 
My dear Miss Pyne: 
Manohester, Massaohusetts 
August 2, 1955 
If you will read the Inbimate Papers of 
Colonel House by Professor Charles Seymour, you 19'111 trnd 
that he treats all suoh matters in detail, and you will 
have the answers you desire~ 
With all good wishes 
Sincerely yours, 
44 
C .M. Hous e 
The summer of 1916 was olouded by the Rebellion in Ireland and the 
execution of Irish political prisoners. The United States Senate had 
169 
adopted a resolution asking for clemency for Sir Roger Casement therefore 
the question beol!UJl!l a diplomatic one. The Foreign Relations of 1916 
contain the following correspondence. 
In the Senate of the United States July 29, 1916: 
Resolved, That the Senate express the hope that the 
British government may exercise clemenoy in the treatment 
of Irish political prisoners; and that the President be 
requested to transmit this resolution to the government. 
On August 2, 1916, the following appears in the Foreign Relations: 
Aoting Secretary of State to Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) 
(Telegram, Washington, August 2, lP .M.) 
3606. Please transmit textually 1l> Foreign Office the following 
resolution: 
In the Senate of the United States, July 29, 1916 
Resolved, That the Semte express the hope that the British 
government may exercise clemency in the treatment of Irish 
political prisoners; and that the President be requested to 
transmit this resolution to that government. 
45 
Polk 
44 A pe rsonal letter from Col. Hous e. 
45 F.R. 1916 Supp. 870, Doc. No. 841.00/20 
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.' At the bottom of the rage ooours the following notation: "The resolu-
46 
tion was reoeived from the White House August 2, 1916 after 11 A.M." 
Telegram) Washington, August 2, 1916, 5 P.M. 
3608 Departments 3606 August 2. Please report immediately if Sem te 
Resolution presented to Foreign Offioe, and also any further details on 
Casement Case. 
47 
f101k 
Charge' in Great Britain (Laughlin) to Seoretary of state (Telegram) 
London, August 3, 1916, 4 P.M. (Reo'd. 3:40) 4654. Your 3608 August 
2, 5 P.M. I delivered to Lord Grey today your 3606 whioh reaohed me this 
morning. lie did not promise an answer but said he 'WOuld oommunicate the 
Senate Resolution to the Prime Minister and probably lay it before the 
oabinet. 
Casement was executed early this morning. 
48 
Amerioan Embassy 
On August 28, 1916, Grey of tile Foreign Offioe wrote 1x> House: 
London,August 28,1916 
Dear Colonel House: 
I hope the United States 'Will 1lIlke it clear that 
in all questions of Intermtional Law taken up by them, it il 
the merit of the question and not the unpopularity of Great 
Britain or Anti British feeling that is the motive of foroe. 
We are not favorably impressed by the aotion of 
the Senate in having passed a resolution about the Irish 
prisoners though they bave taken no notioe of the outrages 
in Belgium and massacres of Armenians. These latter were 
outrageous and unprovoked, whereas the only unprovoked thing 
in the reoent Irish affairs was the rising itself which for 
a f_ days was a flU"midable danger. I enolose a short summary 
46 F.R. 1916 Supp. 870, Doc. No. 841.00/20 
47 Ibid. 870 48 Ibid., 871, Doo.No. 841.00/21 
that was drawn up here as relevant to the Senate resolution 
though we have not yet sent it to the President. The natural 
question on the action of the Senate is. it humanity is their 
motive. why do they ignore the real outrages in Belgium? 
Sincerely yours, 
49 
Grey ot Fallodon 
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Wilbur Forrest tells of the anxiety ot the British Government to get 
their side ot the Irish trouble to the United States. The Admiralty in 
London tound out that two AIrer ican correspondents were in Holyhead denand-
ing navy transportation to the Emerald Isle, the British naval authorities 
said: 
What an excellent chance\ Let us send down all the 
American correspondents to Ireland. The United States is 
not in the war. and there are millions ot Irish AlDer icans 
whose sympathies will be with the Sein Feiners. It is 
essential to get the Briti sh point ot view over to the 
Americans who are not ot Irish extraction and the more 
American correspondents get to Dublin, the greater weight will 
the British viewpoint have in the United States. 
Forthwith the Admiralty began to ~e1ephone every American 
oorrespondent within reaoh. Nine out ot ten agreed to go. 
Captain Butler was in oharge. The party oonsisted ot twenty 
persons, including Augustus Birrell, the British Cabinet's 
Secretary tor Ireland. They weBS taken trom Holyhead to 
Ireland on a British Destroyer. 
Forrest sat in the High Court ot Justice in Fleet Street in London 
while Sir Roger was tried tor high treason. He heard the Lord Chiet Justioe 
proclaim Casement guilty and sentence him to be hanged with a silken cord. 
an honor which the British law allows titled persons at their exeoution. 
Sir Roger oomp1ained in a voice as oalm as it might have been at an atter-
noon tea. He objected to oonviotion under a statute eight hundred years old 
Forrest sat a tew teet trom him and prepared a minute description. The 
49 Seymour, The Intimate Papers ot Colonel Hous e, 317-318 
50 Wilbur Fo'i=re'st, Behind the Fr~t Pa e. D. Appleton-Cenbury Co.NewYork,52-
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.' Brit ish censor declined to pass it. Forrest's message never reached New 
51 
York. 
There 'Was a strange blend of pure Americanism in Page whioh at times 
overshadowed his intense pro-English feeling. On August 1, 1916, he records 
the following memorandum: 
I lunched with Mr. Asquith •••• He showed a very 
eager interest in the President's campaign, and he 
confessed that he felt some anxiety about the Anti-British 
feeling in the United States. This led him to tell lD9 
that he could not in good conscience interfere with Case-
ment's execution, in spite of the shoals of telegrams that 
he was receiving from the United States. Then he asked lD9 
about Mexioo, as he usually does when I talk with him •. I 
gave him as good a report as I oould, remindin~ him of the 
great change in attitude of all Latin .America oaused by 
the President's patient polioy with Mexico. When he said 
'Mexioo is a bad problem,' I couldn't resist the impulse 
to reply: 'When Mexico troub les you, think of Ireland.' 
Ireland and Mexioo have each given trouble for two 
oenturies .52 
The sands were running low in the glass of A.nl9rioan neutrality when 
Sir Gilbert Parker came to us in January of 1917. Sir Gilbert tells the 
story himself as fbllaws: 
"Permps here I may be permitted to say a few words oonoerning my ovm. 
work sinoe the beginning of the war. It is in a way a story by itself but 
I feel justified in writ:Lng one or two paragraphs about it. Practioally 
since the day that war broke out between England and the Cenbral Powers I 
became responsible for .Am.erican publicity. I need hardly say tmt the 
soope of my department was very extensive and its aotivities widely ranged:; 
51 Forrest, 64-65 
52 Hendriok, Vol.2, 168-169 
53 Sir Gilbert Parker, "The United States and the War." Harper's Monbh1,l 
Magazine, Vol. 136, 521-530 (Deoember 1917 to May 191a) 
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Since 1914, the Amer io an people through their Press whioh had beoome 
54 
a fo~dable power for moulding publio opinion to suit national poli~: 
by personal appeal as noted in our Ambassador; by books and pamphlets; and 
by oinema and radio, were led to the slaughter. 
Farther on in his artiole Sir Gilbert Parker sets up the paragraph 
whioh reveals so muoh and hurts so deeply. 
I had been in Amerioa throu~ all these months of 
developing purpose and sentiment and I had seen a whole 
people, who in January last had appeared to have grawn 
indifferent to horror, suddenly amalgamate the~elves, 
strip themselves of levity and indifferenoe and the dangerous 
and ins idious security 0 f P tRoe, into a great fighting foroe 
whioh is not the less a fighting foroe beoause down \Ulder-
neath everything in the United States is a love of peaoe and 
devotion ~ the aoquisition ~ wealth .55 
Just possibly Sir Gilbert's oontaots had given him an insight into a 
olass of Amerioans whose ignoble purposes are no more representative of the 
great body of Americans than would a like group be representative of the 
great hordes of Englishman. 
There is not to be found in the whole panorama of modern history a 
more perfeot example of a great and powerful nation being used as a oat's 
paw. When we fillll1ly went into the war in a military sense, after being in 
it all along in an eoonomic sense, the Allied ohestnuts were burned to a 
orisp and of course, every one knows that the .Amer ioan paw was badly 
56 
singed in pulling them out. 
54 A.L. Kennedy, M.C. Old Diplomaoy and New, ~-l922. D. Appleton and 
Company, New York;' 1923, 194.--
55 Parker, 523 
56 Woodward, 129g130 
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.' The English had one inestimable advantage in the battle of propaganda. 
They spoke our 3.anguage. They could travel beside us in the crowd and pass 
as Americans. They controlled the news centers of the world. The common 
bond of language was the nagic touch. From this bond ran the spoken and 
written appeal that touched the heart of the world's greatest democracy. 
When we read theu- poetic appeals, the propaganda was covered by 
the sense of right and justice which it carried. Robert Bridgis, the Poet 
Laureate ot England, wrote in "Wake Up, England:" 
Up careless, awaket 
Ye peacemaker's, fightt 
England s tams tor Honour: 
God detend the rightt57 
Laurence Benyon contributed "The Fourth ot August." The appeal ot 
this poem is great atter twenty years ot disillusionment. 
Now in thy splendour go betore us, 
Spirit of England, ardent-eyedt 
Enkindle this dear earth that bore us, 
In the hour of peril purified. 
For us the glorious dead bave striven; 
They battled that 'We might be tree. 
We to that living cause are giving, 
We arm for men that are to be. 58 
Alfred Noyes who carried the Atlas, marked in red, to shaar the 
German colonies established in South America when he visited the United 
57 Poems of the Great War. Published on behalf ot the Prince of Wale's 
National Reliet Fund, Chatto and Windus,London.1914,8 
1715 
.' States, voioed his emotions in "The United Front." 
I t is God's answer. Though fo r many a year, 
This lard forgot the faith that mde her great, 
Now, as her fleets oast off the North Sea fOl£111, 
Casting aside all faotion and all fear, 
Thrioe armed in all the majesty of her fate, 
59 
Bri tain remembers, ard her sword s trikes home. 
The spirit of Drake and other English pirates and buooaneers is in 
the poem by R.E. Vernede's "England to the Sea:" 
Hearken, 0 Mother, hearken to thy daughtert 
Fain would I tell thee what men tell to me, 
Saying that I henoeforth no more or any water 
Sball I be first or great or loved or free. 
Wherefore, 0 Sea, I stand thus before thee 
Stretch forth my hands unix> thy surge and say: 
"When they come forth who seek their empire 0' er thee;,,; 
And I go forth to meet them - on that day. 
God grant to us the old Armada weather, 
The winds that rip, the heavens that stoop and lour 
Not till the Sea. and England sink together, 
60 
Shall they be masterst Let them boast that hour~ 
58 (oontinued from p.174) Poems of the Great War. Published on behalf of 
the Prinoe of Wales' National Relief Bund, Chatto and Windus, London, 
1914, 13-14. 
59 Ibid., 15-17. 
60 Ibid., 18-20. 
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.' John Drinkwater contributed "We Willed It Not" in which he voices the 
peaoeful pursuits of England and states the quarrel had been thrust upon 
her. G.K. Chesterton set up the position of England in "The Wife of 
Flander:s" as follows: 
How should I pay for one poor graven steeple 
WhEreon you shattered what you shall now mow? 
How should I pay you miserable people. 
How should I p~ you everything you owe? 
Unhappy, can I give you baok your honor? 
Though I forgave, would any nan forget? 
While all the great green land has trampled on her 
61 
The treason and the terror of the night we met. 
All the trade dispute between England and the United States is 
voioed in the verses of the poem which follows. The floating mines, the 
Orders in Council, the trade agreements, all flowed from this aotion "The 
Hour" by James Bernard Fagan: 
We've shut the gates by Dover Straits, 
And North Where the tides run free, 
Cheek by jowl, our watchdog's prowl, 
Grey hulks in a greyer sea. 
And the prayer that England prays tonight -
o Lord of our destinyt 
As the foam of our plunging prows is white; 
We have swod for peace and we war for right, 
62 
God give us viotory\ 
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.' Strange to say; it was Kipling who struok the note dear, to Catholioity 
the world over, in his "Hymn Before Action." Humble and tender were the 
words of the old warrior poet, with a mute appeal to the broken hearts of 
the womanhood who waited: 
Aht Mary, pierced with sorrow, 
Remember, reach and save 
The soul that comes tomorrow 
Before the God that gave; 
Since each was bom of woman, 
For each at utter need -
True oomrade and true foeman -
83 
Madonna, interoede\ 
There was another group of English poets. They sang another BOng; 
a song which explained the eoonomic tie up with the military glory. The 
daily papers announced that the shares of the Bethlehem. Steel Company had 
risen rapidly in consequeme ot the war, and W.N. Ewer wrote "Bethlehem" 
A.D.l 
Seraphs hymn the Saviour's birth: 
Over the llB.nger hangs a gem, 
A pmedge ot peace to all the earth, 
The risen star of Bethlehem. 
61 Poems of the Great War, 23-24 
62 Ibid., 21-22 
63 l'6I<r., 37-38. 
A. D. 1915 
Mars and Mammon laugh to see 
Over the ruin wrought by them, 
The symbol of' their sovereignty 
64 
The risen shares of' Bethlehem. 
Lord Northcliff'e arrived here in 1917. England awed the private 
bankers of' America $400,,000,,000. She was unable to pay this except with 
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American /lid. It was neoessary to oonoiliate American publio opinion with 
the idea of' f'inanoing the British Empire. The lords of' British propaganda 
thought Amerioa underestimated England's saorif'ioes. 
Northcliff'e oabled Balfour: "You may rely on me never to use minatory 
language. I have been dealing with these people for thirty years. Nothing 
can be gained here by threats, much by flattery and self' abnegation.15 
Northcliffe endeavored to see Ford but Ford put him off. Northcliffe 
wrote as follows: "It may be necessary for me to gp to Detroit and eat 
humble pie" and if so" I will do so gladly. Ford is entirely indifferent to 
financial consideration." 
The two lII!9n met. Ford is charmed. "Ford" says Northcliffe, with 
unoanny intuition, ~ho looks like the Bishop of. London, is an anti-mili-
tarist" an ascetic, and must not be treated as a oommeroial man." North-
oliff'e advised the Prime Minister to be cinematographed with the Ford 
Traotor" because he knows Ford will appreciate the oompliment. Northcliffe 
ordered a oopy of Cabbet's Rural Rides and one of Tennyson's Letters sent 
to Ford. Northoliffe cabled, with equal shrewdness, to "Please send the 
64 Bertram Lloyd, An AnthOlo§y:poems Written During the Great War. G.Allen 
and Unwin, London, 191 , 39 --
65 Viereck 140-141. 
66 
books direotly to him in Detroit with my compliments." 
The sands are out. One by one they fell, unseen and um ttended. 
The slight modifioation of the Deolaration of London, the mine fields of 
the North Sea, the Orders in Counoil, the blookade, the sea lanes, the 
oontrolled trade, the ory of the neutral world for help, the vast loans, 
the ooldly oaloulated propaganda that plumbed our every strength and 
weakness. 
The Man, who on an August day in 1914, had oalled for a neutrality 
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of thought a s w~ll as of deed, on an April morning in 1917, oalled for the 
same nation to follow him in war "tor God helping him he oould do no 
other," What of him? 
66 Viereok, 141-142 
WoodrOW' Wilson was pro-English. On that point we may all agree. 
Here the writer departs from the beaten pain and sets up the following 
qualifioations. The England that Wilson had in mind was an intellectual 
England. The home of a race of men who had produced Mills, Burke, Bright, 
Cobden, Bagehot and. Gladswne, Shakespeare and Wordsworth. It was the 
country Whose tradition and greatness had been developed in his home. 
The England tha. t Wilson faced was the England that had forced a 
government on Egypt, India and Africa, it was the England. tha. t had beoome 
the finanoial oenter of the world; the England that was mistress of the 
sea lanes of all the oceans, the country that had developedthe most power-
ful school of propaganda in the world. 
Wilson was a slow 1:hinker. He admitted that he had a greater sense 
of power when deal ing with men oollectively than singly. Singly he felt 
a saorifioe of pride. Collectively he possessed a matohless Skill. He 
had ideas Which touched the hearts of the people. Those ideas were not of 
recent development. He had carried them with him from boyhood. He 
intended that America should return to the spirit of the Constitution. 
Like Thomas Jefferson be believed that the people were reasonable human 
beings J 1:hat right and justice must triumph in the end. 
Wilson hated war. He never intended that this oourrl;ry should enter 
the war. Nei theE' did he intend that German militarism should rule in 
Europe. Wilson intended to foroe a peace between the exhuasted belligerents. 
180 
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.' He intended to come in as a powerful neutral and set up a peace without 
"!;ictorious terms. The League of' Nati ons was to enforce that peace. 
England wanted a victorious peace forced on the Central Powers and a 
League of Nations to forever mforce its terms. 
Wilson could assume a. position and refuse to bldge, but he had no 
other mode of defense, and it needed as a rule, but little maneuvering by 
his opponents to prevent matters from coming to a climax. By pleasantries 
and an appearance of conoiliation, Wilson was maneuvered off his ground 
and missed the great moment of opportunity_ 
On April 6, 1917, he faced two problems that demanded an instant 
answer: (1) He could remain a neutral. Result: utter collapse of the 
Allies; am with them the trade and finance of the United States; also 
Wilson's chance to appear as a member of the Peaoe Conference, for a 
victorious Entente would make hilt partioipation in peaoe parleys impossible. 
(2) He could join the Allies. Result - The Geman Military Government 
would be destroyed. The war would be prolonged, but Wilson would be a 
member of the Peaoe Conferenoe on equal terms with the rest of the Allies. 
Ironies: 
1) Wilson did not want to enter the war. 
2) The Allies did not want him in the Peaoe Conferenoe as a neutral. 
3) Wilson wanted to stop the war and if he entered it the war would 
be prolonged. 
4) Wilson wanted to lead the neutrals in the Peaoe Conference, but 
step by step he had been Skillfully maneuvered out of his position 
by the present reality of the Englland of his dreams, and the 
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.' oooperation ot Amerioans who oared more tor "gold" than tor
the oountry ot their birth or the lives ot the young manhood 
ot Amerioa. 
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Vol.5, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1935, oalm judioious treatment 
of the mterial with little oODlllent. 
3 - Autobiographies 
Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. 2 Vol. Houghton 
Mifflin Company, New York, 1926. car81'u11y written, the writer teels 
tha t Colonel House was pro-English but there is a skillful oonoealment 
of the taot. Andrel"Tardieu, France and Amerioa - Some Experienoes in 
Cooperation. Houghton' Mifflin Company:- BosiDn, 19~Visoount Greyof 
Fa110dOn, k.G., Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, 2 Vol., Frederiok A. 
Stokes Company, New York,"T929. A oareful summary of diplomatio 
me. terial. Not antagonistio to .AIDer ioa. 
4 - War Memoirs 
David Lloyd George. War Memoirs., 4 Vol., Little,Brown and Company, 
Boston, 1934:. Vol.2 used. Rather ori tioal of Amerioa's attitude in 
the war. Trade was the di sputed quas t:l. on. Robert Lansing, Seoretary 
ot State, War Memoirs. Bobbs-Merril,.l Company, New York, 1935. The 
material presented at the beginnin£ of the war striotly neutral but 
dri ted to the ro-All oin~ of view. 
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5 - Policies .' 
James Brown Soott, President Wilson's Foreign poliC~. Messages, 
Addresses, Papers. Oxford University Press, New Yor , 1918. Probably 
the most soholarly presentation used. Professor Brown studied at 
Harvard, Barl in, Heidelberg and Paris. Edgar E. Robinson and Victor 
J. West, The Foreign Polioy of Woodrow Wilson 1913-1917. The Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1917. A set up of ihe problems, principles and 
decisions of President Wilson. Roy Stannard Baker and William E.Dodd, 
The New Democrac~-presidential Messages, Addresses and Other papers -
19l3-::r9l7. 2 Vo ., Harper and Brothers, New York, 1926. A clear 
picture of Wilson's efforts to do that which was right and just. 
6 - Conferences 
James Brown. Scott, The Deolaration of London. Oxford University 
Press, New York. ThIS is a collectIOn or o1'ficial papers and 
documents relating w the International Naval Conference held in 
London, December 1908, to February 1909. The introduotion is by 
Elihu Root. 
7 - Magazine s 
American Journal of International Law. Vol. 9, 1915, Baker, Voorhis 
ana Compe.ny, New York. The EdItor""Tii' Chief was James Brown Soott. 
Among the members of the Board ot Editors were Charles Cheney, Hyde, 
Robert Lansing, and John Bassett Moore. Harpers Monthly Magazine, 
Vol. 136, Deo. 1917 to May 1918, Harper and Brothers, 1916. Sir 
Gilbert Parker oontributed his oelebrated article "The United States 
and the War" 1:D this magazine. The Cornhill Magazine, Vol. 70, Jan. 
to JUD8 1931, John Murray, London, 1931. IiiEnglish publication with 
a very fine article on British propaganda. Politioal Science Quarterly 
Vol.4a, Jan. to Dec. 1925, Columbia UniversitY Press, New York, 1926. 
Parker Thomas Moon was nanaging Editor and a member of the Committee 
on Publications. Everybody's Magazine, Vol. 25, July to Dec. 1911, 
'The Ridgway Company, New York, 1911. Current Opinion, Vol. 57, July-
Deo. 1914, The Current Litera-rure PubliShing Co., New York, 1914. 
The Journal ot Intermtional Relations, Vol.12, 1911-1922, Clark 
University, Woroester, Mass. J .Fred Rippy's article explains in 
tull the fear felt by ihe Latin oountries of the possibilities in the 
Monroe Doctrine. The Independent, Vol. 75, July- Sept. 1913. The 
Independent Weekly;-Yno. New York. The article by George E. Holt 
explains how the American Consular service is a business proposition. 
Foreign Affairs An !mer lean Quarterly Review, Vol. 7, Oct. 1928-July 
1929, New York. Aii article on AnglO-American Relations by John W. 
Davis held America pu-tly responsible for the law of the sea. 
The Fortnigntly Review, Vol. 96, July to Dec. 1914, "The Courting of 
liiirica," Chipman and Hall Ltd., London, 1914. The artic le by J.D. 
Whelpley, deplored any effort on part of British to change the 
American point of view. 
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8 - Books 
Right Hon. H.II. Asquith, M.P., The Genesis ot the War. Cassell a.b.i 
Company, Ltd. London, 1923. Reiirtor EngliSh poiht"'Ot view. Right 
Hon. Arthur J. Baltour Freedom ot the Seas. Sir Joseph Cuaston and 
Sons Ltd., London, 1916. ArthuF""BUITa:rd, The DiPloma0fm0t the Great 
War, The Macmillan Company, New York, 19l8:--Fair and partial pre-
sentation ot diplomatic material. J.S. Bassett, A Short Hi8to~ ot 
The United States, 3 Vol., The Macmillan Company,-New York, 19 .-
JOhn Maurioe Clark, The Cost ot the World War to the American peotle. 
Yale Uni ver si ty Pres s,-llewHaven -:--T .P. Conwel l":'EVaii"s, For eign Po icy 
trom a Baok Benoh. Oxtord University Press, London, 1932. Presents 
interestI"iig material on liberal English point ot view. Edwin J .Clapp, 
Eoonomic ASITcts 2.! the~. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1915. 
Protessor C ppis Professor ot Eoonomics at New York University. 
Presents the best material on trade si tua tion 1914-1915. Dwight 
Lowell Dumond, Roosevelt to Roosevelt. Henry Holt and Company, New 
York, 1937. The matter inthis '&>ok is presented in a new and 
in:t;eresting anner. G.L. Dickinson, C .R. Buxton, H. SidebothBm., 
J.A. Hobson, I.C. Willis, A.M.Royden, H.N.B. Brailsford, P.Snowden M.P~ 
V.Lee, Toward A Lasting Peace. The Macmillan Company, New York,1916. 
This is a grouP of studies by English liberals. H.C. Engelbrecht,Ph.D. 
and F.C. Hanighen, Merchants ot Death. Dodd Mead and Company, New 
York, 1934. This is a olose 'ilildy of the International Armament 
Industry. Wilbur Forrest, Behind the Front Page-~ D .Appleton-Century 
Comptny, Inc., New York, 1934. ur:-P'orrest wa;-a olose triend ot 
Walter H. Page, the Amerioan Ambassador at st. James. Earnest 
Gruening, Mexico and Its Her! tafe. The Century Company, New York, 1928. 
Not sympathetic fnTtS"tTeatmen ot the Catholic question. G.P .Gooch 
Recent Revelations ot European Diplomacy. Longmans,Green and Company, 
tondon, 1927. scho'li'r1y ana lair. tm. Hacker and B.B .Kendrick, '!'he 
United States Sime 1865. F.S. Cro,;'ts am Company, New York, 1934-:--
D.F. Houston, Eig,. Yei'rs with Wilson's Cabinet. 2 Vol. Doubleday, 
Page and Company, ew York;-I'926. w. Irwin, Propaganda and the News. 
MoGraw-Hill Book Company, Ino., New York, 1934. Deals 1I'itli thS-
question of propaganda in ine United states. W .F. Johnson, George 
Harvey, ! Passionate Patriat. Houghton Mifflin Company, New York;1929. 
l.t. Kennedy, Old DiPlonal and New, 1876-1922. D.App1eton and Company, 
New York, 1923. Points ou the good tlB. t remains trom the old 
diplomacy, but points out haw the economio question dominated. 
John Maynard Keynes, C.B. The Economio Consequenoes of the Peace. 
Haroourt, Brace and Howe, New York, 1920. This conti'fnSthe finest 
interpretation ot President Wilson's nature; his strength and weakness. 
J .H. Latane, A History of .Amerioan Foreign P;iiC~. Doubleday Page and 
Company, Garden City~New York, 1927. B.Llo , oems Written During 
the Great War. G.A11en and Unwin Ltd. London, 1918. W.E.Woodward, 
A New Al'ilSrIO'an HiStory, The Literary Guild Inc., New York, 1937. 
Nonn sympathy with English point of view. Yanohester Guardian 
Histo ot the News. John Heywood Ltd., London, 1919. Recognized as 
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• the United States' hostility to war. J.B. McMaster, The United States 
in the World War, 2 Vol. D..A.ppleton and Company, New York, 1918. 
J .MOCOnaugh, W'fiO Rules Amerioa - A Century of Invisible Government. 
Longman's Green-and Company, New York, 1934:- An expose' of money 
power in America. W .Millis, Road to War 1914-1917. Houghton Mifflin 
Company, New York, 1935. Presents"the ecOiiOinic side of war. 
A.D. Noyes, The War Period of American Finance, 1908-1925. G.P. 
Putnam's SonS:- New York, lW6. The first hand 'IiifOrmation in this 
book came from Senator Carter Glass and Bernard M.Baruoh, and BenjaDdn 
Strong, Governor of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. E.O'Shaughnessy 
A Diploll'8. t' s Wife in Mexioo. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1916. 
Not triendl y toW'i'lSon' s Mexican plan. A .Pons onby, Falsehood in War 
Time. E.P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1928. Very fair in hrs-
presentation of a difficult question. Stephen and Joan Rauschenbush, 
War Madness, Natiom1 Home Library Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1937. 
:tared J .Rippy, The United States and Mexioo. Alfred A. Knopf-Inc. 
New York, 1926:--G.Seldes, Iron,~ood aDd Profits, Harper and 
Brothers, New York, 1935. '!h8econoDiicrlde of' tb8 war is treated in 
this volume. H.L.Stoddard, As I Knew Him - Presidents and Politics 
from Grant ~ CocUidge. Harper and Brothers New York, 1927. Apparently 
anti-Wilson. J .D. Squires, British Propagama at Home and In the 
United States. Harvard UniversitY Press, CaIii'brrrge;-I'9!E': A Harvard 
Historical Monograph. Very scholarly_ M.Su11ivan - Our Times - The 
United States 1900-1925, Vo1.V. Over Here 1914-1918. Cliarles 
Soribl'l8r's Son's,'New York, 1933. A newspaperDUl' s point of view. 
The Time's His to OJ' 2!. ~!!!.. The Times, Lomon, 1917. G.S. Viereck, 
'§Pr'eadiili Germs 0 Hate. Hora.ce Liverjght, London, 1930. A German 
writer. Gives f1rst"1i.ii:td information. Irene Cooper Willis, England's 
¥a1!J. War. Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1928. A study of English liberal 
e ism during the war. Who's Who in America. A.N. Marquis, 
Chicago, 1932. A biographical drctionary of notable living men and 
women of the United states, Vol. 17 used. 
